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ABSTRACT 
FOR OR AGAIST THE EU:  
DISCOURSES AROUD TURKEY’S KURDISH COFLICT 
 
Pelin Baş 
Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2011 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik 
 
 
There is a broad literature on Turkey's Kurdish Question and its European Union (EU) 
accession process. However, these studies mostly do not speak to each other nor do they link 
international actors with those of the domestic. To fill this gap, in particular, this study 
focuses on the impact of the European Union accession process on Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict 
during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the discourses of the 
domestic political actors to the requests and discourses of an international actor, namely the 
EU. Building on the effects of EU reforms on the Kurdish Question, this study argues that in 
addition to the actual progress that is reflected through the EU reforms in Turkey, the impact 
of the accession process is visible in the discourses of the political party leaders. Through 
analyzing the political discourses in Turkey between 2002 and 2010, this study demonstrates 
how the EU reforms that affect the Kurdish Question are reflected in the political discourses 
in Turkey and what affects the changes in the discourses of actors along with the variation 
over time. 
 
Keywords: Kurdish conflict, discourse analysis, EU accession process, Turkey-EU relations, 
Europeanization, conflict resolution. 
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ÖZET 
AB ĐÇĐ YA DA AB’YE KARŞI: 
TÜRKĐYE’DEKĐ KÜRT SORUU ÜZERĐE SÖYLEMLER 
 
Pelin Baş 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2011 
Danışman: Doç. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik 
 
Türkiye’nin Kürt sorunu ve Avrupa Birliği süreci üzerine geniş bir literatür 
bulunmaktadır. Fakat bu literatürdeki çalışmalar çoğunlukla birbirleriyle bağlantılı değillerdir 
ve uluslararası aktörler ile yerel aktörlerin arasında bağ kurmazlar. Bu boşluğu kapatmak için, 
bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği sürecinin AKP hükümeti döneminde Türkiye’nin Kürt sorununu 
nasıl etkilediğine bakacak ve yerel politik aktörlerin, AB’nin istek ve söylemlerine karşı nasıl 
bir söylem geliştirdiğini inceleyecektir. Bu çalışma, AB reformlarının Kürt sorununun bir 
parçası olan konulardaki etkilerine bakarak, AB reformlarının getirdiği gelişmelerin yanı sıra, 
AB giriş sürecinin etkisinin siyasi partilerin liderlerinin söylemlerinde de görünür olduğunu 
tartışmaktadır. Çalışma, 2002- 2010 yılları arasındaki Türkiye’deki siyasi söylemleri 
inceleyerek Kürt sorununu etkileyen AB reformları üzerine nasıl bir siyasi söylem 
kullanıldığını ve bu söylemlerdeki aktörden aktöre ya da zaman içerisinde oluşan 
değişikliklerin nedenlerini inceleyecektir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kürt sorunu, söylem analizi, Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, 
Avrupalılaşma, uyuşmazlık çözümü.  
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CHAPTER 1: ITRODUCTIO 
 
The history of relations between Turkey and European Union (EU) goes back a long 
way. Turkey established relations with the EU right after the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and since then, Turkey-EU relations has been like a 
rollercoaster with ups and downs. In that journey, one of the most important turning points 
came in 2005, when Turkey embarked on its accession negotiations with the EU. With the 
opening of accession negotiations, Turkey-EU relations entered into a new phase. In order to 
be a member of the EU, Turkey is required to adopt political, legal and economic reforms and 
make structural adjustments. Among these reforms, with the criticisms it received both from 
the domestic and international actors, the reforms on the Kurdish conflict have become the 
most challenging reforms for Turkey. 
Both the Kurdish Conflict and the EU membership are the issues that have dominated 
the Turkish politics over the years. However, despite the fact that the first issue was defined 
as a domestic problem and the second issue was a foreign policy objective for Turkey, these 
two issues became entangled. With its influence on the Kurdish Conflict through the reform 
process, EU became an actor in the conflict whereas through the Progress Reports of the 
European Commission, the Kurdish Conflict came to be defined as an issue that Turkey needs 
to solve peacefully to be a member of the EU. Demonstrating how this relation was 
established, how these two issues affect each other and how this relation is manifested in the 
discourses are among the objectives of this study. 
This research focuses on the impact of EU accession process on the Kurdish conflict 
and analyzes the discourses of the domestic political actors to the requests and discourses of 
an international actor, namely the EU. The research question of this study is “What are the 
main themes, strategies, and linguistic means employed by Turkish political party leaders in 
their discourses on the EU and Kurdish conflict, 2002 onwards?” In an attempt to provide an 
answer to the research question, this research analyzes the discourses of the domestic political 
party leaders on the EU accession process by focusing on the discourses on the Kurdish 
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Conflict. Apart from presenting the party positions on the relevant issues, study of the 
discourses of the political party leaders are necessary since they also reveal the power 
relations and domination. As Habermas argues, “Language is also a medium of domination 
and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. In so far as the 
legitimizations of power relations . . . are not articulated . . . language is also ideological. Here 
it is not a question of deceptions within language, but of deception with language as such” 
(1977, p. 259). The power relations, ideology and domination are especially manifested in the 
discourses of the politicians. Therefore, studying the discourses of the political party leaders 
will demonstrate the attitudes and arguments of the parties on the Kurdish conflict in relation 
to their discourses on the EU. In addition, the study of discourses will reveal how the power 
relations and certain arguments are the manifested and reconstructed through the discourses of 
the political party leaders whose speeches are influential for the masses.  
In order to analyze the discourses and answer the research question, in this study, 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and discourse-historical approach are employed to. The 
rationale behind using this particular approach is based on the distinguishing feature of the 
approach which takes the influence of the historical context on the discourses into 
consideration. Both the EU membership and the Kurdish Conflict are sensitive political issues 
and they are affected and constructed by the domestic and international political and social 
developments, therefore they can’t be analyzed by de-linking them from the historical 
context. As this study examines the discourses of the domestic political party leaders to the 
demands and critiques of the EU, to identify the EU demands from Turkey on the Kurdish 
Conflict, Progress Reports presented by European Commission between 2002 and 2010 were 
analyzed. To investigate the support and/or reaction to the EU accession process and the 
reforms, the discourses of the leaders of the political parties that hold seats in the national 
assembly between 2002 and 2010 were studied. The parties whose leaders’ speeches have 
been analyzed are AKP (Justice and Development Party), CHP (Republican People’s Party), 
MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party), DTP (Democratic 
Society Party), and BDP (Peace and Democracy Party). While all other parties were 
represented in the parliament for a time period between 2002 and 2010, because the party 
could not pass the %10 election threshold, DEHAP was not represented in the parliament. 
Still, the discourses of the party leaders of DEHAP were also included because if not, the 
political representation of the Kurdish people before to the establishment of DTP in 2005 
would be problematic. Because DEHAP, DTP, and BDP identified themselves as the 
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representatives of the Kurdish people and the discourses show consistency in time; their 
discourse are analyzed as the group of Kurdish political parties. Still, the individual 
characteristics of the parties were also paid attention.  
The significance of this study comes from the fact that even though there is a broad 
literature on Kurdish Conflict and the EU accession process, whether they are qualitative or 
quantitative, explanatory, descriptive or exploratory, these studies mostly do not speak to each 
other nor do they link international actors with those of the domestic. This study aims to fill 
this gap by looking at the EU accession process as a two-level game where the governing 
party negotiates in the international level with the EU but also needs to satisfy the domestic 
political actors in Turkey. Concentrating upon the domestic reactions to the reform process on 
the Kurdish Conflict, this study aims to present how the reform process is outplayed in the 
discourses of the party leaders. Examining the discourses on the EU and the Kurdish Conflict, 
the study contributes to the literature through the discourse historical approach which 
manifests the power relations and presents how certain arguments are played and constructed 
by the politicians in time. This study also aims to explore the reasons why even though some 
of the parties are named as pro-EU parties, they have critical position towards the reforms and 
how these critiques are presented through the discourses.  
This study is composed of five parts. Chapter 2 starts with a review of the literature 
that explains the literature on the third party intervention and the role of the European Union 
in conflicts and conflict resolution. By employing the concept of Europeanization, this chapter 
concentrates upon the literature on the domestic impacts of the Europeanization in the 
candidate countries. Because the method used in this study is discourse-historical approach 
and the effects of the historical developments are crucial to take into account, Chapter 3 
provides a brief history of Turkey-EU relations and the Kurdish Conflict and analyzes the 
milestones in the relations and in the conflict. Chapter 4 introduces the methodology used to 
answer the research question. It also explicates how the data was collected and how it was 
analyzed. Brief information about the discourse-historical approach will also be provided. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the data, elucidates the common themes, theories that possibly explain the 
rationale behind the discourses and the methods used for arguing for or against the reforms. 
Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the findings and presents the conclusion of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In this chapter I will answer the question of how the impact of third parties on the 
ethno-political conflicts and their resolution are examined in the Conflict Resolution, Political 
Science and European Studies literature. The objective of this chapter is to present the 
relevant theories which are necessary to understand the role of the EU in the Kurdish Conflict. 
To provide a comprehensive literature review, this chapter will be composed of four parts. 
The first part will be on the Conflict Resolution literature on the third party roles. The second 
part will be devoted to the role of European Union in Conflict Resolution, by examining its 
influence on member states and candidate states individually and focusing on the role of 
Europeanization which is employed as a conflict resolution mechanism by the EU. In the third 
part, domestic effects of Europeanization will be focused. The last part will be devoted to the 
conclusion of the theories that are used in the literature review. 
2.1. Third Party Intervention  
The emergence of the Conflict Resolution field goes back to the 1950s (Kriesberg, 
1997a), yet the abundance of the conflicts in the post-Cold War era, especially those in the 
former Soviet and former Yugoslavian states and post-colonial African states revealed the 
need to study ethno-political conflicts (Harff & Gurr, 1998). With the end of the Cold War, 
there have been numerous third-party interventions in conflicts. As Regan (2002) identified, 
between 1944 and 1999, 101 of 150 intrastate conflicts had third-party interventions in places 
such as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet republics, and Cambodia. Within those 
conflicts, inter-ethnic tensions have been identified as the main determinant factor (Harff& 
Gurr, 1998). Among these conflicts, the literature on the third party intervention in ethno-
political conflicts falls into the interest of this study. Thereof, in this part, I will approach the 
literature by the question of how this form of ethnopolitical conflicts and their resolution 
through third party intervention are analyzed in the literature of conflict resolution. 
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The conflict resolution literature provides us with a plethora of studies on the various 
roles third parties could play in conflicts (Horowitz 1985, Carment 1993; Gurr 1993; Gurr & 
Harff 1998; Harvey 1998; Midlarsky 1992; Gottlieb 1993; Boutros-Ghali 1992; Damrosch 
1993; Carment and James 1998, 2000; Boyce 1998). As the literature on third party 
involvement in conflicts increased, the sub-topics of the studies and perspectives also 
expanded. The most popular topics related to third parties can be identified as; the motivations 
of third parties to intervene, timing of the interventions (Druckman 1986; Zartman 1989; 
Licklider 1993; Bercovitch 1996; Kriesberg 1997b); study of third party interventions with 
game-theory models (Amegashie and Kutsoati 2007; Chang, Potter, and Sanders 2007) third 
party intervention in civil wars (Rosenau 1968; Holl 1993; Regan 1996, 2002; Zartman 1993; 
Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000), and third party roles in 
interstate conflicts (Kydd 2003; Regan & Stam 2000; Dixon 1996; Bercovitch & Regan 1999; 
Bercovitch & Diehl 1997).  
At this point, it needs to be underlined that the literature on the third parties did not 
create one single approach to examine the third party involvement; but different approaches to 
the issue. According to the studies present in the literature, the roles of the third parties vary, 
and many categorizations have been proposed by scholars for a better analysis. For example 
Sandole (2003) identifies these roles as conciliation, consultation, facilitation, pure mediation, 
power mediation, and arbitration whereas Pruitt and Rubin (1986) study these roles as formal 
vs. informal, individual vs. representative, invited vs. non-invited, impartial vs. partial, 
advisory vs. directive, inter-personal vs. intergroup, content-oriented vs. process-oriented 
goals. In her analysis, Beriker (2009) divides these third party interventions into two, as 
transformative intervention and structural intervention. Transformative intervention includes 
facilitative mediation, interactive conflict resolution, conflict resolution training and post-
conflict rehabilitation whereas structural intervention includes positive incentives, 
peacebuilding, peacekeeping, initiating bilateral cooperative programs, negative incentives, 
power mediation, and military intervention. As a commonality to all those three studies, it can 
be observed that the third parties are not only expected to terminate the violence, but also to 
promote positive peace (Galtung 1990) by eradicating structural and cultural violence and 
promoting long term reconciliation.  
Another common point that is discussed in relation to the third party roles is the issue 
of neutrality and impartiality. Young claims that ‘a high score in such areas as impartiality 
would seem to be at the heart of successful interventions in many situations’ (Young, 1967, p. 
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81) as he defines impartiality as not favoring one side over the other, having independence of 
lacking of attachment to any entity having a stake in the conflict, being unbiased, worthy of 
trust and emotionally not being attached. In addition to impartiality, the concept of neutrality 
is also frequently utilized as a determining factor of being a third party to a conflict. Walton 
(1969) conceptualizes the term neutrality, as being neutral with respect to the outcomes and 
related substantive issues. After Young’s (1967) conceptualization, the idea that the impact of 
third parties increases if they are neutral and impartial is employed in many studies (Jackson, 
1952; Northedge & Donelan, 1971; Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999) and it stands as a 
common notion in the contemporary studies on the third parties as well.  
Similar to the question on the third party roles, the question on the intervention 
strategies of the third parties does not have one answer in the literature. In their analysis, 
Regan and Stam (2000) found that the interventions in the earlier stages of a conflict are more 
effective.  One of the categorizations on the intervention strategies of third parties had been 
formed by Beriker (2009), who identified two intervention strategies. The first intervention 
strategy is related to conflict transformation and conflict prevention. The basic presumption in 
this strategy is that, causes of the conflicts are subjective; therefore methods that equip third 
parties with the necessary means to change their perceptions, attitudes and behaviors will be 
effective. These methods can be identified as problem-solving workshops (Kelman, 1979; 
Dukes, 1999; Rubenstein 1999), conflict-resolution training and education (Cheldin, 
Druckman and Fast, 2003), facilitative mediation, and post-conflict rehabilitation (Çelik and 
Rumelili, 2006; Beriker, 2009).  
The second intervention strategy is structural prevention, which is defined as 
"…involving creating organizations or institutionalized systems of laws and rules that 
establish and strengthen non-violent channels for adjudicating inter-group disputes, 
accommodating conflicting interests, and transforming conflicts by finding common ground" 
(Stern and Druckman 2000, p.6). This approach focuses on the effects of democratization, 
demilitarization, de-alignment, socio-economic development, human rights, humanitarian 
law, and socio-cultural openness as the methods to decrease the leaning towards violence 
(Clements 2002) with the idea in mind that structural changes will end up with changing the 
conflict behavior of the third parties. However, because the changes in the conflict behavior 
or the structure are very hard to achieve, as expressed by Jeong (2000) as well, “structural 
changes may not be easily or immediately achieved”. 
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The literature on the third party intervention underlines that a good intervention 
requires good analysis, good intervention process, timing and sequencing (Fisher and 
Keashley 1991; Crocker 2001; Eralp and Beriker 2005; Çelik and Rumelili 2006). It is widely 
recognized among conflict resolution scholars that a single strategy fails to bring resolution to 
the conflicts, therefore series of concurrent and consecutive strategies must be adopted (Fisher 
and Keashley 1991; Çelik and Rumelili 2006). An overview of the literature offers two main 
approaches on the process of third party intervention, and these two approaches are 
particularist approach and structural approach.  
On the one hand, the particularist approach indicated that behaviors of the parties to 
the conflict and the characteristics of the conflict should be examined. The influential factors 
in this analysis are listed as the characteristics of the third party, the conflict resolution tools 
employed, timing, sequencing of the third party actions, characteristics of the conflict (level 
of intensity, issue and stages of the conflict), and the parties to the conflict and the 
relationship between them (Kleiboer 1996; Nan, 2002; Balas, 2000).  
On the other hand, the structuralist approach argues that the environment in which the 
conflict takes place is the major influential factor on the third party intervention and thus the 
social identities, structures, culture, and institutions are the main factors that influence the 
third party intervention (Cheldin, Druckman & Fist 2003). Because the structuralist approach 
focuses on the structural causes of the conflicts, it is necessary to conceptualize the structural 
causes of the conflicts. The conceptualization proposed by Dukes (1999, p.125) identifies 
structural causes of the conflicts as “the disintegration of the community, and the meaning 
found in the civic life, citizens’ alienation from the institutions and practices of governance, 
the inability of centrally organized public institutions to resolve public conflicts”. 
In addition to the role of the third party actors and the intervention strategies that have 
been discussed so far, the relation between the conflict stage and the third party intervention 
also draws attention among the scholars. One of the pioneering works on phase-based models 
was produced by Wright (1965), namely the model of escalation, when he identified four 
stages according to the increasing actions of violence. According to this model, escalation 
proceeds through the awareness of inconsistencies, growing tensions which hinder normal 
interaction, the use of non-military pressure tactics, and to the engagement in violent 
confrontations.  
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Another stage-model is produced by Glasl (1982) who identifies nine stages of conflict 
escalation in line with the changes in perceptions, attitudes, overt behaviour and patterns of 
interaction. Then, combining these nine stages into three main phases according to the main 
shifts in cognitions and interactions, Glasl (1982) relates six common strategies to the nine 
stages. Accordingly, these strategies are identifies as moderation, process consultation, 
sociotherapeutic process con-sultation, mediation, arbitration, and power intervention. Glasl 
(1982) underlines that after adopting a strategy, achieving the appropriate results, third parties 
move to another strategy.  
Drawing upon Glasl’s research (1982), Fisher and Keashly (1991) come up with four 
stages of the conflict; discussion, polarization, segregation, and destruction whereas a 
different strategy is recommended to be followed in each phase. These strategies are; 
development of communication in discussion phase, consultation and bridging for 
polarization stage, arbitration and power mediation in segregation stage and deployment of 
peace operations at the destruction phase. Similar to Glasl (1982), Keashley and Fisher (1996, 
p. 240) argue that “different interventions are appropriate at different stages of the conflict”.  
Another model on the timing of the third party intervention belongs to Zartman (1989) 
who argues that a successful intervention should come at the point of “mutually hurting 
stalemate”, namely at the “ripe moment” of the conflict. He indicates that the third party 
intervention should come at a time when the solutions are blocked by the conflicting parties 
and they recognize that the current form of the conflict will damage them both. However, it is 
essential to note that a mutually hurting stalemate is a 'perceived' situation rather than being 
'objective', therefore even through the solution is blocked; parties still may not be willing to 
take a step towards solution.  
As frequent as the model is used in analyzing the timing of intervention for third 
parties, the 'ripeness' theory has been at the core of many debates as well (Kleiboer 1994; 
Kriesberg, 1991; Kelly & Nethery 2008; Rothstein 2007; Rubin, 1991). One of the criticisms 
underline that, instead of ripeness, the willingness of parties should be focus of the analysis 
since the willingness may bring parties around the same table (Kleiboer 1994, pp. 109, 115). 
Another criticism point out that the ripeness may imply a form of passivity which would 
suggest that third parties should wait for the right moment to arrive (Rubin, 1991, pp. 239-
240).  However, as a response to this critique, Haass argues that ripeness model doesn’t ask 
third parties to do nothing until the conditions are right, this is “politically unrealistic and 
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unsustainable” (Haass, 1988, p. 247). In addition, the third parties could also create hurting 
stalemates so that parties will be willing to come to the table and states 'ripe moment' 
therefore invites efforts to create the conditions for the 'ripe moment' (Salla, 1994). In order to 
foster emergence of ripe-moments Rubin states that analysts and/or practitioners need to look  
for  ways to create ripeness (Rubin, 1991, p.  240), and some mechanisms that can be used to 
foster that process are the use of carrots and sticks, 'information-sharing', 'inaction and waiting  
for  change',  'pie-expanding solutions', 'refraining the conflict', and the intervention of third 
parties (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).  
 As the writings on the role of third parties in the conflicts suggest the possible ways 
and time for intervention, the actors who could intervene as a third party in an effective way is 
also an interesting question for the scholars. Within the literature devoted to the roles and 
strategies of the third parties in conflicts, the idea that the regional organizations will have a 
constructive impact had been the well-discussed idea and the reason behind this is their 
familiarity with the parties of the conflict and the zone of the conflicts (Amoo & Zartman, 
1996; Peck 2001; Çelik & Rumelili, 2006). The regional organizations usually have the means 
to provide solution, shift the balance of the power, use persuasion, side payments, and broker 
ceasefires (Çelik & Rumelili 2006). Having the power of structural interventions and 
transformative interventions invested in themselves, regional organizations had influential 
roles as third parties to the conflict. Being identified as one of the most influential regional 
organizations, the role of European Union in conflict resolution has been discussed for a long 
time and in the following section, the literature on the conflict resolution mechanisms of the 
European Union will be defined. 
2.2. European Union in Conflicts 
Since 9 May 1950, the foundation of the European Union as the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) by the Schuman Declaration, the organization has been considered 
to be one of the most effective regional organizations in the world. After ECSC became the 
European Union, the borders of EU had expanded, its influence, credibility and legitimacy 
increased, and the issues of engagement mushroomed. When the Union was founded in the 
form of ECSC, it had the purpose of preventing the emergence of new wars in the European 
continent. That distinctive feature was put forward clearly in the Preamble of the treaty 
establishing the ECSC which states that the purpose of the community was “to create, by 
establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among 
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peoples long divided by blood conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will 
give direction to a destiny henceforward shared” (European Coal and Steel Community, 
1951). Therefore, after the establishment of the community, it was apparent that the European 
integration would be a fundamental factor for maintaining peace in Western Europe after 
World War II, especially by contributing to the resolution of the prolonged France-German 
conflict (Wallenstein 2002, p.33; Cole, 2001). In time, that project was transformed into a 
model that was considered to be a solution to the conflicts not only between France and 
Germany but between the nation-states of European continent (Stetter, Albert, Diez, 2004). 
Hence, because the European Union was built with the intentions of conflict transformation, 
transforming ages-long conflicting relations into cooperation and maintaining it through 
integration, from the day it was found, the conflict resolution intentions were embedded in the 
organization. 
On the matter of resolving conflicts and providing peace through EU, the earlier 
theories on the European integration claimed that the establishment of the economic relations 
between countries would have a spillover effect, and as a result, it would bring further 
cooperation in the other areas such as political and social, so that war will not be an option 
anymore (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Nye 1968). Though this 
theory has been criticized a lot (Wallace et.al. 1983; Bulmer 1986; Moravcsik 1993), the idea 
that EU has a significant role in conflict resolution remains solid. Before introducing the 
conflict resolution mechanisms of the EU, it should be noted that the EU is involved in the 
conflicts in its borders and outside its borders by employing different mechanisms. Having 
identified itself with promotion of peace, democracy, rights and law in its neighborhood 
(Manners 2002; Smith and Sjursen 2004), most of the engagements of EU took place in 
Central East European countries during the 1990s, because it was experienced that the 
existence of conflicts in the neighborhood threatens the stability and security of the 
community with the risk of spillover effects (E. Council, 2003b, p.4-5). Yet, this does not 
mean that EU’s involvement is only limited to the continent, because the EU also paid 
attention to the crises in Chechnya and Azerbaijan, conflicts in some of the African countries, 
especially in Burundi, and it also engaged in activities which attempted to raise awareness on 
the conflicts in Morocco and Angola, with the aim of preventing escalation of ethnic crises in 
all cases (Öberg, Moller & Wallensteen 2009, p.78).  
When engaging in conflicts, the main mechanisms EU uses are generally identified as 
enlargement (Christou 2002, 2004, 2010), Europeanization (Coppieters et al., 2004); 
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especially ‘compulsory’ impact’ and ‘connective impact’ of Europeanization (Diez et al., 
2006, 2008) and the use of conditionality or socialization (Tocci, 2004; Coppieters et al., 
2004). These concepts and the theories on EU involvement as a third party in the conflicts 
will be discussed in the following sections. In order to provide the necessary background to 
analyze the EU involvement in Turkey’s Kurdish conflict, while looking at the European 
Union’s engagement in conflicts, first, European Union’s role in conflict resolution will be 
examined and following this part, Europeanization as the EU’s main conflict resolution 
mechanism will be explored.  
2.2.1. European Union in Conflict Resolution  
European Union has been engaging in the conflicts outside its borders since the 1990s, 
which suggest that conflict resolution activities of the union started after that time period. Yet, 
the lack of engagement with third parties through conflict resolution mechanisms does not 
prove the lack of these mechanisms; indeed, the creation of common European institutions  
within EU could be considered as a preventive mechanism, which was intended to foster 
establishment of better relations between Western European member states  by making them 
take part in collective decision-making bodies which would result in development of a liberal 
security community (Ackermann 1994, pp. 229-250; Wallenstein 2002, p. 33). During that 
time period, it was predicted that because of spillover effect, peaceful relations would be built 
between members of the European community (Haas, 1964). This idea was supported with the 
EU employed instruments such as economic incentives, development assistance, and technical 
cooperation, which intended to foster cooperation. However, because of the challenge of 
1990s, the need to develop different mechanisms for conflict resolution was revealed, and 
after then, the EU started to adopt mechanisms to deal with the conflicts of the non-member 
states. 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia, emergence of conflicts and the genocide in Bosnia, in 
Europe’s backyard, pushed European Union to adopt more comprehensive approach for 
conflict resolution (European Parliament, 2001). As a response to the conflicts in the 
European continent, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) adopted mechanisms of conflict 
prevention and use of Special Representatives with the aim of establishing “structural 
stability” (Commission, 1996). These mechanisms were specified as “development of 
cooperation and external assistance, trade policy incentives, humanitarian aid, social and 
environmental policies, diplomatic instruments and political dialogue, cooperation with 
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international partners and non-governmental organizations, and new crisis management 
instruments” (Barnes 2002, p. 1) and possibility of deployment of humanitarian and 
peacemaking missions (Barbe & Johansson 2001). After the Treaty of Amsterdam, EU’s 
motivation to engage in crisis management continued and this motivation was reflected at the 
Cologne European Council of June 1999, which marked the beginning of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a distinctive part of the Union’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP).  
The European Security and Defence Policy is mainly identified with ‘crisis 
management’ as defined in Article 17.2 and Article 25 of the Treaty On European Union. 
With ESDP, it became clear that what the EU means with ‘crisis management’ goes beyond 
the military involvement and it also involves civilian involvement which is significant in the 
European approach to conflict prevention and crisis management. With the experiences of the 
involvement in Bosnia and Albania, the Feira European Council (June 2000) listed four 
priority areas which were determined as the places to acquire concrete capabilities of the 
police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection (Haine, 2004). 
In 2002, the Union announced that it would be ready, as from 1 January 2003, to take over 
from the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since January 
2003, ESDP was manifested through a series of crisis management operations which included 
the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (civilian), Artemis in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (military), Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (military) and its 
civilian mission Proxima (Missiroli, 2004).  
Since then, some significant developments have been taking place, such as the creation of 
the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and 
Transformation, the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (Debiel and Fischer 2000, 
pp. 6-7). The  European  Commission  also began to  develop a conflict prevention and 
civilian crisis management strategy and has launched  EC  Conflict  Prevention Assessment 
Missions to  Papua New  Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the Fiji Islands, as well as  
Indonesia and  Nepal  (European Commission, 2002). The European Union's Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) also seeks to enhance the EU's conflict prevention 
capacity as well. It was established as the second pillar of the European Union with the 1992 
Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. The establishment of the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe could be given as an example to demonstrate the involvement of the EU 
through CFSP (Eavis & Kefford, 2002; Rynning, 2001). In the Civilian instruments for EU 
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crisis management report, prepared by European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Management Unit (2003), the instruments of European Community has been identified as; 
• Political dialogue, underpinned by   
• Agreements and their institutional arrangements with third countries and regional 
groups (Association Agreements and other forms of political partnership);  
• Trade and economic measures;  
• Development and other co-operation assistance;  
• Emergency relief;  
• Support for rehabilitation and reconstruction  
• Macro-economic support  
In the relations with third parties, there are two conflict management styles that EU 
can choose, to act as an actor or as a framework (Hill 2001; Noutcheva et al. 2004; Tocci 
2004). In the cases where EU acts as an actor, it creates the necessary conditions for parties to 
negotiate and direct parties to reach an agreement. On the other hand, when acting as a 
framework, EU provides structural changes and this style is related to the concepts of 
Europeanization and conditionality and employed mostly in the cases of Central and Eastern 
European countries and member states. In the case of EU, conditionality is usually employed 
through “reinforcement by reward” (Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2003, p.496), that is 
by offering assistance (technical and financial) and institutional ties (trade and cooperation 
agreements, association agreements, or full membership to the non-member states). In order 
to benefit from the EU assistance and to establish institutional ties, the states are expected to 
fulfill the democratic and human rights standards of EU (Smith 2001, pp. 37–40) and that 
became an indivisible part of EU conditionality. In this study, the EU acting as a framework 
will be used in order to analyze EU’s role in the Turkish case because as a non-member state, 
Turkey is mostly motivated by the reward of establishing institutional ties in the form of full 
membership.  
Nevertheless, no matter which strategy EU chooses, as stated by Barbe and Johansson 
(2001), conflict prevention has become an indivisible part of EU’s foreign policy in the 
1990s, and it shall remain so. In the following section, Europeanization, which has been 
identified as one of the main conflict resolution strategies of European Union and which falls 
into the interest of this research will be analyzed. Because EU may employ different 
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mechanisms, while examining Europeanization, the impact of European Union on the member 
states and on the accession countries will be examined as well.  
2.2.2. Europeanization  
 Börzel and Risse (2001) provide a commonly agreed upon definition of 
Europeanization as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance, that is of political, legal, and social institutions associated with 
problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks 
specializing in the creation of European rules”. However, as observed by Tocci (2004), 
instead of referring to the process of political and economic development with west Europe, 
or indeed western standards, Europeanization is understood as “EUisation”, that is supposed 
to be a brand of Europeanization that focuses on EU acquis communitaire and relates 
integration into EU structure. After this observation, even though I will analyze the effects of 
EU impact on a candidate country, I will use the term Europeanization because in academic 
literature, Europeanization has been analyzed as EUisation as well.  
On the process of Europeanization, there is a division among scholars whether the 
process is one-sided with upper-hand belonging to EU because of conditionality (Grigoriadis 
2008; Engert, Knobel and Schimmelfennig 2003; Kubicek 2005; Keyman & Önis 2007) or is 
an interactive process between domestic and EU factors (Tocci 2005; Ulusoy 2007). The 
scholars claiming that the Europeanization can be perceived as an one-sided process that is 
imposition of European norms through enlargement has mainly focused on the impact of the 
EU conditionality on accession countries by giving the example of the Eastern enlargement of 
the EU. Yet, this approach has been criticized with the argument that the impact of the 
domestic actors who put internal pressure for change has been ignored in this analysis 
(Radaelli 2006, p.14) and the process of Europeanization is an interactive one. What is meant 
by “an interactive process” is that the Europeanization is perceived not as a linear process 
based on EU conditionality of a successful accession process and membership, but as a 
process that emerges as a product of the relations between domestic and EU actors. Emerson 
and Noutcheva (2005) provide another perspective on the issue, and underline that in the 
process between the EU member states and Europeanization, member states are also players 
who shape the process, thus the process turns out to be a two-way process between “structure” 
and “agency”, but in the process between states of European periphery and structure, states 
are affected by EU, however do not have the institutional means to affect EU. 
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 There is a plethora of studies on Europeanization and impact of EU on member states 
(Diez, Stetter, Albert 2006; Treib 2008; Ladrech 2009), on quasi-member states (Fischer, 
Nicholer & Sciarini 2002; Laegrid, Steinthorsson & Thorhallson 2004), and on candidate 
states (Tocci 2004; Sedelmeier 2006; Schimmelfennig 2009; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 
2008; Ulusoy 2007; Çelik & Rumelili 2006; Rumelili 2003, 2004, 2007). In order to have a 
more comprehensive understanding of the impact of Europeanization, its effect on the 
member states and the candidate states will be examined under two sections. Within that 
literature, because Turkey is a candidate state and this study is focusing on the EU’s impact 
on the Kurdish conflict in the accession process, the works on the impact of Europeanization 
on the accession countries falls into the interest of this dissertation; therefore in the first 
section Europeanization regarding the accession countries will be reviewed. To take this 
analysis one step further and deeper, following this section, the domestic impact of 
Europeanization on the accession countries will be studied.  
2.2.2. a. Europeanization on the Member Countries 
The impact of European Union on the member states is most clearly seen through the 
practices of ‘Europeanization’ which creates a European public sphere where the 
incompatibilities between the countries can be peacefully communicated (Risse & Van de 
Steeg, 2003). In this perspective, while the EU is viewed as creating a framework that is 
constructing a European identity to be shared by the member states and will make the costs of 
conflict across borders too high to continue so that the members will recognize their shared 
needs and common identities (Pace and Stetter, 2003). Even though the basic assumption on 
the impact of the Europeanization on the member states presents the notion of the shared 
identity as the key to the resolving conflicts, that is not the only mechanism that EU employs. 
In addition to this understanding, EU has been using mechanisms such as monitoring, use of 
sanctions, capacity building, rule interpretation, and social pressure as means for making 
states comply with the EU rules and norms (Tallberg 2002, p.614).  
The literature presents several mechanisms through which Europeanization can affect 
the member states and promote domestic institutional change but as Knill and Lehmkuhl 
(1999) propose, they can be broadly categorized under three major mechanisms. The first 
mechanism is called “institutional compliance” and refers to the imposition of mechanisms on 
member states. In this case, “EU prescribes an institutional model to which domestic 
arrangements have to be adjusted” (Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999, p.1). The second mechanism is 
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“changing domestic opportunity structures” and it leads to a redistribution of resources among 
the domestic actors through modifying domestic rules and the opportunity structures. The 
third mechanism is called “policy framing” and it is the mechanism which alters the beliefs of 
the domestic actors so that the decisions and preferences of the domestic actors will be 
changed. Though the last mechanism is identified as the “weakest” form of Europeanization, 
the purpose of employing that form of Europeanization is to change the domestic political 
environment by increasing the general support for broader European reforms (Ingram and 
Schneider 1990; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2000). Still, the existence of three different mechanisms 
does not mean that they are used separately at different times, in fact, as noted by Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (2000, p. 3) EU employs all three mechanisms together at the same time in order to 
increase its effectiveness. 
As the impact of Europeanization has been analyzed according to the mechanisms 
employed by EU, another analysis is provided by Börzel and Risse (2000) who make an 
analysis according to the dimensions of the impact. They distinguish three major dimensions 
to analyze the domestic impact of Europeanization and domestic change and these dimensions 
are policies, politics, and polity. The first dimension, the policies refer to the EU-induces 
policy changes that affect the domestic structures; especially the legal and administrative 
structures, policy narratives and discourses (Schneider 2000, Caporasp & Jupille 2001, 
Radaelli 1997, Schmidt 2000, Liebert 2000). As Börzel and Risse explain, more than %80 of 
the environment and agriculture policies are made at the European level and the 
implementation of the European policies at the domestic level falls into the first dimension. 
The second dimension is composed of the politics and includes the effects of the policies that 
are adopted in the EU-level on the domestic process of societal interest formation, 
aggregation, and formation (Marks & McAdam 1996, Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998). The 
third dimension refers to the polity, and focuses on the changes in domestic institutions 
(Wright, 1994; Börzel 2000, Featherstone 1996). 
Whether analyzed through the mechanisms or the dimensions, the common view is 
Europeanization affects the member-states. However, there are different views on the level of 
influence of Europeanization on the member states, that the influence is differential (Cowles, 
Caporaso and Risse 2001; Kohler-Koch, 1998b). Therefore, as Börzel and Risse (2000, p.4) 
put it, “the issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in 
what direction, at what pace, and at what point of time”. 
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There are many studies pointing at that level of difference among the member states 
and they can be referred by collecting them under three main factors. While the first group of 
studies focuses on the issue of misfit between European and domestic institutional structures 
as the key factor for domestic change (Héritier, Knill & Mingers 1996; Duina 1997), the 
second group of studies focuses on the European assistance, opportunity structures, and the 
actors at the national level (Marks & McAdam 1996; Harmsen & Wilson 2000; Schneider 
2001), whereas the third group focuses on the institutional compatibility and modifications of 
domestic opportunity structures (Börzel & Risse 2000, 2003; Cowles & Risse 2001; Knill 
2001). 
As different mechanisms, dimensions and levels of impact are identified to understand 
the impact of Europeanization on the member states, the influence of Europeanization on the 
candidate countries is no less than the member countries. In fact, Europeanization has been 
considered as one of the most effective mechanisms of the EU for the candidate states. 
Therefore, what is left as a question in our case is the degree of this impact on the EU 
candidate states and how the Europeanization manifests itself on these countries. In the 
following part, this issue will be handled and while doing that, four theoretical perspectives 
will be studied to see this impact.  
2.2.2. b. Europeanization on the Accession Countries 
European Union membership has been an attraction for the countries from the region; 
and although has been narrowly defined as the impact of European integration at the national 
level of the member states (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002, p. 255), impact of Europeanization can 
be easily extended to the EU non-member states because Europeanization can also be seen as 
“a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to 
European integration” (Hix and Goetz, 2000, p. 27). As the Central and Eastern European 
countries had no choice but to accept the acquis to become member states (Lavenex &Uçarer, 
p.43) candidate countries are required to meet the EU criteria to become a member state, and 
during that process an institutional and structural transformation take place within the 
candidate countries in compliance with the EU acquis communitaire.  It is important to note 
that “the conditionality for membership gives the Union significant leverage in transferring to 
the applicant countries its principles, norms and rules, as well as in shaping their institutional 
and administrative structures” (Grabbe, 2002, p. 93). Yet, through this transformation, the 
national governments of the candidate countries may use the EU conditionality to justify 
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harsh and unpopular policies (Hughes, p.330), however this is just a glimpse of the the impact 
of Europeanization on the accession countries. In order to analyze its impact, the theories on 
Europeanization, mechanisms, theories and the conditions under which they operate need to 
be elaborated on. The four theoretical perspectives categorized by Schimmelfennig (2009) 
will provide a useful overall look at these mechanisms. 
 The first perspective on the effects of Europeanization on the candidate countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe is formed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005).  
Table 1. Alternative Mechanisms of Europeanization 
Principal Actor in rule 
adoption process 
Logic of Consequences Logic of Appropriateness 
EU-driven External Incentives Model Social-Learning Model 
CEEC (domestically)-driven Lesson-drawing Model Lesson-drawing Model 
Table derived from Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) 
In this table, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) use two dimensions to identify 
the models in the Europeanization process. On the one side, authors underline that the 
Europeanization process can be either EU-driven or domestically driven. On the other side, 
other distinction is built upon the logic of action, that is logic of consequences and logic of 
appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1989). In the logic of consequences, first model, that is 
external-incentives model states that the Europeanization can be driven by EU through use of 
sanctions and/or rewards, and in that case the rewards can be establishment of institutional 
bounds or economic benefits. The model is based on the presumption that the domestic status 
quo of the candidate states can be altered by EU incentives. The second model, the social 
learning model, on the other hand, claims that when non-member states perceive the EU rules 
as legitimate and identify themselves with these, Europeanization may be stimulated through 
intergovernmental debates or societal actors. According to the third model, the lesson-drawing 
model, because of the dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo, states turn to EU and 
voluntarily learn policies and rules if they perceive these policies as solutions to their 
problems (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).  
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The second perspective is proposed by Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) regarding the issue 
of external dimension of Europeanization especially in the immigration policies. While 
looking at the impact of Europeanization, Lavenex and Uçarer (2004, p.420) identify four 
types of Europeanization in the form of policy adaptation and transfer; “adaptation through 
unilateral emulation, adaptation through externalities, and two forms of policy transfer 
through conditionality, one where the changes fit the domestic interests, and one when the 
latter occur under pressure”. Through looking at the relations between the EU and the 
candidate countries and the adoption of rules and norms of EU, their research findings suggest 
that if the third parties are convinced of the necessity and the benefits of the EU rules, or the 
costs of non-adoption are high, they will comply. In addition to these factors, EU requirement 
of adoption of these rules are also effective since the issue of conditionality plays a significant 
role. 
 The third theoretical perspective belongs to Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006) who 
construct four pathways of EU impact according to the approach by EU and the target of the 
impact in their study on the border conflicts. These pathways are; (1) compulsory impact, (2) 
enabling impact, (3) connective impact and (4) constructive impact. In this analysis, 
compulsory impact refers to the strategy of using carrots and sticks such as membership, 
financial aid, and free trade agreements. The second path is called enabling impact and it 
provides opportunities to the domestic actors to make the changes they desire with linking 
these adaptations with the EU process. The connective impact of EU supports contact 
between conflict parties, mainly through common activities to provide a space for interaction. 
The fourth path is the constructive impact, identified to be the most productive way, aims at 
changing the underlying identities that foster conflict behavior, and then re-constructing the 
identities to establish peaceful relations between the parties (Diez, Stetter, Albert 2006, pp. 
572-574). 
 Another theoretical perspective is constructed by Bauer, Knill and Pitschel (2007) 
when they analyzed domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Looking at the potential 
impacts of EU policies in Central and Eastern European candidate countries that are likely to 
join the EU and in non-member states with only minimal or no accession prospects, authors 
argue that three models can be identified as the mechanisms that have potential to trigger 
national adjustments, depending on the rationality underlying domestic actors’ behavior and 
these are; compliance, competition and communication (2007, p.418). In their analysis, 
compliance refers to the obligation of national administrations to implement the legally 
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binding EU rules; competition simply refers to the abolition of national barriers for the sake of 
common market whereas communication means the governance model through voluntary 
information exchange and mutual learning between national policy-makers. All these models 
show that the EU has a strong impact through Europeanization on domestic policies of EU 
non-member states.  
 While the scholars of the field identify different models for examining the impact of 
European Union on the candidate countries through Europeanization, the models listed above 
are only a few of them, yet what these models show is that the application of the concept of 
Europeanization is no longer restricted to political changes in member states of the European 
Union, instead it is used to describe any processes of domestic change in candidate as well as 
in applicant or neighbor countries (Bauer, Knill & Pitschel 2007, p.406) As the tendency to 
conceptualize the EU impact in a way that acknowledges its impact reaching the countries 
beyond the borders of the Union (Smith 1996; Friis & Murphy 1999; Commission of the 
European Union 2003; Archer 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Smith 2005) 
increased, so did the studies examining the domestic impact of EU through Europeanization.  
In the following section, studies addressing that issue will be focused.  
2.3.  Domestic Effects of Europeanization 
In this part of the study, the literature on the domestic impacts of Europeanization will be 
examined. I conceptualize the domestic effects of Europeanization as a process of change at 
the domestic level of member states in accordance with the rules, norms, and procedures of 
European system of governance, adopted from the work of Olsen (1996). Yet, it should be 
underlined that the process of Europeanization is far from being viewed solely as the impact 
of the EU institutions on the domestic sphere. As Putnam (1988) argues, the domestic politics 
and international negotiations affect each other in a way that neither of them can be examined 
without taking the other into account. Therefore, while looking at the domestic effects of 
Europeanization, a research that examines only EU’s influence over the candidate countries 
will not be able to provide sufficient answers to understand the process. Instead of this, as this 
research will also employ, an analysis of two-levels, the level of domestic politics and 
international level is necessary. While doing that, first an analysis of the two-level game will 
be provided; second, EU’s two mechanisms to increase compliance of member states with EU 
standards will be examined and third, the concept of Euroscepticism, which acts as the 
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combining factor between domestic and international level, will be introduced to see the 
correlation between these two levels. 
Putnam (1988) is the first scholar to come up with the concept of “two-level game”, where 
he argues that when examining the international negotiations, neither a domestic political 
level nor an international level approach can sufficiently enlighten the process of negotiation 
if they fail to include both levels’ influence over each other. While in the domestic level, the 
governments are pressured by various local groups whose aim is to create policy changes, in 
the international level, national governments try to maximize their gains so that they could 
satisfy the domestic groups in the domestic level. In this process, two-levels emerge; Putnam 
(1988) identifies the bargaining between the international actors in the international level as 
the Level I (the negotiation phase) and the debates that take place in the domestic level as the 
Level II (the ratification phase). As the bargaining is taking place between the executives of 
the countries (i.e. the heads of national governments which represent state preferences in the 
international arena) and the executives and domestic groups simultaneously when the 
ratification of the agreements in the countries is necessary for the agreement to be 
implemented, in most of the international bargaining cases, executives will try to come up 
with an agreement that is acceptable not only to the other actors with whom they are 
bargaining, but also to a majority of its domestic interests (Mo, 1994), so that the agreement 
they produced will not fail in the ratification phase, which is an indicator of the domestic 
groups’ direct influence over their national governments during the international negotiation 
phase. 
At that point, it should be noted that the interests of the domestic groups should not be 
treated as homogenous; instead, various groups can pressure the governments and expect to 
get different outcomes from the same process. As a result of this, national governments 
participating in international negotiations may be both empowered and constrained by the 
domestic groups because these groups seek to maximize their gains and minimize the losses 
(Milner 1988; Gourevitch 1986; Frieden 1991; Odell 1982). Moravcsik (1993b) argues that in 
cases where the costs and benefits are certain and risky for the domestic groups, they will 
have the tendency to put more and stricter pressure on the governments whereas the 
governments will be given more flexibility if the costs and benefits are disperse, insignificant, 
and the risk is low (Moravcsik, 1993b, p. 488; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, pp. 78-79). Even 
though the variety of the interests of the domestic groups puts pressure on the executives 
during the negotiation phase, these constrains may also be used in favor of the executives in 
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the international arena (Schelling 1960). In cases where the internationally negotiated 
agreements need to be ratified domestically (i.e. by national parliaments), an executive might 
claim that his/her hands are tied due to the domestic pressures during the negotiation phase; 
meaning that if the executive is to give more concessions, the ratification of the agreement in 
the domestic level will be endangered. When the governments bring this argument forward, 
the intention is to extract more concessions from the other party during the negotiation 
(Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988; Fearon 1997; Milner and Rosendorff 1997). Called as the 
"Schelling conjecture", many scholars explored the conditions under which domestic 
constrains on executives may be used as an advantage in international level or not (Evans, 
Jacobson, and Putnam 1993; Schoppa 1993; Meunier 1995; Hammond and Prins 1999; Iida 
1993, 1996; Milner 1997; Milner and Rosendorff 1997; Mo 1994, 1995; Pahre 1997, 2001; 
Smith and Hayes 1997; Tarar 2001), and even if the models and prerequisites they came up 
with vary, the influence of the international and domestic level on each other is common in all 
analyses and it is crucial to take this two-level relation into account in order to have a better 
understanding of the effects of the process. 
 What is also common in the scholars’ analysis of the bargaining process of national 
governments in the international level is that they all refer to the concept of win-sets. When 
analyzing the bargaining power of governments in the international level, Putnam (1988) 
introduces the concept of win-sets (Bosold & Oppermann 2006). Moravcsik (1993a, p. 23) 
contributes to this concept with his definition of win-sets, which he explains as “the entirety 
of foreign policy actions on the international level which a government can successfully ratify 
both formally and informally on the domestic level”. Through making a differentiation 
between large domestic win-sets and small domestic win-sets, Moravcsik (1993a) underlines 
that these win-sets become crucial during the negotiation phase. In that definition, large 
domestic win-sets mean that governments have room for maneuver so that they can 
compromise and cooperate in a way that outcome of the negotiation will still be acceptable in 
the domestic level. As Putnam argues that overlapping of the win-sets of the parties is needed 
to reach an agreement, large win-set makes reaching Level I agreements more likely (Putnam 
1988). On the other hand, small win-sets indicate that more strict limitations are imposed on 
the governments; yet, as bad as it sounds, the small win-sets can also empower the 
governments’ international bargaining power with the argument that the governments have 
the option to walk-away from the negotiations and as explained as the Schelling conjecture 
(Schelling 1980, pp. 21-28; Moravcsik 1998, pp. 60-67).  
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  As win-sets are so important in the international bargaining process, Putnam (1988) 
presents three determinants of the win-sets; Level II preferences and coalitions (the 
distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents), Level 
II institutions (whether simple majority or qualified majority is required, depending on the 
form of the institutions) and Level I negotiators' strategies (Executive having small or large 
win-sets and domestic pressures). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the win-sets are stable 
and fixed; on the contrary, governments can shape their win-sets (Moravcsik 1994, pp. 6-14). 
For this purpose, they can use issue linkage of the issues, side payments (Mayer 1992; Friman 
1993, pp. 389-395) and their privileged access to information (Milner 1997, pp. 20-23) so that 
they can influence the public opinion in favor of them, in order to extend their win-sets.  
Within the Europeanization literature, two-level game model provide a useful tool to 
explain the varying impact of European integration on domestic structures of the candidate 
countries. Until now, this part of the literature review has been focusing on the process 
between the domestic level and the international level during the negotiations. In order not to 
miss the EU’s influence in the candidate countries, in the following part two mechanisms that 
are employed by EU in order to create domestic changes to increase to compliance of member 
states with EU standards. These two mechanisms are identified as conditionality and social 
learning.  
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the 1990s created a major 
change in European Union’s foreign policy which formerly was focused on the notion of non-
intervention to the domestic systems of third parties. However, as the membership of Balkan 
states came to the agenda, the concept of conditionality became a popular one. Until then, 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law had been identified as the “essential elements” 
as a condition to establish institutionalized relations with third parties (Schimmelfennig 2009; 
Horng 2003). Conditionality involves using carrot and stick policies to ensure the candidate 
countries’ compliance with the EU norms, rules and structures (Tocci 2008; Balas 2000; 
Çetin, 2005). Grabbe (2002; 9-11) identifies five mechanisms of conditionality in EU 
membership: provision of legislative and institutional templates, aid and technical assistance, 
benchmarking and monitoring, advice and twinning, and gate-keeping. The first mechanism 
of conditionality is the provision of legislative and institutional templates and it refers to the 
adoption of all the EU’s existing laws and norms by the candidate countries. The second 
mechanism is aid and technical assistance which gives aid to the candidate countries to assist 
them for the implementation of the reforms and provide the technical assistance to increase 
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their institutional capacity. The third mechanism is benchmarking and monitoring and with 
that mechanism, the candidate countries are benchmarked and their progress is monitored 
through the ‘Regular Reports’ published by the European Commission. The fourth 
mechanism is advice and twinning and it pays for the civil servants from EU member-states 
who work in candidate states and share their experiences especially in the technical areas. The 
last mechanism, namely the gate-keeping, is the EU’s most powerful mechanism and it refers 
to the candidate country’s accession to the different stages of the accession process, 
particularly achieving candidate status and starting negotiations.  
Though all these methods have been used frequently, the European Union’s 
conditionality has been most effective in the cases of candidate countries when countries had 
a credible promise of eventual membership and the proposed reforms did not threaten the 
regime survival. Yet, in the case of conditionality, it should be noted that it was particularly 
influential only after the accession negotiations had been opened (Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
Even so, positive conditionality has been used more frequently than negative conditionality, 
meaning that EU offers of benefits had been employed more often instead of use of 
punishments in cases of violations (Tocci 2008; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). One of 
the examples of the positive conditionality is offering material benefits to the candidate 
countries in the form of financial aids, with the aim of supporting them. Defined as 
“reinforcement by reward”, its effect depends on the domestic political costs of fulfillment of 
the EU criteria of candidate governments (Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2003).  
Especially after the Eastern enlargement of EU, wide range of research was conducted 
on the impact of EU on domestic change in candidate countries and in that context, the EU 
conditionality has become the key element to explain the domestic changes in the candidate 
countries (Grabbe, 2001; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). Though many 
studies were conducted on the impact of Europeanization on the domestic sphere of the 
candidate countries and different structures were identified, two key notions are common in 
these studies. First one is the “goodness of fit” (Risse et al, 2001), or also named as misfit 
(Duina 1999; Tocci 2004), or mismatch (Heritier et al 1996). The idea is that the difference 
between European and domestic politics and institutions determine the degree of pressure put 
forward for adaption of the EU rules. When the structures of the EU and candidate countries 
fit to each other, it is unlikely to see a pressure for domestic change since the structures 
already comply (Börzel & Risse 2009). The second common point is the existence of 
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domestic actors with capacities to use the new opportunities and avoid constraints (Tocci, 
2004).  
The second mechanism of EU is the social learning and it refers to promotion of 
institutional, political, economic and wider societal contact and dialogue between the EU and 
conflict parties (Checkel, 2001). This mechanism proposes a domestic change that will 
transform the perceived interests, promote internalization of EU norms, and alter norms, 
beliefs and strategies of the parties (Diez et.al 2006; Tocci 2008). As noted by Emerson and 
Noutcheva (2005), these more deep-rooted changes that will come through the transformation 
of identity and interests may be expected to occur in the long term whereas the conditionality 
can create changes in the policies in the short or medium term. 
While these two mechanisms are the ways through which EU demonstrates its effect 
on the candidate countries, to identify the different degrees of domestic change caused by 
Europeanization, Börzel and Risse (2001, p.10) proposes three degrees and these are 
absorption, accommodation, and transformation. In the degree of absorption, member states 
incorporate the European policies or ideas and re-adjust their institutions accordingly, without 
having major changes in their existing systems and in this level, the degree of domestic 
change is considered as low. In addition, this is the level where the main motivation is to 
change the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors so that the strategies and preferences of 
domestic actors will be affected as well (Eising 1999; Kohler-Koch 1999). In the second 
level, that is accommodation, member states accommodate Europeanization pressure by 
adapting the existing processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential 
features. In this level, altering the domestic opportunity structures is the key factor (Dimitrova 
& Steunenberg 2000). Heritier, (2001) adds that patching up new policies and institutions 
onto existing ones is one way of doing that and the degree of domestic change is modest. In 
the third level, the transformation level, member states replace the existing policies, 
processes, and institutions with new and significantly different ones, or alter them in a way 
that would change their underlying characteristics in a fundamental way and the degree of 
domestic change is high. Named as ‘positive integration’ (Taylor 1983), this level, domestic 
change is fostered through specific institutional requirements by EU. However, it is noted that 
many European policies can be characterized as a mixture of these different mechanisms of 
Europeanization that are linked to each other in a hierarchical way with the stronger 
mechanism encompassing weaker forms of Europeanization. 
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Yet, in order to analyze the domestic impact of Europeanization on the countries, apart 
from the pressure put on the states by EU institutions, as Putnam (1988) argues, international-
domestic level interactions should be taken into account, therefore for a comprehensive 
understanding of the Europeanization process, the developments and debates that take place 
within the candidate countries should be taken into consideration as well.  
 Heritier and Knill (2001) identify contested interest constellation and a relatively even 
distribution of powers and resources across opposing actor coalitions as the factors that 
affects the EU’s impact on the national regulatory style and structure. In cases where the 
distribution of power and resources is equal or not dominated by one constellation and interest 
constellations are contested, Europe-induced changes are likely to trigger regulatory reform 
by empowering one of the constellations. On the other hand, if domestic environment is 
characterized by the dominance of one actor coalition and highly uneven distribution of power 
and resources, the potential domestic impact of Europe is expected be lower due to the fact 
that in these cases, the EU-induced changes are less likely to change the present distribution 
of power and resources between domestic actors. Therefore, if the European influence is 
going to strengthen the position of the actors who are already in a dominant position, this will 
not make a big difference in the domestic environment whereas the European influence will 
not be enough to increase the power of opposition actors so that they will be able to make a 
strong opposition to the dominant actor (Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002, p.261).  
In the case of the EU negotiations, Putnam’s two-level game framework emphasizes 
the importance of the domestic political considerations in the candidate country and how 
successful the governments are on satisfying the domestic groups (Öniş, 2004). In order to 
understand domestic process on the European integration of the candidate countries, the use 
of the concept ‘Euroscepticism’ will be needed. In addition, because the accession 
negotiations have been identified as one of the driving forces behind the Euroscepticism and 
the imposition of EU conditionalities that usually are viewed to create tension between 
national and international levels (Hughes, p.328), exploration of the concept of 
Euroscepticism is necessary and is an important input in the analysis of the domestic-
international interaction. 
Many scholars working on the concept of Euroscepticism broadly view it as encircling 
range of critical positions on European integration and outright opposition (Taggart, 1998; 
Kopecky´and Mudde, 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005; 
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Hooghe & Marks, 2007); yet the definition provided by Taggart is the most frequently used 
one. He defines Euroscepticism as “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as 
incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” 
(Taggart, 1998, p. 366). In their further analysis, Taggart and Szczerbiak differentiate between 
the hard Euroscepticism and soft Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001a, 2001b). In 
this division, hard Euroscepticism refers to the position where actors have a principled 
opposition to the EU and European integration, and comes with the argument that their 
counties should withdraw from membership, or have reservations to the current form of the 
European integration, and propose two ways to identify the hard Eurosceptic parties; being in 
opposition to the EU on the principle, or ideologically and stressing on some factors which 
would eventually mean being “de facto” Eurosceptic (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2001a, p. 4). On 
the other hand, soft Euroscepticism refers to the position where opposition to the EU comes as 
directed to some issue areas. However, as a reflection upon these debates on the party-based 
Euroscepticism, Taggart and Szczerbik (2002, p. 8-11) agree that some modifications were 
needed to their conceptualization. In the new proposition, they underline that the party-based 
Euroscepticism can’t be defined by exclusively referring to party’s position on EU 
integration, enlargement, issue areas or being in conflict with the national interest by arguing 
that any party can employ one of these arguments for a time period but that does not indicate 
that they are Eurosceptic; in the categorization, a combination of these elements are necessary 
to name a party as Eurosceptic. 
Instead of hard and soft division of Euroscepticism, another classification is offered by 
Kopecki and Mudde (2002) who argues that the “two-dimensional conceptualization of party 
positions on Europe based on the distinction between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for 
European integration”; diffuse support referring to the support for the general ideas of 
European integration and specific support to the general practice of European integration; that 
is, the EU as it is and as it is developing (Kopecki & Mudde, 2002, p. 300). The difference 
between the support for the EU as a general framework and EU as it is developing will also be 
employed in our analysis. 
Another typology on the concept of Euroscepticism and the party positions has been 
developed by Flood (2002), who identifies six categories to determine party positions 
regarding the EU integration and these are; rejectionist, revisionist, minimalist, gradualist, 
reformist, and maximalist. Yet, as acknowledged by Flood (2002, p. 7) as well, because his 
categorization provides straightforward categories, in order to be able to place one party in 
one of the categories, parties or other groups need to be researched in depth and their 
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positions are usually complex. At that point, one problem with the categorization occurs. 
Because parties do not elaborate their stance towards EU integration, it is usually not possible 
to make this categorization (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2003).  
Several authors (for example, Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001a; Sitter, 
2001) argue that Euroscepticism can be explained mainly by a strategy linked to a party’s 
position in the party system depending on, for example, whether the party is in the 
mainstream or on the periphery, or whether the party is in government or in opposition. 
Hooghe & Marks (2009) explains that “basic facts we observe: . . . that most mainstream 
parties are more Euro-supportive than voters, that mainstream parties have tried and failed to 
depoliticize the issue, that major EU issues are orthogonal to economic left/right competition, 
and that the heat has been raised mainly by oppositional parties or factions, particularly those 
on the populist right and radical left” (p. 21). A similar notion has also been proposed by Hix 
and Lord (1997; Hix 1999) who suggest that the mainstream parties represent the left–right 
class and sectoral alliances that divide over integration–independence and these parties adopt 
a pro-EU position in order to avoid internal disputes. On the other side, the radical parties 
oppose the EU more openly. To this analysis, Hooghe and Marks (1999) adds that the 
divisions of economic integration and political integration which are considered to be 
effective on the identification of party positions. Left–right competition can assimilate  the 
former, they observed, but not the latter. It is on political integration that  mainstream parties 
are divided and avoid clear positions. Radical parties coherently oppose the EU because of 
extreme positions on either or both dimensions (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002). As a 
support this point, Taggart & Szczerbiak (2002, p.17) also acknowledge that some parties 
(such as new populist and nationalist parties) may have an ideological stance that makes them 
more inclined to embrace a Eurosceptic discourse than others (such as social democratic and 
Christian democratic parties) and Euroscepticism (especially hard Euroscepticism) is more 
likely to be found on the extremes of politics and not among centrist parties, however they 
reject the idea that having left or right position effects the parties’ stance on European Union, 
which is an argument put forward by Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2001), who argue that left-
right position affects the party’s stance on EU.  
Building upon the previous typologies, Catharina Sørensen’s (2004) model defines six 
types of Euroscepticism by underlining that these types are heterogeneous and not mutually 
exclusive. These types are based on national sovereignty (EU perceived as threat to the 
nation-state), ideology (objection to the EU’s perceived values), political performance of EU 
(negative perception of transfer of values), economic utility, affective pull, and principled 
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opposition (to the whole conception of the EU) and her typology also covers the degree of 
opposition as a factor that effects party’s Euroscepticism. Yet, this model is a disputed one as 
well (Flood & Usherwood, 2005).  
In the case of Turkey, political parties have been broadly supportive of European 
integration but have also expressed deep reservations concerning the specific conditions that 
needed to be satisfied for full membership. (Öniş, 2004; p.501) In the post-1999 era, while 
some parties identified themselves as pro-EU parties, such as the “Motherland Party” (ANAP) 
and the “Justice and Development Party” (AKP) (Öniş 2001, 2003, 2004), following the start 
of the accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005, Euroscepticism also show a 
significant increase in Turkey (Yılmaz, 2011a). One of the distinguishing features of the rise 
of Euroscepticism in the Turkish case is based on the concept “Sevres Syndrome”. Referring 
to the Treaty of Sevres that was signed on 10 August 1920 by the Allied powers and 
representatives of the government of Ottoman Empire and abolished the Ottoman Empire, 
Sevres Syndrome is based on the fears of the separatism that is supposedly supported by the 
European states. It is claimed that the European state’s aim is to divide Turkey and give lands 
to the Armenians and the Greeks. In fact, it is also claimed that Kurds are among the people to 
whom Europeans would like to allocate land, therefore the Kurdish Conflict became a part of 
the Sevres Syndrome and represents the fears of separatism. Furthermore, these fears resulted 
in an increase in the Euroscepticism in Turkey especially by focusing on the Kurdish Conflict. 
 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
On the conflict resolution role of the EU, the literature identifies Europeanization as one 
of the most effective mechanisms for the conflicts in the EU member and the candidate 
countries. However, while Europeanization aims to transform the domestic political and legal 
structures of the candidate states through reforms and structural adjustments, it also aims to 
contribute to the resolution of the conflicts by changing the domestic opportunity structures. 
Yet, the involvement of EU in the conflicts is not always welcomed by the parties. The 
concept of Euroscepticism is an indicator of the reservations towards EU integration and also 
towards the impact of EU on particular issues, such as the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey. By 
using an approach based on democratization and human rights, EU demands Turkey to adopt 
reforms that would enhance the rights of the Kurdish people and possibly put an end to the 
Kurdish Conflict. However, most of the time, these reforms are not welcomed by the political 
parties in Turkey, except the Kurdish political parties who are supportive of the process. Even 
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though they may be identified as pro-EU party and sometimes soft-Eurosceptic, CHP states 
their reservations on the involvement of EU in the Kurdish Conflict. Representing the hard-
Euroscepticism in Turkey, MHP opposes both to the accession process and the EU 
membership. One of the reasons behind this opposition to the involvement of EU is the 
skeptical stance of domestic political parties towards EU’s role as a third party, whether the 
EU Carries the characteristics of a third party or not. In the Turkish case, MHP has been 
accusing the EU as the supporter of the Kurdish political parties and this is one of the 
arguments MHP used frequently. As the involvement of the EU in the Kurdish issue increased 
after Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country, which gave legitimacy to the EU to make 
improvements in the level of democracy and human rights, this involvement was not 
welcomed by the Turkish political parties and this opposition was not performed only by 
MHP. From time to time, CHP also presented a critical stance towards EU’s involvement in 
the Kurdish conflict with the reason that the reform packages on the Kurdish conflict were 
against the interests of Turkey. Because the two parties who hold seats in the national 
assembly were critical towards the reforms that were required to make improvements on the 
issues related to the Kurdish conflict, the win-set of the AKP government became 
significantly smaller. Even though in the international level, the AKP government could 
justify the slow progress by referring to the opposition within the country, reaching a 
concensus in the national level became a harder task. However, it should be noted that the 
political environment in Turkey on the issue of reforms on the Kurdish conflict is not only 
dominated by the negative views on the involvement of the EU. On the contrary, as stated 
before, the Kurdish political parties are welcoming the involvement of the EU, and most of 
the civil society organizations are also supportive of the process. Therefore, while the 
mainstream Turkish political parties diminish the win-set of the government, the support of 
the Kurdish political parties and the civil society organizations increases the win-set. Still, an 
overlap of the win-sets of the parties is missing, which results in pressuring the government 
for taking different actions. This diversity in the positions and the demands decreases the 
likelihood of reaching a concensus among the political parties and affects the Kurdish conflict 
in a negative way. Still, before analyzing the reasons behind these critical positions, providing 
a historical background of the Turkish-EU relations and the Kurdish Conflict is necessary.  
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUD OF TURKEY-EU RELATIOS AD 
KURDISH COFLICT 
 
 In this chapter, the historical background of Turkey-European Union relations and the 
Kurdish Conflict will be presented. As the focus of this thesis is the impact of the European 
Union reform process on the political discourses on the Kurdish Conflict, without presenting 
the background of the relations and the conflict, one can’t reach a solid analysis. With this 
aim, first, Turkey’s long history with the European Union will be presented and then the focus 
will be shifted to the history of the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey. Yet, one point needs to be 
underlined that even though most scholars argue that establishment of relations with the 
European countries and the reform process has started during the times of Ottoman Empire 
and the roots of the Kurdish conflict can be traced to the Empire, for the sake of presenting a 
brief history, this thesis will focus on the period after the establishment of Turkish Republic 
and provide the major turning points in relations and in the conflict. 
3.1. The relations between Turkey and EEC/EC/European Union 
The historical roots of the European Union go back to the Second World War that 
brought destruction to the European continent. Determined to prevent emergence of such a 
tragedy again, European states had the idea that through cooperation that would start in 
economics and then spillover to other areas such as politics and to the other countries, peace 
could be sustained, and with that purpose in mind, the first step was taken with the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was signed in 1951 and 
entered into force on 24 July 1952. The ECSC brought six states; France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, together to support their economic development 
by establishing a common market in coal and steel. As the ECSC became a successful 
precedent for the future of cooperation among European states, to take this one step further 
and expand the areas of cooperation, the six countries signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and 
thus created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
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Community, better known as EURATOM. These years were the times when the foundation of 
the EU was laid, through integration and expansion EEC would become the union that is 
based upon economic, political, and social cooperation and composed of 27 member states 
today. 
While the European states were constructing the union in the continent, Turkey was 
also going through a transformation and was building itself as a Western state. Many scholars 
argue that following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, reaching the contemporary 
level of civilizations became the primary goal of the Turkish state elite (Senem & Keyman 
2004; Kirişçi 2002, Öniş 2000; Müftüler-Baç 1997). In the first years of the Republic, most of 
the reforms of Atatürk were designed for “destroying the symbols of Ottoman-Islamic 
civilization, and substituting them with their Western counterparts” (Toprak 1993, p.631). In 
this reform process, western countries and their political, legal, social and economic systems 
became an inspiration for Turkey. Even though the concept of westernization is linked with 
the Kemalist ideology in Turkey, some scholars argue that the westernization project is not a 
recent phenomenon of the Turkish Republic but indeed it is the continuation of the nineteenth 
century reform movements of the late Ottoman Empire, in particular the Tanzimat 
(Regulations) (Oran 2003; Ulusoy 2009). Discussing that the westernization process was 
initiated in the Ottoman Empire to catch up with the western states that were far more 
powerful than the Empire, Oran (2003) and Ulusoy (2009) state that the aim for the Ottoman 
Empire and the Republic was the same, that is to catch up with the Western powers and they 
connect the two movements to each other. Whether interpreted as a breakthrough from the 
Ottoman tradition or a continuation of the 19th century reform movement, after the foundation 
of the Republic, westernization project became a primary project and did not lose its 
importance over time. In fact, with the emergence of the EEC and then the EU, the 
westernization project became clearer for Turkey and the membership became associated with 
the westernization project. Buzan and Diez state that “Within Turkey, the legitimacy of the 
political and military elite’s Kemalist project of westernizing the country has depended, to a 
significant degree, on a plausible prospect of EU membership” (1999, p.44) and this trend 
became visible after the formation of the EEC and the EU. 
With the determination to sharpen its position as a western country and contributed 
with the dynamics of the Cold War that encouraged countries to be a part of a camp, whether 
western camp or the communist bloc, Turkey became a member of the many of the Western 
organizations and stressed upon the western characteristics of the country by “joining all the 
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right clubs” (Baç 1997, p. 54). In 1948, Turkey joined The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), became a member to the Council of Europe in 1948 and 
NATO in 1952.  The establishment of the EEC gave another opportunity to Turkey to 
demonstrate that Turkey belongs to the Western camp and furthermore, it represented the 
establishment of the relations between Turkey and EU. 
 
3.1.1. The 1960s 
The relations between Turkey and European Union started right after the establishment 
of the EEC. In 1959, Turkey applied to be a member of EEC and as Müftüler-Baç (1997) 
states; the motives behind the application can be listed as the western oriented politics that 
Turkey was already pursuing, gaining access to the European market, concerns of economic 
development and Greece’s application to the EEC. In Turkey’s application, the political and 
economic motivations were combined and they were contributed with the Greek application 
to the EEC because the relations between Turkey and Greece were tense and Turkish 
motivation was to keep an eye on Greece in any international area they participate. However, 
Turkish application did not end up with membership and instead, EEC concluded that until 
Turkey becomes ready, instead of membership, the status of an association would be granted. 
After the application, the agreement creating an Association between The Republic of Turkey 
and the European Economic Community (known as the Ankara Agreement) was signed on 12 
September 1963. The agreement entered into force on 1 December 1964 and three phases in 
customs union were established so that the integration between the EEC and Turkey would be 
deepened and that would eventually lead to Turkey’s full membership to EEC. These three 
stages were identified as a “preparatory period'” of at least five years (1963-1968), the 
“transitory period” (1973-1995) and “final stage Customs Union” (1995) (Yılmaz, 2008). In 
the preparatory period Turkey was expected to pursue economic development, in the 
transitory period both EEC and Turkey would make tariff reductions and ensure free 
movement for the workers, and in the last stage that was to be initiated when Turkey becomes 
ready, Turkey would become a full member and a customs union would be established (Baç 
1996, pp.57-58). On 13 November 1970, the Additional Protocol was signed and it 
established a timetable of technical measures to be taken to attain the objective of the customs 
union within a period of 22 years (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2010).The Additional 
Protocol was welcomed by the Turkish side because of the significant economic advantages it 
brought and it was considered to be an important step for the establishment of the customs 
union. 
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3.1.2. The 1970s 
While the 1960s were about establishing and deepening the cooperation between 
Turkey and EEC, the 1970s were the opposite; it was dominated with the domestic and 
international economic and political crises that affected the relations between the two actors. 
There were three significant events that influenced the relations between Turkey and EEC 
during the 1970s and these were the memberships of United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
to the EEC and the 1973 OPEC Oil Crisis with devastating economic repercussions. Even 
though both events had important impact on the Turkey-EEC relations, the crucial turning 
point was the 1974 Turkey’s Cyprus intervention that led to the partition of the island1 (Eralp 
& Beriker, 2005). Because of the Cyprus intervention, Turkey received significant amount of 
criticisms in the international arena and the Turkey-EEC relations started to deteriorate after 
the event. Today, the Turkish troops are still present in the island and that constitutes a 
problem in the Turkey-EU relations. 
While Turkey was dealing with the problems in the international politics, significant 
events were taking place in the domestic politics. On 12 March 1971, a military intervention 
took place and although the parliament was not suspended, it placed the civil government 
under the auspices of military. As this has been a point that took the attention of the EEC and 
the event was not welcomed, the Turkish side was not satisfied with their relations with the 
EEC. In fact, there was dissatisfaction with the Association Agreement because even though it 
was signed with great hopes for economic cooperation, the level of cooperation did not meet 
the expectations of the Turkish state. Due to the limitations of the agreement, Turkey was 
questioning the credibility and commitment of the Community and the benefits of the 
association (Müftüler-Baç, 2005). Following the international and domestic events that 
created tense relations, by invoking the Article 60 (the Self-Protection Clause) of the 
Additional Protocol, the Turkish side froze its relations with EEC in 1978. Yet, Turkey still 
did not want to be left behind Greece in international platforms and when Greece signed an 
Accession Treaty with the EEC, EEC membership captured the attention of the Turkish side 
in 1979 again. In order to catch up with the Greeks, Turkish state officials declared that they 
were considering making an application to the EEC for membership in the fall of 1980. 
However because of the 1980 military coup, the application was not filed. After the coup, the 
                                                           
1 The Republic of Cyprus was established by the London and Zurich Treaties (1959). The Treaty of Guarantee 
(1960) designated Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey as guarantors of the island in the event of violation of the 
constitution. In July 1974, a coup d’état was attempted against president of Cyprus, by a group of extremist 
Greek Cypriots and Turkey responded by military intervention, using its rights as a guarantor of the republic. 
Since 1974, Turkish armed forces have maintained troops on the northern part of the island.  
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relations with the Community were frozen and in 1981 Greece became a member to the EEC 
(Müftüler-Baç 1997). 
 
3.1.3. The 1980s 
After the military coup in 1980, the Association Agreement was suspended by the 
European Parliament in 1982 because of the political situation and human rights violations in 
Turkey. The civilian government took power in 1983 and only after then positive 
developments started to take place and the Association Agreement was resumed in 1986. In 
1987, Turkey applied for full membership for the first time, on the basis of the Article 237 of 
the EEC Treaty which gave any European country the right to apply for membership. 
However, after two years of assessment, in its Opinion of December 18, 1989, the 
Commission stated that Turkey’s application was rejected and concluded that “Turkish 
accession [is] unlikely, [because of the reasons] such as the expansion of political pluralism, 
the state of democracy, the persistence of disputes with a Member State (namely Greece), the 
lack of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative economic backwardness, especially 
in macroeconomic terms, the Kurdish question, and problems related to human rights.” 
(Müftüler-Baç 2000, pp. 22, 23). It should be noted that even though significant progress has 
been made since 1989, even today Turkey has been criticized on the similar topics. After the 
rejection of its application, it took 6 years for the relations to be better off again, and in 1995, 
as it was foreseen by the Association Agreement, Turkey signed the Customs Union 
Agreement with the EU. 
 
3.1.4. The 1990s 
The first years of the 1990s were the years of transformation for the EEC. In 1992, 
The Treaty on European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty) was signed and the 
European Community was replaced by the European Union. The treaty also paved the way for 
deeper cooperation and further integration that would contribute to the stability and prosperity 
and enhance the security of all countries (Eralp & Beriker 2005). After the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and USSR, the integration and membership became topics that had to be clarified 
because with the emergence of new states, the importance of the EU in the region increased. 
With the Maastricht Treaty, the criteria for the membership started to shape. The Article 49 of 
the Maastricht Treaty states that any European country may apply for membership if it 
respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law. This was the first step and the further definition came in 1993. 
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In the Copenhagen European Council, 1993, the criteria for membership were defined as the 
Copenhagen Criteria, which were:  
1. Political: Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities.  
2. Economic: Functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition 
and market forces in the EU.  
3. Capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.  
4. Adoption of the European legislation and its effective implementation. (Presidency 
Conclusions, 1993)  
Based on the Copenhagen Criteria, at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, the 
EU set the timetable for the six former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus to start accession 
negotiations in the next year. The Council did not include Turkey in the next round of 
enlargement process, yet it was expressed that Turkey was still eligible for membership based 
on the Ankara Agreement. As Turkey was not given a date for accession talks, this decision 
came as a shock and the Council’s decision was interpreted as, “Turkey’s application... was 
apparently ignored, despite the hopes raised by the experience of the Customs Union with the 
EU” and it increased the doubts “whether the EU was serious about ever including Turkey” 
(Müftüler-Baç & McLaren 2003, p.21). The Council declared this they reached that decision 
because the Copenhagen Criteria have not been fulfilled by Turkey, and to be more specific, 
the human rights violations, the tense relations with Greece and the presence of Turkish 
troops in Cyprus were listed as the main factors that affected this decision (Müftüler-Baç 
1998). For the Turkish side, this decision was a great disappointment (Öniş, 2000) and 
following the Council’s declaration, the Turkish government decided to freeze the relations 
until Turkey would be recognized as a candidate and would be treated on the same basis with 
the other countries. The state of the relations between Turkey and EU is depicted well by the 
words of Müftüler-Baç, who expressed that “the Luxembourg Summit ended as relations 
between Turkey and European Union reached crisis point” (1998, p.42).  
However, after two years from the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey was recognized as a 
candidate at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 and this development was met with great 
joy in Turkey and increased the optimism that the membership was possible. The 
Luxembourg decision that stated that Turkey was not ready to be recognized as a candidate 
country changed with the Helsinki Decision and three main events were influential in this 
change. In 1999, the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan diminished the violence in Turkey, the 
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election of a coalition government that was committed to the EU reform process accelerated 
the improvements in Turkey and the earthquakes that Turkey and Greece had suffered from 
caused positive developments in the Turkish-Greek relations (Kirişçi, 2002). These three 
developments affected the Turkey-EU relations positively. In the Helsinki Summit in 1999, 
Article 12 of the Presidency Conclusions (1999) expressed that:  
"The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in 
the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms 
towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria Turkey is a candidate State destined 
to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate 
States. Building on the existing European Strategy, Turkey, like other candidate 
States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.” 
After being recognized as a candidate, Turkey started working on the Copenhagen 
Criteria to start the accession negotiations. The Helsinki decision and the recognition as a 
candidate state changed not only the attitudes and the perceptions towards the EU, but it also 
increased the motivation to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria so that the accession negotiations 
would begin. With that stimulus, a “political avalanche of democratization” became the case 
in Turkey (Avcı in Kubicek, 2005, p.70) during the coalition government formed by DSP 
(Democratic Left Party), MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and ANAP (Motherland Party).  
3.1.5. The 2000s 
After the Helsinki Summit, Turkey felt that the membership of EU was closer than it 
was ever before. The declaration of candidacy increased the expectations that the EU process 
would push for change and Turkey would overcome its democratic deficiencies during the 
accession process (Kubicek, 2001), however, the changes in the political environment in 
Turkey signaled that the process would not be smooth as it was expected to be. While up until 
the Helsinki Summit, the consensus on Turkey’s EU membership was dominating the 
domestic politics in Turkey, after the Helsinki Summit, divisions within the government and 
among the parties started to come to the surface.  
The relations between Turkey and the EU improved steadily after the formation of the 
new coalition government in June 1999 by Bülent Ecevit. In 2001, the Accession Partnership 
Agreement was adopted by the European Council and it listed the economic, legal, and 
political reforms Turkey needed to introduce to be able to meet the Copenhagen criteria for 
starting accession negotiations and it called for lifting of restrictions that deny Turkish 
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citizens the possibility of broadcasting in their mother tongues as well as the need to assist 
cultural diversity and secure the cultural rights, including education in the mother tongue, of 
all Turkish citizens irrespective of their origin (Kirişçi, 1999, pp. 293-294). In response, The 
National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) was announced on 24 March 2001 
by the Turkish government for the adoption of EU rules and three harmonization packages 
were adopted until 2002.  
The coalition government was committed to the EU process and the reform adoption 
process was inspiring; however, there were problems related to the characteristics of the 
parties in the coalition. As Kubicek expresses it, the 1999 parliamentary elections had created 
a coalition government that was formed by the enemies of the nationalist right and the social-
democratic left (1999). One of the first examples of that division over the EU membership 
emerged during the formation and adoption of the NPAA. On 18 March 2000, DSP-MHP-
ANAP coalition had finally reached a conclusion on the commitments Turkey would make to 
the EU. The NPAA consisted of short and medium-term reforms of 89 new laws and 94 
amendments to be made to the existing laws, and proposed a massive modernization in 
Turkish political system. However, the decision making process was not an easy one. In fact, 
as Avcı (2003, p.150) argues, “The NPAA appeared to be a joint declaration of the three 
coalition partners but also, in a way, symbolized the difficulties the coalition partners had 
when attempting to agree on sensitive issues.” In addition, even though it came with great 
difficulties, the NPAA was not considered to be sufficient by the EU, the document that was 
formed at the end of tough negotiations did not produce the positive reaction it was expecting.  
As the adoption of reforms was accelerated for the forthcoming Copenhagen Summit 
of 2002, in the meetings in Laeken in December 2001 and Seville in June 2002, the European 
Council underlined that; 
“New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen (in December 2002) on the next stage 
of Turkey’s candidature in the light of developments in the situation between the 
Seville and Copenhagen European Councils, on the basis of the regular report to be 
submitted by the Commission in October 2002 and in accordance with the Helsinki 
and Laeken conclusions” (Presidency Conclusions 2002, in Avci 2003, p. 151) 
The acceleration of the reform process and the adoption of EU norms were designed to 
assure that Turkey would be granted a certain date for the accession talks to begin, however, 
in the Copenhagen Summit Turkey was not provided with a certain date. Instead, the Council 
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concluded that if it is recognized in the European Council Summit in December 2004 that 
Turkey meets all the Copenhagen criteria, the accession talks with Turkey would start 
“without delay” (Kirişçi, 2002, p.2). Based on the conclusion of the Copenhagen Summit of 
2002, in December 2004, the Brussels European Council decided to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey in October of the following year and on 3 October 2005 accession 
talks were symbolically opened while on 12 June 2006 concrete accession negotiations were 
started.  
As the negotiations were opened, a new phase started in the Turkey-EU relations; “put 
bluntly, the EU has embarked upon a social engineering project, one that is far more 
ambitious and intense than in previous enlargements, because of Turkey’s differences” 
(Kubicek, 2004, p.51). In order to track the changes and evaluate the progress of the country, 
the most important criteria have been the Progress Reports on Turkey that are presented by 
the European Commission since 1998. These reports provide the basis on which EU reflects 
on the areas Turkey needs to improve and the main issues in the political criteria were 
identified as democracy and rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities in general. 
To be more specific, the national threshold of ten percent, the State Security Courts, 
corruption, the influence of the National Security Council on Turkish politics, ill-treatment 
and human rights violations were identified as the main problems. However, as the Progress 
Reports required reforms in more specific areas, it became harder for Turkey to reconcile the 
internal and external policies during the accession process. In fact, as Ziya Onis (2000) 
argues, the Turkish policymakers did not fully realize that the EU has changed in recent years, 
while it was focusing on the structural changes before, now the human rights issues are more 
central in the accession debate. In addition, because there is not a consensus among the 
Turkish elites on the reforms that need to be implemented for improving the human rights, 
and because they are not committed to make the necessary changes required by the EU, the 
process towards the full membership will be “slow and protracted” (2000, p. 465). 
In the 2002 elections, AKP became the governing party whereas CHP was the main 
opposition party, the only opposition party that could pass the election threshold. After the 
elections, AKP started to underline its determination for the EU membership. During the first 
three years after the elections, the government adopted six harmonization packages in addition 
to the 2004 constitutional revisions of 10 articles. Within these harmonization packages, most 
important and challenging reforms were the abolition of death penalty under all 
circumstances, closure of the State Security Courts, prevention of torture and ill-treatment, the 
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expansion of freedom of speech, the restructuring of the National Security Council, the 
removal of military personnel from civilian courts and the Higher Education Council (YÖK) 
(Aydınlı, 2009). In addition, the Protocol 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) was ratified by the Turkish parliament and a new Penal Code which brought 
important changes in human rights and legal status of women was passed in September 2004. 
Furthermore, a Reform Monitoring Group was set up in order to oversee the implementation 
of the new laws. In 2007 elections, AKP, CHP, MHP and DTP (Democratic People’s Party) 
were represented in the parliament and the reform process continued although the EU 
Progress Reports continuously underlined that adoption of reforms was not in a pace that was 
desired and the implementation of the reforms were problematic.                                                                                                                                         
 Among the issues where reforms are needed, the Kurdish issue is one of the most 
challenging ones. Since the Progress Report of 1998, each year, the cultural and linguistic 
rights of the minorities and more specifically the rights of the Kurdish people and the Kurdish 
issue have been devoted a detailed part. While until 2005 the Kurdish people were defined as 
the “Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin”, after 2005 the Progress Reports used the wording 
“Kurdish population”. However, even before mentioning directly from the rights of Kurdish 
people, in its earlier reports EU implicitly referred to the cultural rights of the minorities and 
democratization issue in a broader sense. With respect to the Kurdish issue, in these reports, 
Turkey has mainly been criticized on the issues of election quota, limitations on collective 
rights, especially the use of Kurdish language, human rights violations, ill-treatment and 
torture, the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and the presence of the village 
guards and the landmines. Yet, before proceeding with the reforms on the Kurdish issue, 
providing a brief history of the conflict would be useful to analyze the present situation of the 
conflict and what kind of a role does the EU reform process play on the issue. 
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3.2. The Kurdish Conflict  
The Kurdish conflict is an issue that has been part of the Turkish political agenda since 
the establishment of the Republic, however the conflict can’t be described simply as a conflict 
between the state and the PKK. The definition of the conflict suggesting that it is a conflict 
between the Turkish state and the Kurdish nationalist movement which is mainly represented 
by PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) (Kaliber& Tocci 2010, p. 191) is only one dimension of 
the issue. Furthermore, apart from representing clash of two armed forces, the roots of the 
Kurdish conflict go deeper. As Kirişçi argues, the conflict is caused by “the state’s failure to 
reconsider the definition of its national identity in a manner that would allow Kurds to express 
and live their ethnic and cultural identity in public” (2003, p.275). When the conflicts are 
fueled by the issues of recognition and identity, they get more complicated, and this is the 
situation in the Kurdish conflict.  
The Kurdish conflict had significant repercussions for Turkey both in the domestic and 
the international politics. The conflict increased the military expenditures and military budget 
and played an important role in the economic backwardness of the eastern part of the country. 
In addition, the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) who were forced to leave their homes 
increased the cost of the conflict. Yet, this is only one side of the coin which focuses on the 
domestic impact of the conflict. On the other side, the Kurdish conflict also had important 
limitations on the Turkish foreign policy and EU membership is one of the most affected 
foreign policy issues. Turkey has to adopt reforms and increase its level of democracy so that 
it can achieve a resolution to the Kurdish conflict and become a member to the EU. Hence, 
Turkey’s failure to bring a peaceful end to the conflict became an obstacle for the country’s 
integration into Europe and the West. In this process, the EU Progress Reports have been 
stating that Turkey needs to make improvements in the conditions of minorities and its human 
rights record to be admitted to the union (Ergil, 2000, p.122-123), and that task becomes 
another challenge for Turkey.  
However, it should be underlined that the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict is 
significant not only for Turkey, but also for the EU and the actors in the region. Somer (2004) 
argues that the EU membership of Turkey and its influence on the Kurdish conflict are 
important issues for the international actors for two reasons. First of all, Turkey’s membership 
to EU will increase the credibility of the EU as a global actor that can transform the problems 
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within the candidate countries. Secondly, as Turkey finds a way to resolve its long-standing 
Kurdish conflict, Turkey’s energy to play a more active role in the region of Middle East will 
increase so that it can be more influential on the Middle Eastern politics. As Öniş (2003, p.2-
3) states, an end result of the resolution of the Kurdish conflict would be “striking shift in 
Turkey’s position from a coercive to a benign or constructive regional power”. Therefore, the 
Kurdish conflict becomes significant not only for Turkish politics, but also for the EU and the 
regional politics of the Middle East.  
While it is clear that the Kurdish conflict is one of the most important obstacles for 
Turkey’s membership in the EU and EU supports the reform process in Turkey, the way that 
EU influences the conflict and the reform process has been criticized. As Müftüler-Baç 
argues, the ups and downs embedded in the messages of EU undermine the legitimacy of the 
union, it decreases the Turkish trust and weakens the pro-European and pro-democratic 
arguments of the modernizing, Western oriented actors present in Turkey (1998, p. 257). In 
this complex environment where the set of issues are intermingled, the influence of EU on the 
Kurdish conflict can’t be examined without looking at the history and dynamics of the 
conflict. In order to provide a brief historical background, the conflict will be examined under 
four main parts. In the first part, starting with the Republican period, the emergence of the 
conflict will be presented (1923-1984). In the second part, continuing with the formation of 
PKK and the terrorist attacks, the period named as the escalation of conflict (1984-1999) will 
be focused. The third part will explain the period of ceasefire that started after the capture of 
PKK leader Öcalan and present the negative peace period (1999-2004). The last part will 
focus on the period started after the end of the ceasefire and named as the re-escalation of the 
conflict and will present the recent developments (2004-2010).   
3.2.1. The Emergence of the Conflict : 1923- 1984 
The emergence of the Kurdish conflict or as some scholars name it the Kurdish 
question, goes back to the Ottoman system and the first years of the Republic (Tezcür 2010, 
Jwaideh, 1999; Van Bruinessen, 2003). Although this part focuses on the period after the 
establishment of the Republic as Yeğen argues, “the Kurdish question was a question of the 
old order which had been succeeded by the present order” (1999, p.561), therefore a brief 
overview of the influence of Ottoman Empire on the Kurdish conflict will be useful.  
  The most significant contribution of the Ottoman Empire to the Kurdish conflict 
comes from the problematic minority definition which is succeeded in the Turkish system 
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through Lausanne Treaty. To state it more explicitly, in the Ottoman Empire, the nationalities 
were defined according to the religious affiliations of the people, instead of their ethnicity 
(Ergil, 2000) and among the Muslim population ethnic identities did not have significance 
because Islam was the common bound. This element became very significant during the 
World War I because even though three important statements were made in the international 
agreements that would support the independence of Kurds from the Ottoman system, Kurds 
preferred to side with Turks during the War of Independence. After the World War I, the 
Number 12 of the President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points stated that the other 
nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be provided with security of life and an  
opportunity to have autonomous development, Article 62 of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 
called for local autonomy for the areas dominated by Kurds and Article 64 of the same treaty 
underlined the possibility that the Kurdish people might be granted independence from the 
empire (Gunter, 2004, p.199). However, during the War of Independence, united as Muslims 
under the umbrella of Islam, ethnic Kurds and Turks became allies who were fighting for the 
freedom of their country. During the struggle, most of the Kurdish tribal leaders sided with 
Turks, however with the declaration of the Republic in 1923 and the abolition of the caliphate 
in 1924, this cooperative relation started to change.  
During the 1920s and the 1930s, Turkish government implemented policies that would 
strengthen the central authority and local-administrative autonomy for Kurds became an issue 
that was ignored (Somer, 2004, p.240). In the 1920s, most important development was the 
1923 Lausanne Treaty. With the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, that is still in force today and is 
a reference point in the minority rights and minority definition, the minorities in Turkey were 
defined the as non-Muslims that are Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. The rights of these 
minorities were placed under the protection of international regime (Yılmaz, 2011b). 
Therefore, instead of adopting the international definition of the minorities that is based on the 
racial, linguistic, or religious differences, Turkey adopted a definition based only on the 
religion (Oran 2004 p. 64), which resulted in denial of the existence of Muslim minorities 
such as Kurds (Grigoriadis 2008 p.31). Especially with the 1924 Constitution, the minority 
notion was strengthened that Kurds were not being accepted as minorities. As Yeğen argues, 
for the Turkish state, “Kurds, just like other citizens of the Republic, had become Turks. 
There were no more Kurds (or any other ethnic groups, as an ethnic political body) but simply 
Turkish citizens” (2009, p.599). While the process of ignorance of Kurdish identity became 
clear with the new constitution, the following years would be based on the policies of 
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ignorance and suppression of the Kurdish identity and transformation of the identities into the 
Turkish identity. 
  The new republican order was based upon the Turkish nationalism, culture and 
identity, and during the consolidation of the Republic, expression of Kurdish identity and 
speaking language were not allowed. This pressure was strengthened by following 
assimilationist policies towards the Kurds. According to Đçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci (1999, 
p.993), in fact the roots of the Kurdish conflict can be found at the “state- and nation-building 
deficiencies in the early Republican period of the 1920s”, which refers to the assimilationist 
and exclusionist policies started to be implemented during the 1920s. Ergil (2000, p.124) 
argues that since the times when Ottoman Empire included the Kurdish dominated areas 
aspart of their territory in the 15th and 16th century, they granted high regional autonomy to 
Kurdish local leaders in return for the loyalty to the empire. However, the main purpose of the 
reforms of the 1920s and the 1930s was decreasing the regional autonomy and embedding the 
new principles such as secularism, Western, progressive, and centralism within the Turkish 
system as a core element of the new Turkish state. The increasing pressure of Turkish state for 
the centralization of the power resulted in Kurdish response which would not be welcomed by 
the state. The Kurds perceived these new developments as a threat towards their historical 
rights and privileges and responded through rebellions. Between the late 1920s and the late 
1930s various revolts and two large-scale Kurdish rebellions took place, however, these 
rebellions were suppressed violently and the repressive policies continued without slowing 
down. In fact, as Yeğen argues, “the consolidation and centralization of power had been of the 
greatest importance for the Republican regime in the years between 1920 and 1950” (2009 
p.562). As the Kurdish rebellions were taking place, the Turkish state considered these 
movements as the rebellions of “pre-modernity”, because the idea was that the rebellions were 
demanding regional autonomy for their tribes and as the consolidation of state power was a 
component of civilization project, these movements must have been representing the pre-
modern state order (Yeğen 2009, p.563). As the state perceived the rebellions as the 
movements of pre-modenity, this understanding of the state contributed to the definition of 
the Kurdish question; it became “a question of reactionary politics, tribal resistance, and 
regional backwardness” (Yeğen 2009, p.598).  
As the 1920s and the 1930s were the years of modernization and consolidation of the 
central authority, it was also the years when the ethnic Kurdish identity started to be refused 
by the government and the idea that Kurds were “mountain Turks” was being promoted 
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(Kirişçi 2006, p.174). Especially after the Kurdish rebellions of the 1920s and the 1930s, the 
Turkish government started to see the emergence of a separate Kurdish identity as a threat to 
the nation-state (Kaliber & Tocci 2010, pp. 195-196). While compulsory settlement policies 
were also implemented, they were halted in the1940s because of three reasons.  Yeğen 
identifies the first reason as the establishment of a more democratic regime in Turkey with the 
Democratic Party who had a more positive attitude towards Kurds. The second reason is that, 
after the suppression of the Kurdish rebellions in the 1920s and the 1930s, Kurds were not in 
a position to organize further rebels and create trouble for the state. The final reason is, 
because of the rapid urbanization starting with the 1950s, Kurds migrated to the major cities 
in the west to find job opportunities and that decreased the necessity to implement harsh 
resettlement policies. As the need to follow resettlement policies decreased, in the following 
years, the government implemented assimilationist policies to suppress the Kurdish identity 
(Yeğen, 2009, p.604).  
In the 1920s and the 1930s, Kurds manifested their reactions to the centralization 
policies of the state through rebellions; however in the 1960s and 1970s, the Kurdish reactions 
took a more organized form. Dominated by the leftist Kurdish movements such as the Turkish 
Workers Party (Türkiye Işçi Partisi), youth revolutionary movements (Dev-Genç) and cultural 
clubs (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths/ Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları), in the 1970s 
the Kurdish conflict started to be represented as a call for the eradication of the inequalities in 
the socio-economic rights of the underdeveloped southeast part of Turkey (Kaliber & Tocci 
2010, pp. 195-196). However with the 1980 military coup, the repression of rights and 
freedoms increased, 1982 Constitution was adopted, education in languages other than 
Turkish (Article 42) was prohibited. The most significant turning point would come in the 
mid-1980s, when the PKK, an organization that is based on Marxist-Leninist principles and 
led by Abdullah Öcalan, emerged as an organization seeking secession and began to attack 
civilians as well as military targets.  
3.2.2. Escalation of the Conflict: 1984-1999 
As it has been discussed above, oppression of the Kurdish identity had already started 
creating problems between the state and the Kurdish nationalists; however the milestone of 
the conflict would emerge in the 1980s. During the years between 1987 and 1999, three 
significant events took place. The first event was the emergence of PKK, an armed group that 
launched attacks both on military personnel and civilians in Turkey and caused a change 
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within the dynamics of the conflict. The second significant event was the forced migration of 
the Kurdish people throughout the 1990s which resulted in the significant numbers of IDPs.  
The third significant event was the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, 
which resulted in declaration of ceasefire by the PKK, which lasted for five years.  
The literature on the Kurdish conflict suggests that the roots of the conflict can be 
traced back to the first years of the republic and even to the Ottoman Empire. While it is true 
that the oppressive policies of these years contributed to the emergence of the conflict, the 
most striking development came in 1978 when PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan) was founded by Abdullah Öcalan. The purpose of this establishment was 
to “set up a democratic and united Kurdistan in southeastern Turkey to be governed along 
Marxist-Leninist lines” and to “monopolize the Kurdish nationalist struggle” (Çağaptay 2007, 
pp. 15-17). The PKK rhetoric mostly focused on its left-wing and anti-imperialist features and 
presented the conflict as a movement against “the Turkish imperialism in Turkish Kurdistan” 
(Barkey & Fuller 1998, p.23). As the PKK launched its first terrorist attack in 1984, which 
resulted in death of more than a dozen people, the Kurdish conflict of Turkey gained a new 
dimension. While until the 1980s, suppression of the Kurdish identity has been the case, the 
emergence of PKK who claimed itself as the representative of the Kurdish people, changed 
the nature of the conflict drastically; created clashes between the Turkish armed forces and 
PKK, claimed many deaths from both sides, and set terrorism as the first issue that has to be 
tackled in the Turkish political agenda.  
Following the PKK attacks, the government decided to declare emergency rule in 
thirteen Kurdish-populated provinces in 1987, known as OHAL, which would not be lifted 
until 2002. Between 1991 and 1999, the conflict peaked. The time period was also the times 
when the highest number of deaths occurred and human rights violations took place. The 
second important event, the capture of Öcalan came in 1999, and afterwards the PKK 
declared a ceasefire. However in 2004, the ceasefire ended and the attacks started again. The 
ceasefire period could be named as the negative peace period, which is defined as “the 
absence of violence, absence of war” (Galtung 1964, p.3). Therefore, when in 2004 the 
conflict re-escalated, together with Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, the conflict became the 
focus of the international actors, mainly the EU’s. When the Turkish Army Forces crossed the 
boundaries and bombed the PKK camps in Northern Iraq in 2007, the conflict once again 
became internationalized (Çelik 2010, 153-154). 
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The third important event is the internal displacement of the Kurds in the mid-1980s 
and the 1990s. Kirişçi identifies 3 reasons for the displacement and these are;  
“a) the evacuation of villages by the military, allowed by the 1987 emergency rule;  
b) The PKK’s pressure against the villagers who do not support the PKK to abandon 
their villages; and  
c) Insecurity resulting from being caught between the PKK and Turkish security 
forces” (Kirişçi in Çelik, 2005b, p.979).  
The forced migration started in the second half of the 1980s and escalated in the early 
1990s, and during this time, Kurds were forced to migrate from Eastern and Southeastern 
Anatolia. Since 1984, many people have had to leave the region, but forced migration 
escalated further after 1993, when village evacuations were intensified (Çelik, 2005, p. 139). 
Not only during the displacement, but also during the settlement the Kurdish people had to 
tackle with problems such as education, integration to city-life, and difficulties of finding jobs 
and houses. The situation of IDPs is challenging for Turkey because many domestic and 
international organizations have argued that human rights have been abused during this 
displacement process. In addition, these organizations underlined that the rights of the 
Kurdish IDPs have been violated with the state’s inability to provide food, temporary housing, 
and medical care (Çelik 2005b, p. 980-981). The situation of IDPs is still problematic for 
Turkey because even though some regulations have been made to encourage their return to 
villages, they could not be implemented properly. This has also become an issue for Turkey’s 
EU membership because of the human rights violation and it has been criticized in the EU 
Progress Reports. 
The years between 1984 and 1999 refer to the escalation stage and while the attacks 
claimed many lives, the conflict became more visible. Meanwhile, the issues of terrorism and 
IDPs emerged and these two issues would continue dominating Turkish politics in the next 
years as well. Nonetheless, while “terrorism” became one issue that has been addressed by 
many political leaders and the international organizations, the problems of the IDPs have not 
been touched upon- they were only addressed by few resettlement laws which could not be 
implemented because of the issues related to the security, employment, infrastructure, 
existence of village guards and landmines (European Commission, 2008). 
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3.2.3. The Ceasefire and the egative Peace Period: 1999-2004 
The year 1999 marks a turning point for Turkey both in domestic and foreign policies. 
For the domestic politics, the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan was significant 
because it resulted in the declaration of ceasefire by PKK. For the foreign policy, it was 
important because in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey was recognized as the candidate 
country to the EU. Together with these developments, the Turkish politics became dominated 
with the reforms that intended at ensuring Turkey’s membership to the EU. With the 
recognition of its candidacy and declaration of the ceasefire, Turkey adopted many reforms 
that affected the rights of the Kurdish people. In addition to the EU candidacy and the 
ceasefire, another important development was the Iraq intervention of USA in 2003 and this 
intervention caused changes in the external environment of the conflict.  
 As the Turkish state was adopting reforms in response to the EU demands to start the 
accession negotiations in the Copenhagen Summit in 2003, the intensity of the Kurdish 
conflict decreased. During this time period, as Çelik and Rumelili (2006) argue, 
Europeanization, which is an important tool for EU to solve conflicts in the accession 
countries, helped the transformation of the Kurdish conflict from being a terrorism issue to 
one that is about democratization. As the EU required Turkey to meet a minimum set of 
democratic criteria for accession negotiations to start, the democratization and reform process 
accelerated in Turkey together with the increasing responses against the EU. However, the 
influence of EU on the Kurdish conflict was not always welcomed by the political actors in 
Turkey and after the 1999, the problems between EU and Turkey started to emerge and 
became more visible.  
In June 1999, Öcalan was captured, tried and sentenced to death. However, 
abolishment of the death penalty was one of EU’s demands. Even though Öcalan was 
sentenced to death, Turkey abolished the death penalty and Öcalan was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, which encouraged negative views towards the EU. Another significance of the 
capture of Öcalan was that, during and after his trial, he considerably altered his expressions. 
After he was captured, he started stating that he was “advocating greater democratization and 
pluralism in Turkey as a solution to the Kurdish problem, rather than secessionism or a 
federal solution” (Öcalan 1999 in Kirişçi 2003). In August, he even stated that he was calling 
PKK to stop using violence and he encouraged the militants to turn themselves in to the 
Turkish authorities to signal their good will (Kirişçi, 2003, p.274).  
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Kirişçi (2003 p.275) argues that on the Kurdish conflict, two approaches exist in the 
Turkish politics; the hard-liners and the moderates. Until 1999, the hard-line approach has 
been the dominant approach and defined the conflict as externally driven; therefore it needed 
to be tacked through military means. Abramowitz (1998, p. Xiii) underline that until very 
recently, Turkish state had been identifying the Kurdish conflict with the PKK insurgency and 
acted as if the problem would be over as soon as PKK was eliminated. The moderate 
approach, on the other hand, has put the denial of Kurdish cultural rights and ethnic identity 
as the causes of the conflict and has argued that only through political reforms that would 
increase the level of democracy and economic reforms that would improve the economic 
conditions in the east and southeast part of Turkey, the conflict could come to an end. With 
the year 1999, Kirişçi argues that the gap between moderates and hard-liners diminished and a 
few factors could be identified as the reasons of this development. He explains that the 
improvement of relations with the West, especially the prospects of EU membership 
strengthened Turkey’s commitment to the political reforms and thus became the most 
influential factor. However, the developments in the international politics constitute only one 
part of the developments. In the domestic politics, the representation of the Kurdish 
politicians in the parliament, their declarations that they were eager to collaborate to put an 
end to the conflict were also very influential. In fact, representation of the Kurds has always 
been problematic in Turkey because one of the parties, that are the Turkish government, does 
not recognize the other party as the representative (Kaliber & Tocci 2010). As the Kurdish 
political parties started to express their demands through parliament, this clearly made it much 
easier to raise and debate reforms in respect to the Kurdish problem, without risking the wrath 
of hard-liners (Kirişçi 2003 p.275). 
One significant event that altered the external environment of the Kurdish conflict was 
the USA intervention in Iraq in 2003 after the 9/11 attacks on USA. The invasion of Iraq 
increased the uncertainty in the Turkish politics and whether a Kurdish state would be 
established in Iraq dominated the political debates for more than two years. During the Iraq 
invasion, the Turkish government became suspicious of the Iraqi Kurds represented by the 
KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) who were 
supported by the USA, because of the idea that establishment of a Kurdish state could set a 
precedent for the Kurds in Turkey. In fact, it needs to be underlined that Turkey has always 
perceived armed Kurdish groups such as Massoud Barzani’s KDP and Jalal Talabani’s PUK 
as a threat to the territorial integrity because of the potential spillover effect of the formation 
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of a Kurdish political entity in Iraq. During the first Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Gulf 
War (1991) PKK already had used the power vacuum to maneuver and the Turkish concern 
was that same could happen during the Iraq invasion of USA. 
However, the impact of the Iraqi invasion was not only limited with the possibility that 
a Kurdish state might be established that would encourage the Kurdish separatist movement in 
Turkey. Turkish government argued that the PKK camps were settled in Northern Iraq, and 
the war in Iraq enabled the PKK to consolidate its camps in the region. Even though right 
after the 9/11 attacks USA declared global war on terrorism, PKK’s existence in the Northern 
Iraq was not the prioritized target for USA and actually, “the PUK and especially KDP 
leadership see the PKK as a useful bargaining chip with Turkey” (Çağaptay, 2007). As the 
possibilities that a Kurdish state might be established and PKK could be empowered through 
its establishments in the Northern Iraq, the security concerns of Turkish policy-makers rose 
significantly (Somer, 2004). The influence of the developments in the Northern Iraq on the 
Kurdish conflict was so significant that Blum and Çelik (2005, p.1) argued that “Turkey’s 
European Union (EU) membership process and the developments in Northern Iraq will be 
among the primary drivers that shape the relationship between Turks and Kurds in Turkey”. 
Although the concerns were high, after the December 15 elections, Turkey began to change 
its stance towards the Kurdish political organizations in Northern Iraq, as Talabani became 
the Iraqi President and Turkish state officers began to recognize their legitimate political 
status (Blum & Çelik 2007, p. 7-8).  
The years between 1999 and 2004 were dominated with the expectations that because 
of the positive developments, the Kurdish conflict might come to an end; however, this did 
not happen. The Turkish state had adopted many reforms, the emergency status in Southeast 
was lifted, the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project was implemented for IDPs and 
steps were taken to eliminate the restrictions on broadcasting in other languages than Turkish. 
The government also enacted partial amnesties targeting low-ranking PKK militants in 1999, 
2000, and 2003. Ocalan, in solitary confinement since his capture, became an advocate of 
Turkey’s membership to the EU (Ocalan, 2003). However, the scope and limitations were 
problematic and not satisfactory, neither for the Kurdish people nor for the EU. 
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3.2.4. The re-escalation of the Conflict- 2004 onwards 
As Yilmaz (2011b) identifies, adoption of the EU-induced reforms on the minority 
rights can be examined under three phases in Turkey, acceleration of reforms (2002-2004), 
slowdown (2005-2007), and revival (2008-2010). In the acceleration process, the Copenhagen 
Summit and getting a date to start accession negotiations were the triggers that encouraged 
Turkey to pass many reform packages as it has been discussed above. In the slowdown period, 
it can be said that the Turkish government did not allocate much energy to the EU reform 
process. However, with the 2007 elections, the reform process was accelerated and the 
“democratic opening” was introduced by the AKP leader Erdoğan in 2009.  
While the reform process was continuing in 2004, PKK declared that it will not extend 
the ceasefire and start the armed struggle again. On 1 June 2004, the ceasefire ended and 
armed conflict re-started. The PKK underlined that they were starting the armed struggle 
because of the continuing operations of the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) 
and the PKK leader Öcalan’s deteriorating prison conditions (Tezcür 2010, p.779). However, 
Tezcür (2010, p.776) argues that in fact, it was a strategic move, because the AKP started to 
gain votes from the Kurdish people and that undermined the PKK’s power. In addition, as 
PKK claims that it is the true representative of the Kurdish people, AKP’s influence on the 
Kurdish people was threatening the very existence of PKK. In order to make sure that AKP 
would not gain the confidence and representation of the Kurdish people, the PKK continued 
its armed struggle and that resulted in deterioration of the reform process. 
The years between 2005 and 2007 refer to the slowing down of adopting the EU 
reform process. During these years, the EU Progress Reports were critical of the new 
regulations that had been introduced because of the PKK attacks. As new amendments were 
adapted to the Anti-Terror Law, freedom of expression was further limited; the violent human 
rights violations in the southeast part of the country continued, and the implementation of the 
reform packages was still problematic. With the new measures taken and already existing 
deficiencies in the implementation process, Turkey shifted its attention to the domestic 
problems it was facing. However, it does not mean that no developments have been made. In 
fact, one of the most significant moves in the Kurdish conflict has been made in 2005 with 
Erdoğan’s speech in Diyarbakır. 
In August 2005, Erdoğan made his famous speech in Diyarbakır where he stated that 
“Turkey has a Kurdish problem. We have self-confidence and democratic courage to face this 
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problem. However, we will never accept that this problem would be used for terrorism” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2005). This was the official acknowledgment that there is a 
problem called Kurdish problem and it was welcomed especially by the Kurdish political 
party and EU Progress Report of 2005. Even though after this speech Erdoğan refrained from 
using the wording “the Kurdish problem”, it was still a significant move. Another turning 
point would come with the introduction of the democratic opening concept in 2009. 
 The concept of democratic opening was highly debated, both because of its content 
and its timing. Even though the concept was introduced, what was meant with opening, what 
kind of reforms it would bring, and how the process would continue were the questions that 
were not answered. In addition, when it was introduced, the PKK attacks were taking place, 
therefore under these circumstances, it became highly criticized. However, Çandar (2009, p. 
16) argues that the concept was offered at that time because of the local election results. In the 
local elections, the DTP won 99 municipalities, and as a result, the share of the votes of the 
AKP in the Kurdish electorate decreased. In order to gain the confidence and votes of the 
Kurdish people, AKP introduced the democratic opening, and although it was named as the 
democratic opening in the beginning, later in time it was named as National Unity and 
Brotherhood Project (Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi) to be more inclusive and emphasized 
the purpose of increasing the democracy level for all citizens of Turkey.  
With the revival process, Turkey had adopted many regulations that increased the 
rights and freedoms, especially those of the Kurdish people. The most crucial reforms for 
Kurdish people can be listed as broadcasting nationally all day long in languages other than 
Turkish on state television, opening of TRT-6 that is broadcasting in Kurdish 24-hours a day, 
The Higher Education Board (YÖK)’s endorsement of establishment of “Living Languages 
Institute” to provide postgraduate education in Kurdish and other languages spoken in the 
country, offering public services in Kurdish in the governorships of several cities in the 
Southeast.  
However, these reforms did not satisfy the Kurdish people, they did not meet the 
expectations and even though the process was welcomed, they were also criticized in the 
Progress Reports because of limitations in their scope and implementation. Still, as Somer 
(2004, p.236) explains that “they were unprecedented steps forward for Turkey in the 
direction of the normalization of the Kurdish conflict via demilitarization and liberal 
democracy”.  
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3.3. Conclusion 
 Turkey's journey to membership in the EU has been a goal for Turkey since its 
application for associate membership in 1959, whereas the Kurdish conflict has been existing 
since the foundation of the republic and started to dominate the domestic and international 
politics right after the formation of PKK in 1984. Although they may seem unrelated issues, 
indeed they are inherently connected to each other. On the one hand, Turkey can’t become a 
member of EU unless it solves the Kurdish problem that is related to the democracy 
deficiencies and the human right violations. On the other hand, in the Europeanization 
process, the involvement of EU and the influence of EU-induced reforms are undeniable. For 
the Kurdish actors, EU has been considered as an important actor that would empower the 
Kurdish side, it would become a spokesperson for their demands and thus empower them so 
that the power imbalance would be overcome, whereas for the Turkish side, EU-induced 
reforms would increase the democracy level for the citizens in Turkey, though some parties 
have reservations about the EU due to the concerns on national unity and integrity. Indeed, the 
EU candidacy marks the beginning of a phase that is dominated with the legal reforms that 
brought significant improvements in the rights of the Kurdish people. 
 As both issues have important influence on each other, the problems in one of them 
affect the other. The most visible form of this relation is visible in the EU Progress Reports 
and their stress upon the rights of the Kurdish people. It is true that there are many political 
issues that Turkey needs to tackle with to be a member, such as the Cyprus issue, or the 
Armenian issue. However, while the debates on these issues have been significant in the 
Turkish politics from time to time, the Kurdish issue has been embedded in the Turkish 
politics. In fact, today the Kurdish issue is no longer examined as the problems of the Kurdish 
people, but has become a problem caused by the level of democracy and human rights 
deficiencies. To tackle with these problems, the EU demands Turkey to adopt democratic 
reforms that would bring a solution to the Kurdish problem; such as enlargement of 
democratic rights to minorities, cultural and linguistic rights, increasing freedom of speech 
and lowering the %10 election threshold. 
 The improvements in both issues are inspiring, however it is clear that the Turkish 
policy on EU and the Kurdish issue have ups and downs, while sometimes reforms are 
introduced and the encouraging speeches are made, sometimes these issues are even not 
pronounced. The lack of a clear and motivated policy on the issues is the reason for this and 
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unless Turkey becomes more willing and motivated to take the necessary steps, the process 
will continue to be like a rollercoaster.   
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, I will present the methodology used in this study to answer the 
research question. The methodology of this study is embedded in complex and 
multidisciplinary theoretical framework Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the study uses 
discourse-historical approach. After presenting the research question, I will explain the 
methodology, present the source material and data collection, and then discuss the limitations. 
The research question of this study is “What are the main themes, strategies, and 
linguistic means employed by Turkish political party leaders in their discourses on the EU 
and Kurdish conflict, 2002 onwards?” In order to answer this question, the discourses of the 
leaders of the political parties that were represented in the national parliament during the 
years between 2002 and 2010 were analyzed. These parties, namely AKP, CHP, MHP, 
DEHAP, DTP, and BDP were influential on the EU accession process with their discourses. 
Among these parties, even though DEHAP could not pass the election threshold and was not 
represented in the parliament, the discourses of the party leaders were included in the analysis 
because DEHAP was the only party who identified itself as the representative of the Kurdish 
people between the years 2002 and 2005. If the party was not included, the discourses of the 
Kurdish political parties would be incomplete. In addition, MHP was not also represented in 
the parliament but the discourses of Bahçeli prior to 2007 were studied. The reason behind 
this decision is that, MHP has been the representative of the ultranationalist wing in Turkey, 
and most of the reactions towards the EU reforms on the Kurdish Conflict come from the 
discourses of Bahçeli. With the idea in mind that the discourses of Bahçeli will represent the 
most extreme critiques towards the EU and the reforms, and will reflect the ultranationalist 
view on the accession process, the discourses were analyzed. 
Studying discourses of political actors are important because they can provide us with 
power relations and the way these actors shape public opinion around both EU integration 
process and the Kurdish Conflict. These political actors represent different ideologies along 
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political spectrum and across time. Discourses of these actors have particular “political 
motive(s) for conveying approval of a stable, familiar ideology” (Fowler, 1991, p. 49) and 
their “own version of the language” (Hall, cf. Fowler 1991, p. 48). These discourses, not only 
tell us what the actors think of the EU process but also how they instrumentalize certain issues 
such as the Kurdish Conflict, an important element in the process, for their own political 
agendas. In order to demonstrate that relation, the methodological framework of this study is 
built upon the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the study adopts a discourse-historical 
approach. 
 
4.1. Methodological Framework 
The methodological framework of this study is build upon the CDA, which is referred 
as “an important diagnostic tool for the assessment of social and political dominance” (Van 
Dijk, 1996, p. 90).  According to Van Dijk, CDA explores the ways “social power abuse, 
dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social 
and political context” (1998, p.1). As Van Leeuwen also underlines, the CDA is focused on 
the use of discourses “with discourse as the instrument of power and control as well as with 
discourse as the instrument of the social construction of reality” (1993, p. 193). Therefore, the 
study of discourse becomes the most obvious way to understand the social constructions 
(Hülsse, 1999). The definitions suggest that CDA focuses on the structural relationships of 
dominance, discrimination, power and control and how these are manifested in the discourses. 
As the CDA uses discourses to manifest the power relations, it should be noted that there is a 
variety of the definitions of “discourse” among scholars. This study uses one of the definitions 
that is commonly used to define CDA; 
“CDA sees discourse - language use in speech and writing - as a form of ‘social 
practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship 
between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social 
structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the 
discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also 
shapes them. To put the same point in a different way, discourse is socially 
constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objective knowledge, 
and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people” 
(Fairclough & Wodak 1997, p.259).  
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One of the characteristics of CDA is that, the discourse is conceptualized as 
representing an action, that is to say discourse is not defined as a form of language use but as 
a “form of social practice” (Wodak 1996; pp.14-16). While using discourses, people take 
actions and their actions have consequences for the situations and other people. Therefore, the 
discourses construct situations and become the basis of further verbal and non-verbal action. 
As Fairclough and Wodak identify, the relationship between the discourses and the situations 
becomes “dialectical”; they construct each other and are influenced by the other (Wodak 
1996, p.16). In addition to the construction of the situations, Hülsse (1999, p. 6) states that 
“society and culture are constituted by discourse, but at the same time, they constitute 
discourse”. As the relation is dialectical, in the analysis of the discourses, the social context in 
which the discourses were used can’t be ignored. On the contrary, they carry vital importance 
for understanding the discourses. In addition to the social contexts, the discourses are 
influenced by the ideologies and are effective for the reproduction of the ideologies. 
Fairclough and Wodak argue that “Ideologies are particular ways of representing and 
constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and 
exploitation” (1997, p. 275) and in this context, the use of discourses become means to 
construct and reproduce the ideologies.  
While the relation between the context, ideology and discourse is a mutually 
constructing one, the relation between the politics and discourses also becomes an issue of 
concern. The question is whether discourses should be perceived as a result of the politics or 
they are a part of politics, that is to say, whether they are mutually complementary or the 
discourses are produced by the politics. In the formation of discourses, conceptualizations 
carry a vital importance; however even though many actors refer namely to the same 
institutions, situations or problems, in fact their references carry different meanings. 
Laclau and Mouffe state that nodal points are constructed in order to fix meaning in a 
wide field of contending discourses (1985, p.113). With the purpose of fixing the meaning for 
a nodal point, other conceptualizations and discourses are used by the actors. However, 
meanings can never be completely fixed; as Laclau and Mouffe underline, the nodal points 
can have only “partially fix meaning” because the actors themselves are also influenced by 
the discourses they create. Therefore, in time, the actors are also affected by the discourses 
which result in the change of nodal points constantly; they are not “transhistorically fixed” 
(Diez, 2001). The process of fixing a nodal point is called an articulation and in the 
articulation process, the use of other discourses and conceptualizations play a significant role. 
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The nodal points are usually representative of the disagreements between the actors on the 
definitions of certain issues and concept, and the nodal points in the Turkish case on the 
Kurdish issue will also be examined in the analysis chapter. 
In analyzing the discourses, CDA uses different approaches that are based on different 
theory, methodology, and the type of research issues. In this study, discourse- historical 
approach will be used. The distinguishing feature of the discourse-historical approach is that it 
integrates the history into the analysis of the discourses and texts. The approach is best 
explained by the words of Wodak (2004), “[the discourse-historical approach is] a movement 
back and forth between the theory and empirical data” (p.200). By including the effects of the 
historical context on the discourses and analyzing the discourses under the light of the 
historical process, the discourse-historical approach becomes the best approach to use in 
analyzing the discourses on the accession process. Unless the influence of the developments 
in the Turkey-EU relations and in the Kurdish conflict is taken into account, the theories will 
fail to provide sufficient answers to the shifts in the discourses. In an environment where the 
discourses of the political party leaders are highly responsive to the developments on the 
issue, ignoring the impact of these developments on the discourses will leave one part of the 
study missing. 
In this study, I use the ‘discourse-historical’ approach and follow the three 
dimensional analysis offered by Wodak (2004). In the first dimension, a manifest analysis will 
be conducted to identify the common themes used in the discourses of the party leaders, by 
looking at what is openly said or written. In the second dimension of the analysis, the 
discursive and argumentation strategies will be investigated by also looking at the possible 
theoretical explanations for a general trend or shift in the discourses. In the third dimension, 
the linguistic means will be identified and the topoi and the metaphors used to support the 
arguments of the political leaders will be presented. Reisigl and Wodak describe `topoi' as 
“parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. 
They are the content-related warrants or `conclusion rules' which connect the argument or 
arguments with the conclusion, the claim” (2001, p.74). Wodak (2001) presents a 
comprehensive list of topoi, and in this study, the topos of usefulness and advantage, the topos 
of danger and threat, the topos of humanitarianism and the topos of responsibility will be 
used. These four topoi were analysed in this study because a detailed analysis of the 
discourses of the political party leaders present that they usually use the same topos with 
similar purposes. The usefulness and advantage topos refers to the conditional that a particular 
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decision should be taken because it is useful and advantageous for “us, them, or all of us” 
(Wodak 2001). Contrary to the topos of usefulness and advantage, the topos of danger and 
threat indicates that the party leaders are relating the reform process to the dangers the reform 
process brings. It argues that because the process or the outcomes are dangerous, the action 
should not be taken. The third topos is the topos of humanitarianism and it argues that 
whether an action will be taken or not depends on the human right standars. If a political 
action or decision does not conform to the human rights, they should be used. The fourth 
topos is topos of responsibility and it argues that because particular fields of action are 
governments’ responsibility, the government should be using this topos.  
TABLE 2. List of topoi by Wodak (2001) 
1. Usefulness, advantage    9. Finances 
2. Uselessness, disadvantage  10. Reality 
3. Definition, name-interpretation  11. Numbers 
4. Danger and threat    12. Law and right 
5. Humanitarianism    13. Histories 
6. Justice     14. Cultures 
7. Responsibility    15. Abuses 
8. Burdening, weighting 
  
 
 
4.2. Data Collection 
The data of this research is composed of the discourses of the political party leaders 
which were represented in the national assembly between 2002 and 2010. AKP received 
%34.28 of the votes and gained 363 seats in the assembly in the 3 November 2002 elections. 
In the same elections, Republican People’s Party (CHP) obtained %19.39 of the votes, 
gaining 178 seats, becoming the main opposition party. Although only two parties could pass 
the %10 threshold, 9 independent deputies were also elected. In the next national election of 
22 July 2007, three parties could cross the 10% threshold and were represented in the 
Parliament. AKP obtained 46.6% of the votes and got in 341 seats in the Parliament, whereas 
the CHP obtained 20.9% of the votes and 99 seats, and the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) 14.3% of votes and 70 seats. 26 independent candidates were also elected and 
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following the elections, 20 of the independent candidates from the Democratic Society Party 
(DTP) formed their own political group and that increased the number of political groups to 
four. Therefore, when analyzing the political discourses, the speeches of the leaders of these 
political parties will be used.  
To understand the reactions to the EU integration process, the speeches of the political 
party leaders between 2002 and 2010 were studied. The data came mostly from the websites 
of the political parties that included a section named “From the Party Leader”. Even the 
political parties, except for MHP, did not have the documents of full speeches; the data gave 
us enough resources to depict the underlying rhetoric2. However, the case of the Kurdish 
political parties was rather difficult since the reach to these discourses was only possible 
through newspaper websites. Because DEHAP dissolved after the establishment of DTP in 
2005 and DTP was closed at the end of 2009, both parties’ websites was not accessible. Even 
though BDP has a website that is accessible, because it does not include the speeches of the 
party leaders, it did not provide us with the necessary data. In order to fill this gap in the 
discourses, the websites of Hurriyet (www.hurriyet.com.tr), NTV (www.ntvmsnbc.com), and 
Tumgazeteler (www.tumgazeteler.com) were used. These three websites were picked because 
they have the most comprehensive online archives. In addition to these three websites, the 
website of ABGS (Secretariat General for EU Affairs) (www.abgs.gov.tr) which included 
some speeches of the Kurdish political party leaders was also used. Starting with the 2002 
national elections, the discourses of the party leaders in which discussions were centered upon 
the EU accession and the Kurdish Conflict were reviewed. In total, 404 speeches that included 
the words EU and Kurd were used to analyze the discourses of the political party leaders. For 
the discourses of AKP, 95 speeches; for MHP, 168 speeches; for CHP, 74 speeches and for 
the Kurdish political parties, 67 speeches which were made between 2002 November and 
2010 December were reviewed.  
4.3. Limitations 
 This study explains the impact of the European Union accession process on the 
discourses of the political party leaders during the AKP government. While making a 
significant contribution to the literature through using discourse-historical approach, this 
                                                           
2
 For AKP the following websites have been used: http://www.akparti.org.tr , http://www.rte.gen.tr, and  
http://www.akgenclik.org.tr (only for 2007-2008 for the missing data). For CHP, 
http://brussels.chp.org.tr (between 2008 and 2010) and http://www.chp.org.tr (for Kılıçdaroğlu’s speecehes in 
2010) and for MHP: http://www.mhp.org.tr have been accessed. 
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study also has some limitations. To start with, in order to limit the scope of this research, only 
the discourses of the political party leaders in Turkey were analyzed. The European 
Commission Progress Reports have been taken as the representative of the EU demands from 
Turkey. Yet, to take this study one step further, the discourses of the political party leaders of 
the EU member states on Turkey’s accession could be analyzed. Especially during the times 
when the debates focused on privileged partnership for Turkey, it is observed that the Turkish 
discourses were responsive to these arguments; however a further analysis of this relation is 
necessary. 
 Another limitation of this study comes from the fact that the study only focuses on the 
leaders of the political parties, whereas the domestic actors such as civil society organization 
are very influential over the accession process in Turkey. In fact, sometimes they were 
pressuring the state for the introduction of reforms. Even though this study uses a top-down 
approach by focusing only on the leaders of the political parties, a further study that will 
include the discourses of the domestic actors will provide more information about how the 
discourses are shaped on the accession reforms, the reactions to the accession process and the 
impact of domestic constellations in this process. Nevertheless, all these issues are beyond the 
scope of this study and could be part of a broader study. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, I will make a discourse-historical analysis committed to Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) and analyze the discourses of the leaders of the political parties’ 
on the impact of the EU-induced reforms on the Kurdish conflict. The focus of this research 
will be the impact of the EU accession process on Turkey’s Kurdish conflict during the 
Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) governance. The discourses of the political party 
leaders that are represented in the Turkish National Assembly between the years 2002-2010 
will be studied. Since this study makes a discourse-historical analysis, the social and political 
developments related to the EU reform process and the Kurdish conflict will also be 
embedded in the analysis. 
As this study focuses on the years between 2002 and 2010, the parties whose leaders’ 
speeches are analyzed are AKP (Justice and Development Party), CHP (Republican People’s 
Party), MHP (National Movement Party), and the Kurdish parties that are DEHAP 
(Democratic People’s Party), DTP (Democratic Society Party) and BDP (Peace and 
Democracy Party). In the years between 2002 and 2010, two national (2002 and 2007) and 
two local elections (March 2004 and March 2009) took place. In the 2002 national elections, 
only AKP and CHP passed the election threshold. In the 2007 elections, this time AKP, CHP 
and MHP passed the threshold and CHP and MHP became the opposition parties. After the 
election, the independent deputies formed the DTP group in the parliament and the number of 
political parties represented in the parliament increased to four. Following the closure of DTP 
in 2009, the independent deputies formed the BDP group in the parliament.  
Only two parties were constantly represented in the parliament between 2002 and 
2007, namely AKP and CHP. However, in this analysis, the discourses of the political leaders 
of MHP, DEHAP, DTP and BDP were also examined. Neither DEHAP, nor MHP was able to 
pass the %10 election threshold in the 2002 elections. However, DEHAP was the only party 
that claimed to be speaking for the rights of the Kurdish people until the formation of DTP in 
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2005. After DEHAP, DTP and BDP claimed themselves as the representatives of the Kurdish 
people and were represented in the parliament. If DEHAP was not included in the analysis, 
the representation of the Kurdish people before 2007 elections would be problematic. In 
addition, MHP discourse prior to the 2007 election was also examined because the views of 
the party on the Kurdish Conflict and the EU-reforms are historically important as they 
represent the ultranationalists in Turkey. 
While analyzing the discourses on the reforms demanded by the EU on the Kurdish 
conflict, the analysis will be based on the three dimensional approach of discourse-historical 
approach as discussed in the methodology chapter. In the first part, the issues and themes 
dominant in the discourses of the party leaders will be identified and while doing that, the 
manifest discourse will be employed. In the second part, the discursive and argumentation 
strategies and the theories supporting the discourses will be examined. The third part will 
focus on the linguistic means and the realizations and explain the topoi, fallacies and 
metaphors used in the discourses, as proposed by Wodak (2001).  
5.1. The Common Themes  
 In the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, Turkey was recognized as a 
candidate country and following the decision of the Council, the discourses around the EU 
started to change. While the dominant view in the Turkish politics was defining the EU 
membership as one of the main objectives of Turkey until 1999; following the recognition of 
Turkey’s candidacy in 1999, this uniformity among the political actors started to change. In 
addition, in the Copenhagen Summit of 2003, the Commission stated that if Turkey fulfills the 
Copenhagen Criteria until December 2004 Summit, Turkey would be given a date to start the 
EU accession negotiations. With these developments, Turkey accelerated the reform process 
and the influence of the EU over the Kurdish conflict increased through reforms. In this 
process, discourse-historical analysis presents that the political debates focus mainly on four 
topics: the civilization issue, the definition of Kurdish Conflict, the definition of the Kurdish 
people, and the rights of the Kurdish people. Not surprisingly, these four topics actually 
complement each other. While the civilization argument is the basic argument and is related 
to democratization, the discourses on the remaining three themes are built upon each other. 
The discourses focus on the definition of the Kurdish people, whether they are referred as 
citizens, minority, people, or Kurdish origin of Turkish citizens. In what follows, the 
definitions on the problem, if it is related with democratization or defined as a security 
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problem, are presented. Third step is to focus on the rights of the Kurdish people which are 
built upon the definitions of the Kurdish people and the problem. That is to say, if the Kurds 
are defined as citizens and the problem is defined as a terrorism problem, the rights of 
Kurdish people are not an issue of discussion because they are already perceived as equal 
citizens. However, if Kurds are defined as citizens or people, and the problem is defined as a 
democratization problem, then the discourses focus on the question of which rights should be 
provided to the Kurdish people. In fact, these arguments refer to the discursive nodal points in 
the EU accession process and the Kurdish conflict because each domestic political actor use 
these arguments and conceptualize their references as if they have fixed meanings, however, it 
is visible in their discourses that conceptualizations of the issues are different. Even though 
these conceptualizations are frequently referred in the discourses, the diversity on the 
conceptualizations leads to a miscommunication among the actors. In the following part, 
common themes which are also representative of the nodal points will be analyzed.   
5.1. 1. The Civilization Argument 
A fundamental topic that is included in the discourses of the leaders of AKP, MHP and 
CHP on the reform process is the civilization argument, which focuses on the question of 
whether Turkey and EU belong to the same civilization, and if not, what are the outcomes of 
this difference that is inherent in the characteristics of the two actors. The following sample 
demonstrates one side of this argument: 
(1) EU has been postponing Turkey’s membership and the underlying reason for this 
exclusionist policy is the differences in the religion and culture. Turkey does not 
have a place in the EU that is viewed as the civilization project of the Christian 
world and inspired by the values of Christianity (MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli, 19 
September 2006)  
The civilization argument is shaped by three approaches. On the one hand, one of the 
opposition parties, MHP states that they are representing different civilizations and argues that 
these two civilizations are not compatible. On the other hand, the governing party AKP agrees 
that Turkey and EU are representing two different civilizations but they are compatible. 
However, the other opposition party, CHP underlines that the civilization argument should not 
be used because it may increase the skepticism towards Turkey’s membership as it was the 
case in France. As Tekin (2010) argues, the idea that Turkey is representing a different 
civilization from the civilization of EU has been dominating the political discourses in France. 
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In the French case, the incompatibility of these two different civilizations is stressed upon and 
very similarly, the MHP discourse has also been expressing that because the civilizations are 
inherently different, they are also incompatible.  
Deriving from the clash of civilizations argument by Huntington (1993), the debates in 
Turkey has been focusing on the question of whether Turkey can be a part of EU even though 
they are representing different civilizations. On this theme, the supportive arguments for EU 
membership have centered upon the argument that Turkey’s EU membership will be an 
example that will refute the clash of civilizations thesis: 
(2) By being a member of the EU… we can make our country the land of freedom 
with having the highest standards in EU. With the historical and cultural legacy 
that we possess, we can refute the thesis of “clash of civilizations” and construct 
the most solid form of “harmony of civilizations” together with Europe. (AKP 
Leader and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, June 2003) 
Because of the fact that Turkey’s EU membership has been debated frequently in the EU in 
terms of clash of civilizations, in order to support the membership of Turkey, the membership 
has been presented as a part of a rapprochement project for two different civilizations by the 
AKP leader Erdoğan in many instances. Among many speeches, two examples can be given:  
(3) Turkey is ready for the EU accession negotiations more than most of the member 
states of the EU... however, if Turkey is to be kept waiting after December 2004, 
we will start looking for other reasons. What are these reasons? This is the 
civilization that we belong to. We state it to our European friends, Europe should 
not be the place of clash of civilizations...Turkey will be part of the EU by 
representing the rapprochement of the civilizations. (Erdoğan, July 2004) 
(4) I have a dream, in which by being a member of the EU Turkey is representing the 
strongest bridge for the meeting of the civilizations while the clash of civilizations 
was trying to bring twilight to the world. (Erdoğan, 13 October 2003)  
The rhetoric of the opposition party, CHP, has also underlined the party’s support for 
Turkey’s EU membership, however, not by referring to the rapprochement but stressing upon 
the similarities between Turkey and EU: 
(5) Clash of civilizations should not be our main thesis. Public opinion in France has 
already created reactions against Turkey saying that Turkey is a Muslim country, 
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it’s not European. We should speak of the thesis to stress our similarities with 
them” (Deniz Baykal, CHP Leader, 20 October 2004). 
Yet, the timing of these arguments is also significant, because the civilization debate 
was mostly used in the years between 2003 and 2004, when Turkey was getting ready for the 
Copenhagen Summit with the expectations that it could get a date for the accession 
negotiations to start. Therefore, the discourses of AKP and CHP, who were in the parliament 
and were both pro-EU parties, focused on the compatibility of the civilizations and 
significance of Turkey’s membership for the civilizations they represent. In addition, the clash 
of civilization debates were already dominating the political debates after the 9/11 attacks on 
the USA in 2001. As the relations between the West and the East, with Christian world and 
Islamic world became questioned in the context of clash of civilizations, presenting Turkey’s 
EU membership as a part of the project of rapprochement of civilizations became a strategic 
move to increase support for the membership, which is manifested in a speech of the Prime 
Minister in 2003:  
(6) Some people are trying to depict 9/11 as the messenger of the “war of civilizations 
and religions”. However, once Turkey fulfills its integration with EU, the world 
will see that the East and the West, Christianity and Islam can coexist. (Erdoğan, 
June 2003)  
While the debates on civilization generally reflects the political parties’ positions on Turkey’s 
EU membership, a deeper analysis of the arguments show that these debates are related with 
the debates on modernization and the level of democracy in Turkey, and in fact they became a 
self-identification issue for Turkey. The rhetoric of the opposition party, CHP, is the most 
significant example of this debate. Traditionally being supportive of the EU membership, 
CHP discourses on the EU membership are linked to the Kemalist ideology and modernism.  
(7) To be a part of EU, we should emphasize our similarities with them and stress 
upon our struggle for modernization that has been started with Atatürk’s reforms in 
the 1920s. If Turkey is in the process of being a member of the EU, we owe this to 
the modernization process that had been initiated with Atatürk’s revolutions, such 
as the adoption of modern law system, democracy, freedom, and modern views on 
women rights. (Baykal, 20 0ctober 2004) 
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Following the arguments of CHP on the EU and democratization process, the AKP rhetoric 
also presents similar points which relate the EU membership to the Kemalist argument of 
reaching the level of contemporary civilizations: 
(8) EU membership is a means in the process; the real purpose is to carry Turkey 
beyond the level of contemporary civilizations. (Erdoğan, 30 June 2009) 
In this process, the EU membership is seen as an opportunity to actualize the 
modernist ideal of the Kemalist ideology and the Kurdish conflict is an essential component 
of the relation of these two because it is inherently perceived as a problem of insufficient 
democratization in Turkey. As the arguments focus upon the human rights violations and 
providing more rights to the Kurdish people, the EU reforms specifically demand Turkey to 
put more effort for the rights of the Kurdish, and thus put the Kurdish conflict at the center of 
the discussions on democratization. While the democratization issue has been used in the 
discourses referring to the Kurdish conflict, the argument of civilization which also refers to 
the level of democracy is linked with the arguments of democratization, modernity, and 
human rights. The reason behind establishing a link between these arguments is that, while 
“reaching the level of contemporary civilizations” and “increasing the level of democracy” 
have been the key motives of the Republic since its establishment, they are also the themes 
that appeal to the Kurdish political parties. That is to say, the democratization concept is 
appealing both to the Turkish and Kurdish parties and the people and it can be a motivation 
for both sides. There are also more themes that can be identified in the discussions on the 
Kurdish conflict and the definition over the Kurdish conflict will be the focus of the following 
part.  
5.1. 2. Definition of the Kurdish Conflict 
The definition of the Kurdish Conflict is a theme that has been dominating the reform 
process on the Kurdish Conflict and represents one of the most significant nodal points. The 
definition of the Kurdish Conflict may be linked only to the democracy level of Turkey by 
being de-linked from the PKK issue, or it may simply be referred as a separatist movement 
and a ‘terrorism’ problem. The diversity on the definition of the issue brings further problems 
which lie at the core of the discussions on the EU-induced reforms. 
The most consistent definition on the Kurdish Conflict has been provided by MHP. By 
linking the Kurdish political parties to the PKK as the proponents of the political demands of 
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the ‘terrorist organization’, the right-wing political party, MHP, consistently has been stating 
that the problem is not a problem related to the democratic rights, but instead, it is a terrorism 
problem that aims separatism: 
(9) With the so-called democratic opening, the Prime Minister has initiated the process 
that will provide legitimacy to the separatist terror organization and this process 
has been the milestone of the disintegration. (Bahçeli, 26 May 2009) 
On the other hand, the discourses in Turkey, especially those of the Kurdish political 
parties and AKP, and also the EU definition of Kurdish Conflict have been dominated with 
the perspective that identifies the Kurdish Conflict with the problems related to the 
insufficiencies in the democratic rights and human rights. However, the definitions over the 
Kurdish Conflict can’t be examined without including the discourses of the party leaders on 
the PKK, whether they define it as a terrorist organization or not, and furthermore if they put 
the PKK issue at the core of the Kurdish Conflict and support military action as oppose to 
democratic rights. A few examples can be given as samples to present this variance on the 
definition of the Kurdish Conflict: 
(10) We don’t define the problem as a terrorism problem. I believe that there is a 
need for a scientific perspective. We see the problem as the rejection of social 
cultural and human rights of the Kurdish people. (Nurettin Demirtaş, DTP Party 
Leader, 5 November 2007) 
(11) Turkey has a Kurdish problem. We have self-confidence and democratic 
courage to face this problem. However, we will never accept that this problem 
would be used for terrorism. (Erdoğan, 11 August 2005) 
The analysis of the discourses on the Kurdish Conflict suggests that AKP leader 
Erdoğan has differentiated the Kurdish Conflict that needs to be solved through democratic 
means from the PKK issue that refers to the terrorism problem. The Turkish political parties 
recognize PKK as a terrorist organization whereas the Kurdish political parties refrain from 
referring to the organization as terrorist organization and instead use the word “guerilla”. This 
creates a tension between the Turkish parties and the Kurdish parties and when the AKP 
leader and Prime Minister Erdoğan refused to have meetings with the DTP leaders because 
they did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, the tension became more visible. 
Erdoğan justified his refusal to meet with the Kurdish political party DTP by stating that:  
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(12) The world has recognized that the PKK is a terrorist organization but DTP has 
been protecting the murderers and presenting them as their martyrs, and then 
expect the attention of the Prime Minister of this country. This is not going to 
happen. I will speak with you only after you recognize the PKK as a terrorist 
organization. (Erdoğan, 5 April 2006) 
The definition of PKK actually deteriorated relations not only between the AKP and DTP, but 
also between the EU and the Kurdish parties. Starting with 2004, the EU Progress Reports 
recognized PKK as a terrorist organization however this created problems between the 
Kurdish political parties and the EU. As the EU recognized the PKK as a terrorist 
organization, demanded the Kurdish political parties to de-link themselves from PKK and to 
recognize it as the terrorist organization, the positive attitudes of the Kurdish political parties 
towards the EU have changed. The Kurdish party leader, Demirtaş, considered the demands 
of EU as impositions and expressed that: 
(13) EU should abandon its impositions on us. Party should decide what to call 
what. (Nurettin Demirtaş, 4 November 2007)  
The discourses on the definition of the problem are crucially important as each 
definition proposes different ways to tackle with the issue. While identifying the Kurdish 
problem with the lack of democratic rights proposes an increase in the democratic rights so 
that a peaceful resolution can be achieved, the identification of the problem with terrorism 
proposes that the only way to solve this problem is the military operations. Yet, as has been 
discussed before, the problem with the definitions manifest themselves not only on the 
definition of the Kurdish, but also on the status of the Kurds, whether they are considered to 
be minorities, founder members, or the citizens who have equal rights in Turkey. To make a 
deeper analysis, the next topic focuses on the issue of defining the Kurds. 
 
5.1. 3. The definition of Kurds 
 Another topic that is common in the discourses of the political party leaders on the 
issue of reforms related to the Kurdish conflict is their reference to Kurds, whether as 
minorities, primary components of Turkish Republic (asli unsur), Kurdish people (Kürt halkı), 
or Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. As the discourses put the definition of Kurds to the 
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heart of their justifications for being in favor or against the reform process, the definition of 
Kurds becomes more problematic.  
 The debate on the definition of Kurds has been significant not only in the discourses of 
the party leaders in Turkey, but also within the EU itself. The 2000 Progress Report, the 
wording used for the Kurds was the “Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin” while the Progress 
Reports of 2001, 2002 and 2003 made references to "Kurdish" language and culture but 
included no reference to the people. In 2004, the report used the wording “Turkish citizens of 
Kurdish origin” again together with the word “Kurds”. However, the definition in the 2006 
Report was different from the others: 
A comprehensive strategy should be pursued, to achieve the socio-economic 
development of the region and the establishment of conditions for the Kurdish 
population to enjoy full rights and freedoms. (European Commission, 2006, p.23),  
After the definition of Kurds as a population in the 2006 Report, the next progress reports also 
defined the Kurds as such: 
Further efforts are needed in order to create the conditions for the predominantly 
Kurdish population to enjoy full rights and freedoms. (European Commission, 2008, 
p.28) 
Over the years, the definition of Kurds differed in the Progress Reports, the references 
to the Kurdish population increased, and the EU reports allocated more space to discuss the 
Kurdish Conflict and what kind of reforms are needed, whether they are implemented or not. 
Kurds have been referred differently in speeches in Turkey and while the definition of Kurds 
have always been problematic in the political discourses, especially when the Kurds were 
defined as minorities in the EU Progress Report in 2004, the Kurdish political Party DEHAP 
reacted to this reference: 
(14) We defend that Kurds are not minorities. Kurds never perceived themselves as 
minorities, never expressed it like that. Kurds are the founding members of the 
Republic. (Tuncer Bakırhan, DEHAP Leader, 8 October 2004).  
The reactions to the EU’s definition of Kurds as minority are not limited to the year 2004 and 
with DEHAP. Many politicians have been rejecting the definition of Kurdish people as 
minorities afterwards as well; 
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(15) Turkey does not have the concept of Kurdish minority. Kurds are one of the 
components of our country. (Erdoğan, 11 April 2005) 
(16) The claims that define my citizens of Kurdish origin as minorities are based on 
the lack of knowledge. My citizens of Kurdish origin can’t be defined as minority; 
they are the primary components of this country. (Erdoğan, 19 March 2007) 
(17) Our primary aim is to make Turkey a democratic republic. We will work for 
brotherhood. We will create an environment where Kurdish people will be able to 
represent their identities and culture freely. (Ahmet Türk, DTP Leader, 16 July 
2007) 
(18) We have been living together for a thousand years with our brothers of Kurdish 
origin with and we developed brotherhood and kinship notion with them. They are 
honorable individuals of the Turkish Republic and they already have equal rights 
in Turkey. (Bahçeli, 8 September 2009) 
The definition of the Kurds is a major issue and the reason it has dominated the speeches of 
party leaders through different references is that, the definition also signals the actors’ 
perceptions of rights to be granted to Kurds. This is clear in the following example; 
(19) Kurds are the founding members of the Republic. With that status, they want to 
use their rights which are stated in the Constitution and laws. (Tuncer Bakırhan, 8 
March 2004) 
(20) One of our significant problems is Southeast...We will solve this issue with 
logic, by embracing the values of the Republic, human rights, freedoms, 
recognizing the citizenship rights by putting democracy at the core. (Kılıçdaroğlu, 
18 December 2010) 
As the discourses manifest, the definition of the status of Kurds is linked with the argument 
on the democratic rights, whether the Kurds should have the minority rights, rights of a 
founding member or that they already have equal rights. The problem of defining the rights of 
Kurds gets more complicated when the EU definition of Kurds as minorities has been taken 
into account. In fact, because of this definition, the EU has been accused of trying to create 
“artificial minorities” (yapay azınlık) in Turkey and that has become another argument to be 
used against the EU by some political leaders.  
(21) We have high expectations from the EU that would contribute to Turkey. 
However, discussions on artificial minorities will not benefit anyone. Kurds, 
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Albanians, Arabs, Circassians, Georgians are all primary components of the 
society. (Baykal, 27 October 2004) 
(22) European Union’s impositions on Turkey to have definitions for the artificial 
minorities are the primary reasons for the situation today. (Bahçeli, 4 May 2005) 
As these debates show the definition of Kurds is linked to the anti-EU discourse in Turkey. 
However, the issue is not limited with the definition of Kurds, but the more challenging one 
comes on the debates on the Kurdish rights: whether they should be referred to as cultural 
rights, minority rights, or an overall increase in the democratic rights of citizens of Turkey. In 
the next part, the issue of rights of Kurdish people will be analyzed. 
 
5.1. 4. The Rights of the Kurdish People 
As the rights of the Kurdish people emerges as another topic that the discourses focus 
on, once again, it should be underlined that the topics listed above are all interconnected to 
each other and the differences in the definition of one issue or people, lead to differences in 
the discourse in the following issues and the rights of the Kurdish people. The rights of 
Kurdish people is an issue that is seen as part of the solution of the Kurdish Conflict which is 
linked with democratization and it builds upon the Kurdish definition, therefore, it can be 
considered as the last step of the construction of themes dominating the discourses on the 
Kurdish conflict.  
Closely related to the issue of defining the Kurds as national minorities, founding 
members, Kurdish people or Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, what the analysis presents is 
that different perspectives exist on the definition of the rights of the Kurdish people and these 
arguments focus on democratic rights or equality that are already existing, as in the case in 
MHP:  
(23) What the European Union demands from Turkey is to set a political and legal 
status for the so-called national minorities and to express this in the Constitution. 
However, it is clear that making a discrimination and classification among the 
citizens of Turkey who have equal rights will initiate the process of ethnic conflict 
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The Kurdish political parties link the Kurdish Conflict to the democratic deficiencies which 
prevent Kurdish people to enjoy their rights in Turkey; therefore they use a discourse that is 
based on the importance of democratization for the resolution of the issue. In this process, the 
Kurdish political parties have been identifying rights such as the education in Kurdish, 
broadcasting in Kurdish, use of Kurdish in public spaces. In addition, while stating that these 
rights are crucial for the Kurdish people, they also use the EU membership of Turkey as part 
of their discourses. In their discourses, it is underlined that democracy will be internalized 
once the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey is resolved. Through these speeches, they put the 
Kurdish Conflict as the root of the lack of democracy in Turkey and a few passages that 
represent these ideas are; 
(24) Kurdish problem can be solved only through improvements in democracy and 
the circumstances are ready for that. (Tuğluk & Türk, DTP Co-Presidents, 29 
March 2006) 
(25) One of the aims of DTP is to change and transform Turkey through further 
democratic reforms. DTP gives importance to Turkey’s EU process and supports 
it. (Tuğluk, 17 November 2005) 
Yet, the use of EU membership in the process of defining the Kurdish rights is not 
employed only in the discourses of the Kurdish political parties but also in the discourses of 
Erdoğan. As he presents the EU membership as a means to increase the level of democracy, 
he makes references to the reforms that will increase the rights of the Kurdish people; 
however he avoids using the wording “Kurdish rights” and underlines that the reforms are 
intended to increase the overall level of democracy and the democratic rights of the citizens of 
Turkey: 
(26) The reforms are taking place not because EU forced us to do so but to make 
sure that no citizen would be deprived of their democratic rights and the Turkish 
people would enjoy their rights at the utmost level through legal adjustments. 
(Erdoğan, November 2003) 
(27) I receive questions about the future of the Kurdish issue and each time, I 
explain that as the Prime Minister of this country, it is my problem. I can state that 
about all the problems Turkey has; they are all my problems. We are a powerful 
state and as a nation, we are going to solve each issue by providing more 
democratic rights and citizenship rights in terms of Constitutional reforms, with 
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the legacy we received from the founders of the Republic and the Republican 
system. (Erdoğan, 12 August 2005) 
(28) We have to differentiate the terrorism problem from the societal problem. 
Terrorism problem is different and we will continue our fight against the terrorists. 
However, to solve the societal problem, we have to come up with socio-economic 
and cultural solutions. (Erdoğan, 21 August 2005) 
(29) On our path towards democracy, we accept the democratization in the context 
of individual rights and fredoms, and we will make sure that everyone accepts it 
that way. Turkey will take every necessary step for that. However, we will never 
accept the impositions on the collective rights and freedoms. (Baykal, 1 January 
2006) 
(30) CHP does not have ethnic hatred. Everyone will learn their mother languages, 
will speak it, broadcast in the mother language and publish newspapers. It should 
be known that we love everyone, we love Kurds. (Baykal, 6 June 2008) 
The CHP discourse under Kılıçdaroğlu leadership has also been in favor of the increase in the 
democratic rights and unlike Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu makes reference to the Kurdish rights, 
especially cultural rights: 
(31) We should continue working for the Kurdish cultural rights. Private 
broadcasting and equal opportunities must be provided in the Southeastern part of 
Turkey. An understanding based on feudalistic and exclusionist policies can only 
bring terror. Instead, we should focus on education and health services and women 
rights. (Kılıçdaroğlu, 13 April 2010) 
While the discourses of BDP, DTP, AKP, CHP have references to the democracy level and 
the need to provide more rights, the discourse of MHP presents a different trend on the rights 
and the necessity to adopt reforms. MHP leader has been arguing that all citizens are already 
enjoying equal rights and furthermore, it is wrong to associate the terrorism problem and 
terrorist attacks that have been increasing since the start of the EU accession process, with the 
democratization issue. The rhetoric manifests itself in many cases; 
(32) The reason that the separatist movement and the attacks are increasing is the 
government’s attempt to associate the terrorism problem with the democracy issue 
and especially the EU’s impositions on the subject. EU, to which AKP has 
surrendered, has named some of our citizens as national and ethnic minorities and 
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demanded Turkey to recognize them by giving them political status which goes 
beyond cultural rights and expression of this in the Constitution. With the purpose 
of improving so-called human rights, freedoms and democracy… the Prime 
Minister has started the process that will give legitimacy to the separatist terror 
organization through his so-called democratic opening. (Bahçeli, 2009) 
MHP’s claim that AKP was legitimizing the demands of the terrorist organization goes one 
step further and also states that AKP and PKK are sharing the same goals. MHP states that 
AKP and PKK are demanding the same reforms which would bring destruction to Turkey and 
five points have been identified by Bahçeli to demonstrate the similarities between AKP and 
PKK;  
(33) 1. “Re-shaping the Turkish national identity and coming up with a concept of 
“Türkiyelilik” as a supra-identity, this is totally nonsense, 
2. Inclusion of other languages than Turkish into the education system step by step and 
the use of these languages in public services, 
3. Disintegration the concept of nation and instead giving people the opportunity to 
participate in the politics based on ethnic identity in a multi-national structure, 
4. Giving amnesty to the terrorists, (by Đmralı murderer having the first line for the 
amnesty), and giving them opportunities to participate in the politics, 
5. By destructing the unitary structure, making transition to federalism through 
democratic autonomy”  (Bahçeli, 2010) 
As the speech demonstrates, the MHP leader has been presenting the reform process as the 
demands of the PKK and thus takes a critical stance towards the reform process. Indeed, the 
references to the destruction that will be brought by the reforms are very commonly employed 
by the leader.   
In the discourses on the rights of the Kurdish people, it is visible that division is 
dominating the speeches. While the AKP and CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu leadership have 
constructed the terrorism problem and the Kurdish issue as two separate issues, the Kurdish 
Conflict has been related to the lack of sufficient democracy in Turkey. Referring to the issue, 
the Kurdish political parties do not touch upon the problematic notion of PKK terrorism and 
instead, refer to the Kurdish Conflict only as an issue of democracy. MHP focuses on the 
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terrorism problem and does not express that a societal problem such as Kurdish Conflict 
exists, instead the terrorism problem has been presented as the only problem, and therefore 
the improvements in the rights of the Kurdish people and the reform process have been 
viewed as supporting the separatist movement.  
The way that these common themes are formed and used in the discourses is 
interesting because in addition to outlying the differences in conceptualizations and 
definitions of the issues, they also indicate the different arguments the party leaders use to 
justify their positions. In all themes, the concepts of modernity, democracy, and human rights 
have been constantly used by the domestic political party leaders, whether to support their 
arguments or to oppose the argument of the other political actors. However, the political party 
leaders prefer using these concepts mostly because these concepts are perceived as national 
goals by the people in Turkey. Because these concepts are appealing for majority of the 
people, the party leaders avoid making clarifying the way they use these concepts and use 
these concepts in a vague way which further complicates the communication channels and 
decreases the possibility of reaching a concensus on the ways to resolve the conflict. After 
examining the common themes that are used in the discourses on Kurdish conflict, for deeper 
analyses and an analytical perspective, in the second part, the theories will be used to explain 
this variety and differences in the discourses. While doing that, especially theories on the 
domestic impact of Europeanization on the accession countries will be employed.  
5.2. An analysis of discourses with the use of concept Euroscepticism 
The EU negotiations represent a two-level game for Turkey. While the government is 
negotiating with the EU in the international level, it is also trying to convince the domestic 
actors on the decisions taken during the negotiations. In the negotiation process, the Kurdish 
Conflict and the EU membership are linked to each other since the Progress Reports have 
started to stress the necessity to adopt and implement reforms on the Kurdish Conflict. The 
discourses of the political party leaders show that, especially on the issue of Kurdish conflict, 
reaching a consensus is more challenging for the governing party. As the differences in the 
arguments and disagreements on the themes present, the leaders have the tendency to combine 
the Kurdish conflict and EU membership issues in their speeches and usually present the 
reform process to support the EU membership by stressing the advantages of the process or to 
criticize the EU. Therefore, the discourses actually represent not only the parties’ approaches 
to the reform process on Kurdish conflict but also their general attitude towards the European 
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Union. These discourses are connected to the concept of Euroscepticism. As Yılmaz suggests 
(2011a), after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the Euroscepticism, especially the party 
Euroscepticism increased in Turkey. This increase was interesting because it was the year 
when Turkey was recognized as a candidate to the EU. As the arguments on the Kurdish 
conflict reflect party-based Euroscepticism, the theories of Euroscepticism guide us to analyze 
the discourses on the reform process on the Kurdish conflict in a more accurate and analytical 
way.  
The discourses on the reforms on the Kurdish Conflict have placed the reform process 
within the Europeanization process, even though the domestic pressure for the reforms is 
undeniable. On the impact of Europeanization, Heritier and Knill (2001) identify contested 
interest constellation and a relatively even distribution of powers and resources across 
opposing actor coalitions as the factors that affect the EU’s impact on the national regulatory 
system. The Turkish case fits to the part where it is stated that the potential impact of 
Europeanization is expected to be lower in cases where one actor coalition is dominant and 
resources are not distributed equally. As this is case in the AKP government, the EU-induced 
changes have not influenced the distribution of power much. Even though the EU 
strengthened the claims of the Kurdish political parties, supported the reform process and 
empowered the Kurdish side, this involvement is far beyond changing the domestic 
distribution of powers on the Kurdish Conflict. In fact, the single-party government became 
the target of the critiques during the reform process and that made the reform process more 
difficult. The parties of the opposition were dominated with Eurosceptic stance which was 
reflected to their positions towards the Kurdish problem. A further analysis, introducing the 
concept of Euroscepticism will be useful at this point.  
The concept of Euroscepticism can be defined as the qualified or unqualified 
opposition to the process of Europeanization (Taggart 1998, p.366). Building upon the 
definition, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) make a division as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is defined as being in opposition to the EU integration 
on the principle or ideologically, whereas soft Euroscepticism is defined as having some 
reservations about the integration but not rejecting integration totally.  
In this definition, while AKP and the Kurdish political parties represent the pro-EU 
side, CHP represents the soft-Euroscepticism until 2007, whereas MHP is a hard-Eurosceptic 
party.  The reason that CHP is identified as a soft-Eurosceptic party lies in the argument of 
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Sitter (2001), who states that the Euroscepticism of a party is dependent on its position, 
whether it is in the government or opposition. Following the critiques stating that parties may 
change their positions, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) also agree that a party does not have to 
be hard or soft Eurosceptic all the time, the positions may shift. That has been the case for 
CHP too, after the Copenhagen Summit of 2003, Baykal expressed that they are committed to 
EU and supporting the process; 
(34) [In the process of EU membership,] I am ready to make every contribution I 
can. (Baykal, 22 September 2004) 
However, after the start of accession negotiations in 2005, it is seen that party’s 
position shifted towards a soft-Eurosceptic position. Three reasons can be identified to explain 
this shift in the rhetoric. One of the reasons may be found in the political discourse of the 
leaders of the EU member states, because CHP rhetoric started to differ at a time when the 
debates on establishing privileged association with Turkey were dominant in the European 
discourse. As the discussions focused on the establishment of a privileged association instead 
of membership, the change in the CHP discourse became visible. Another reason behind this 
shift is expressed by Yılmaz who states that Baykal and CHP shifted to a soft-Eurosceptic 
position because they realized that “the EU flag had been taken over by the Islamic-
conservative AKP and that opinion polls made it clear that the CHP did not stand a chance of 
winning the next elections” (2011a, p.12). As Sitter (2001) argues, parties can have 
Eurosceptic positions if they realize that they are not going to be the main governing party but 
stay in the opposition. The third reason can be identified as the end of PKK’s decision of 
inaction in 2004, which was followed by increasing number of the terrorist attacks. In this 
non-secured environment, CHP leader used these attacks to criticize both the AKP 
government and the EU, with the claim that their initiatives paved the way for the terrorists to 
act in comfort. 
At this point, another theory comes into the picture that is proposed by Hooghe & 
Marks (2009) and Hix and Lord (1997). They state that whether a party will acquire a 
Eurosceptic position or not depends on its position in the political system, whether it is in the 
government or the opposition. The shift of CHP rhetoric fits to that explanation because while 
before the start of the accession negotiations they were underlining their support and 
motivation for the membership and the reform process, after 2005, discourses changed and the 
EU membership was not depicted as a possibility. 
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(35) It seems that in the eyes of the European countries, Turkey’s EU membership 
is no longer a realistic political aim. If Turkey is not going to be a member of the 
EU, we need to be informed. (Baykal, 10 February 2007) 
The logic behind this argument is that, because the parties in the government represent 
the left-right class and sectoral alliances, these parties adopt a pro-EU position. This theory is 
useful to explain AKP’s pro-EU stance. From the day it came to the power, AKP has been 
emphasizing their pro-EU stance and in fact, as Yılmaz (2011a) argues, the Europeanization 
of Turkey has started with the 2002 elections, which brought AKP to power. 
As discussed in the theory on the party positions in the politics, the leader of the other 
opposition party, Bahçeli, also presents a Eurosceptic position; 
(36) It is very clear that EU does not want to recognize Turkey as a member with 
equal rights. In this imaginary negotiation process, Turkey’s full membership is no 
longer discussed; in fact, the negotiations were started the consent of the AKP 
government who was aware of this. The purpose of the negotiations is to put 
Turkey at the orbit of the EU. Even for this second class partnership, Turkey has 
to wait for a long time and whether this comes true or not depends on the 
impositions of the EU. (Bahçeli, 16 June 2009) 
Although Kurdish political parties represent Kurdish nationalists and it would be 
expected from them to manifest a hard-Eurosceptic position like MHP, they show a pro-EU 
position and that is the case in all the Kurdish political parties whose leaders’ discourses have 
been examined in this study, DEHAP, DTP, and BDP. As they underline their commitments 
to the EU process, they also put the Kurdish conflict at the core of the accession process.  
(37) In the EU membership process, the Kurdish conflict will play the most crucial 
role (Tuncer Bakırhan, DEHAP Leader, 14 January 2005) 
The reason behind this support is that, in the accession process, it is believed that the minority 
rights will be improved and EU can play the most effective role for that. Therefore, while the 
nationalist parties are expected to have hard-Eurosceptic positions on EU and the reform 
process, because of the EU support in their claims, they have a pro-EU position.  
Another theory that explains the hard-Eurosceptic in the discourses comes from 
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) who defined the “identity 
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Euroscepticism”. Identity Euroscepticism, according to them, is based on the idea that 
national identity is threatened by the values and life-styles imported from the EU and its 
powerful member states.  The identity Euroscepticism is dominant in the discourses of 
Bahçeli, the MHP leader who makes references to the destruction and dissolution of Turkey 
after each reform debate; 
(38) The EU, who is the advocate of terrorist organization and the political agenda 
of the ethnic separatists, views the destruction project [referring to democratic 
opening] as a historical opportunity. (Bahçeli, 20 October 2009) 
The identity Euroscepticism is most frequently used in the situations where the issue is 
minority rights. For the MHP, the EU demands for minority rights indicate a direct threat to 
the national unity of the nation, the real purpose of the reforms is to create “artificial 
minorities”, and initiate the process of disintegration and destruction of the nation-state; 
(39) Recognition of the people as national minorities, securing this through 
Constitution, providing a political and legal status to this artificial division and 
creating a nation apart from the Turkish nation are the impositions of the EU and 
providing broadcasting and education in the mother tongue are the first steps of 
that destruction project. (Bahçeli, 25 February 2009) 
Sorensen (2004) also presents national sovereignty issue as part of the Eurosceptic 
position of a party. In addition to the argument of national sovereignty, ideology can be used 
as another determinant of the Eurosceptic position of the leaders and the parties. As Taggart 
& Szczerbiak (2002) argue, some parties may adopt a Eurosceptic position because of their 
ideologies. While social democratic parties are less expected to have Eurosceptic discourse, 
the centrist parties are expected to manifest hard-Eurosceptic positions, as in the case of 
MHP. 
Another concept that contributes to the analysis of the MHP is called “crisis 
engineering” and refers to a situation which is dominated by an unsolvable problem because 
of the governing party’s ineffective policies. As expressed by Linz (1978 in Yılmaz 2011a), 
the radical parties present the situation in a country as a political crisis and in this 
environment, the mainstream parties are pictured as too weak to tackle with the situation. 
Therefore the radical parties become the authorities that need to take power. In Turkey, MHP 
is a representative of a party that makes “crisis engineering”. The discourses of MHP on the 
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PKK is the most obvious example of this; by giving the example of the PKK’s decision of 
inaction and the rise in the attacks following 2004, MHP arguments picture the country as 
there is a crisis and MHP is the only party to deal with the situation. 
(40) With the experiences and events, it is clear that the policies of AKP failed. 
AKP has given Turkey a breakdown, they turned Turkey into ruins. They are 
trying to survive with selling lies and hope. (Bahçeli, 11 November 2005) 
(41) Prime Minister is in an attempt to commit a Constitutional crime against the 
national unity and the existence of Turkey with his destruction project called the 
“Kurdish opening”. When AKP came to power in 2002, terrorist attacks were 
close to zero, however within seven years, the government has surrounded to the 
terror, intentionally damaged the fight against terrorism, and became a hope and 
inspiration for the separatists. (Bahçeli, 14 September 2009)  
5.3. Arguing For or Against the Reforms 
While leaders argue for or against the reforms on the Kurdish conflict, they use 
different mechanisms to support their arguments. In this part, the use of topoi, fallacies and 
metaphors in the discourses will be examined to see how these ways build support the leaders’ 
positions. 
5.3.1. The use of Topoi 
The arguments for or against the reform process can be further analyzed by making 
reference to the list of topoi as set by Wodak (2001). Wodak (p.74, 2001) describes the topoi 
as the “conclusion rules which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the 
claim”, and in our case, the conclusion would be arguing for or against the reforms. Among 
these topoi, the usefulness and advantage, danger and threat, humanitarianism, responsibility, 
and law and right are the most commonly used ones in the discourses around the reform 
process on the Kurdish Conflict and in this part; the discourses will be examined by linking 
them with the topoi. 
 
5.3.1.A.  The Topos of Usefulness and Advantage 
The topos of usefulness and advantage is explained with the following conditionality: 
if taking an action will be useful, then it should be performed. The topos has three sub-
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categories on the issue of advantage and these are pro bono publico (to the advantage of all), 
pro bono nomis (to the advantage of us), and pro bono eorum (to the advantage of them). The 
use of topos of “to the advantage of all” is most clearly seen in the discourses of the 
governing party: 
(42) By being a full member of the EU, we can contribute to the process of 
reshaping both the Europe and the global power balances. We can protect our own 
interests by being a part of the European family and becoming a model country. 
We can support the spread of European values far beyond and make our country 
the land of freedom. With the historical and cultural heritage that we possess, we 
can refute the thesis of clash of civilizations and instead, construct the harmony of 
the civilizations. (Erdoğan, June 2005) 
(43) The relation between Turkey and European Union is at the intersection of 
interests and values that will be beneficial for both sides. (Erdoğan, November 
2005) 
The discourses that use the topos of usefulness and advantage generally focus on the 
argument that Turkey’s EU membership will be beneficial both for Turkey and the EU. 
However, as the reform process is a two-level game, the governing party also uses the “to the 
advantage of us” argument to increase the support for the reform process in Turkey; 
(44) Turkey and EU are connected to each other through common political, 
economic, and strategic interests. Once Turkey is a member of the EU, it will play 
a leading role with his secular, outward-looking, population and special political 
and strategic activism. In fact, Turkey will have the opportunity to reflect his own 
ideas and interests on the EU decisions and politics. (Erdoğan, April 2003) 
(45) We do not see the EU membership as an end for Turkey but a means to reach 
the level of contemporary civilization” (Erdoğan, April 2003) 
The topos of usefulness and advantage is frequently used by the governing party who is the 
main supporter of the reform process, and the topos has been linked with the benefits of being 
a member for Turkey and its importance for the world. For Turkey, the process will increase 
the human rights and take Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations, whereas for EU 
and the other others, it will represent the rapprochement of civilizations and have a symbolic 
value. While the topos of usefulness and advantage is used by the government, being in favor 
of the membership, the CHP and Kurdish political parties also agree upon the advantages of 
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the membership. However, MHP discourse represents a different topos. While usually the 
parties that are not supportive of the process use the topoi of disadvantage or uselessness, in 
the MHP case, the disadvantages transform themselves into threats; therefore a more extreme 
counter- topos has been used.  
5.3.1. B. The Topos of Danger and Threat 
The topos of danger and threat is based on the conditional that if a political action or 
decision is dangerous and has threatening consequences, it should not be performed (Wodak, 
p.75, 2001). The topos has been used by all the parties; however it is mostly dominating the 
MHP discourse:  
(46) We are experiencing a dangerous shift in the definition and solution of the 
ethnic separatism problem which is closely linked to the terror. The primary aim 
of this shift is to come up with a new definition and give a new status to this 
problem by giving it a new legitimate identity based on the rights. The security 
and separatism issues are not related to the democratic demands for rights, 
individual freedom, pluralistic democracy and political participation; the problem 
that we have is the ethnic separatist terrorism. (Bahçeli, 15 January 2008) 
The reform process has been perceived by MHP as part of the separatist movement, therefore 
the threat was perceived to be against the national unity and integrity and each reform topic 
has been related to that argument, such as the one below;  
(47) The plans of broadcasting in Kurdish by TRT, establishing Kurdish institutes in 
the universities, including Kurdish in the education system as an elective course 
and taking these steps further should be seen as AKP’s promises to the separatist 
movement. (Bahçeli, 27 January 2009) 
(48) The insistence on the use of other languages other than Turkish in public 
spaces is a dangerous step for the construction of a nation. (Bahçeli, 19 October 
2010) 
Bahçeli claims that the reform process is encouraging the terrorist movement, the 
impositions of EU is taking Turkey towards separatism, and he uses the reforms on the 
Kurdish rights to support his ideas on the threat. In fact, his discourses are built upon the 
security concerns which constantly underline that the national unity and sovereignty of 
Turkey is under threat. However, this threat is not caused only by the Kurdish conflict, which 
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refers to the PKK terror in MHP discourses, but also by the EU itself. The skeptical stance 
towards EU is combined with the discourses on the Kurdish conflict and two issues are 
presented as a threat towards Turkey. In some of their discourses, CHP also underlines that 
the reform process has the potential to encourage the separatist movement; however these 
discourses have never been as harsh as the MHP discourses. While MHP and CHP show 
critical positions towards the EU reform process, AKP leader has been stating that the real 
threat would be taking Turkey out of EU accession process. 
(49) The contemporary international system is in the process of globalization. In a 
system like this, staying out of regional blocks would be a potential threat to every 
country. (Erdoğan, 29 May 2003) 
The topos of danger and threat was employed by MHP and CHP mostly during the reform 
process and especially when for the first time Erdoğan acknowledged the “Kurdish issue” in 
2005 and introduced the “democratic opening” concept in 2009. Following these speeches, 
both MHP leader and CHP argued that these moves were dangerous for Turkey: 
(50) Erdoğan’s statement that ‘There is a Kurdish question’ and ‘these problems can 
be solved with increasing the democracy level’ are the discourses that will take the 
Prime Minister to the negotiation table with Đmralı. They say that after PKK leaves 
their arms, the process will follow. What kind of a process are they talking about? 
After that, an amnesty will come, then giving them their political rights etc. The 
government is in a very dangerous and indeed wrong direction. (Baykal, 21 
August 2005) 
(51) The destruction package is supported by the USA, licensed by the EU, 
approved by the Peshmarga, signed by Đmralı and the AKP government has been 
marketing it under the pretext of so-called democratization, freedom and human 
rights. (Bahçeli, 5 January 2010) 
For MHP, the reform process constitutes a threat towards the national unity whereas the CHP 
discourse focuses on the terrorism problem and presents the possibility that the reforms could 
start a process of negotiation with terrorism as the main problem. However, the topos of 
danger and threat has been employed by both parties especially after August 2005 speech of 
Erdoğan on the Kurdish issue and on the issues of democratic opening. With the use of topoi 
of threat and danger, the opposition parties legitimize their critiques of the process and try to 
influence the people to agree that the process is dangerous for Turkey. In fact, this topos has 
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been frequently used to support the opposition parties’ criticisims of the governing party with 
the argument that the AKP government is leading Turkey towards a dangerous position 
therefore both the reform process and the AKP government needs to be opposed not only by 
the political parties but also by the people. 
5.3.1. C. The Topos of Humanitarianism 
The topos of humanitarianism is based on the conditional that if a political action or 
decision does or does not conform to human rights, one should or should not perform it. As 
Wodak argues, the topos can be employed “in every situation where one argues against 
unequal treatment and discrimination” and comes with the principle of equal rights for all 
(2001, p.75). The analysis of the discourses shows that the Kurdish political parties have been 
underlining that through suppression of Kurdish identity, culture, and responsibility, they 
have been experiencing discrimination based on the ethnicity since the early years of the 
Republic; 
(52) It is very sad to see that the state has not adopted a fair and democratic solution 
for the Kurdish issue. The governments prefer to make some legal adjustments 
instead of permanent political, social and economic programs… Initiating the 
Kurdish broadcast in state radios and televisions are inspiring, and it is a 
significant step to end the ignorance towards language and culture that have been 
suppressed for almost hundred years. (Bakırhan, DEHAP, 12 June 2003) 
On the other hand, the Turkish political parties have been stating that Turkey does not 
practice discrimination; on the contrary, every citizen can enjoy their rights as determined in 
the Constitution. Especially during the AKP governments this claim became clear with 
Erdoğan’s emphasis on citizenship. 
(53) I’m a Prime Minister who got %85 votes from his Kurdish citizens. We don’t 
have discrimination but constitutional citizenship. (Erdoğan, 12 July 2003)  
(54) We do not have a Kurdish problem. Our approach is based on the conscience 
of citizenship. No matter how many ethnic components Turkey has, we are in an 
equal distance to all of them. We do not make a single discrimination among them. 
(Erdoğan, 11 April 2005) 
(55) If there is a problem in the East, it is my problem; so are the problems in the 
Southeast, West, Aegean, Black Sea regions, wherever you can think of, they are 
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my problems. But if other political leaders are not looking at these as problems, 
then it’s not my concern. In fact, they are using expressions of discrimination 
while I embrace all 72 million people without making discrimination. (Erdoğan, 
21 August 2005) 
CHP leader Baykal also was rejecting discrimination; 
“Turkey is not a country based on the discrimination on the basis of race or blood. 
Turkey is a country of togetherness, a country of political consciousness, a country 
formed by people coming together as a result of their political preferences. There is no 
discrimination on the basis of blood or race” (Baykal, 5 June 2008) 
Because the discourses of the Kurdish political parties have been focusing on the topos 
of humanitarianism with the claim that they have been deprived of their rights, as a counter-
argument, the Turkish political parties have been arguing that the problem is related with the 
insufficient level of democracy in Turkey, but it is a problem that all the citizens of Turkey 
have been experiencing, that it is not peculiar to Kurdish people. In fact, to support this 
argument, each time Erdoğan has been speaking in favor of the reform process, he has been 
stressing upon the other ethnicities that are also experiencing problems in Turkey, such as;  
(56) The Kurdish issue is not a problem of some part of the nation, but it is a 
problem for all of us… All the problems are problems of the citizens of Turkish 
Republic, whether they are Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, Abkhazian, or Laz. 
(Erdoğan, 12 August 2005) 
(57) The problems of the citizens of Kurdish origin are as much as those of Turkish 
citizens. The problems of the citizens of Laz origin are as much as those of 
citizens of Turkish origin...If it is about being in the parliament, they are in the 
parliament. If it’s about being in the high positions in the administration, they are 
already there. They have no problems. (Erdoğan, 6 November 2005)  
The use of topos of humanitarianism also encourages the inclusion of EU in the reform 
process through building the arguments on the international human rights. This topos is 
inherently linked with the topos of responsibility; the parties argue that because it is a problem 
of human rights, it is the responsibility of the state to tackle with the issue. MHP is the only 
party who does not refer to the topos of humanitarianism or responsibility and the reason 
behind this avoidance is the conceptualization of the Kurdish conflict by MHP, which is 
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strictly defined as a terrorism problem. Because of this, the human rights argument is not used 
and the state’s responsibility can only be defined as the state’s responsibility to stop the 
terrorist attacks.  In the following part, the use of topos of responsibility in the discourses will 
be examined. 
5.3.1. D. The topos of Responsibility 
The topos of responsibility is based on the conditionality that, “because a state or a 
group of persons is responsible for the emergence of specific problems, it or they should act in 
order to find solutions to these problems” (Wodak, 2001, p.75).  In the discourses examined in 
this study, for the Kurdish political parties, the topos of responsibility refers to the emergence 
and continuation of the Kurdish Conflict because of the state oppression and puts the state at 
the center of the solutions: 
(58) Even though we are looking for peace and democracy, we see that the state has 
been putting more oppression on Kurds, without making use of the democratic 
opportunities. The state has been insisting on the deadlock. (Ahmet Türk, 22 April 
2009) 
The attitude of government has been criticized a lot by the Kurdish political parties. As a 
response to the critiques which sometimes turn out to be accusations, the Turkish political 
parties, especially the AKP, have been stating that it is government’s task to tackle with the 
issue: 
(59) Do the ethnic groups have problems? Yes, they do. Turk, Kurd, Laz, 
Circassian, Georgian, Abkhazian, Roman, they all have their issues…The 
percentage does not matter, as the government it’s your responsibility to solve 
these issues. (Erdoğan, 2010) 
Bahçeli also agrees that the state is responsible for tackling with the issue; however he defines 
the responsibility from a different point of view; 
(60) It’s the Constitutional mission and responsibility of the government to tackle 
with the problems of terror and ethnic separatism. (Bahçeli, 29 September 2009) 
As it is clear in the discourses, the topoi are used in the discourses to legitimize and 
support the positions of the parties and every topos is linked to the other topoi. Furthermore, 
the use of topoi is closely linked with the common themes used in the discourses because the 
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topoi are based on the definitions of the issues according to the parties. As it is the case in 
MHP, because the problem is terrorism problem, the use of topos of humanitarianism is 
irrelevant. Or, as it is the case in DTP, because the problem is caused by the insufficient level 
of democracy, the problem is a humanitarian one and it is the responsibility of the state to 
make necessary reforms. In addition to the use of topos to support the arguments, the political 
party leaders also use argumentative fallacies and in the following part, the fallacies will be 
identified. 
5.3.2. Argumentative Fallacies  
Argumentative fallacies have been used by the leaders of the political parties to argue 
for or against the reform process. A fallacy is defined as “any argument employed or topic 
suggested for the purpose, or with the probability of producing the effect of deception, or of 
causing some erroneous opinion to be entertained by any person to whose mind such an 
argument may have been presented (Benthan 1824/1962, p.3 in Tekin 2010).  
The analysis of the discourses on the EU-induced reforms on the Kurdish conflict 
reveals that two fallacies have been used most, and these are the fallacy of authority and the 
fallacy of extreme case formulation. 
5.3.3. A. The Fallacy of Authority 
In the fallacy of authority, in order to support their arguments, speakers refer to the 
authorities by making quotations from or mentioning the name of the authority. The analysis 
shows that, in the discourses around the reform process, Atatürk has been quoted the most, by 
all the Turkish political parties. 
(61) Our ideal Turkey is the one which has reached the Western civilizations; 
secular, democratic, prosperous and walking in the direction pointed by Atatürk. 
EU is the most effective and important means for that. (Erdoğan, September 2004) 
As Erdoğan makes quotations from Atatürtk to support the membership process and later the 
reform process, Bahçeli also uses quotations but to demonstrate that the government is 
moving towards a different direction on the issue of use of Kurdish language; 
(62) Just as Atatürk states; “Do you know why we lost the Balkans? There is only 
one reason for that, and that is the language institutions that were established by 
the Slavic research communities. When they woke up the national consciousness 
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of the people who were living among us, then we had to withdraw from the 
Balkans (Bahçeli, 17 October 2009) 
5.3.2.B. The Fallacy of Extreme Case Formulation 
With the fallacy of extreme case formulation, the speakers condemn an action or a policy 
through “starkly exaggerated terms” (Van Dijk 2000, p.291 in Tekin 2011). The extreme case 
formulation is mostly dominant in the discourses of MHP and their arguments against the 
reform process.  
(63) “The primary aim of the politicization strategy of the terrorist organization that 
was adopted in 2002 is to improve and spread the local languages as a part of o 
project of recognition of the Kurdish identity. Within six years, enforcements were 
made to have further concessions and by 1 January 2009, TRT has come to the 
point of broadcasting in Kurdish. For us, the national state structure was betrayed 
by the government, was stabbed in the back and received a deadly wound” 
(Bahçeli, 6 January 2009) 
As the speech demonstrates, when the issue is the reforms related to the Kurdish language, 
MHP uses extreme case formulation and claims that these steps are the steps towards 
destruction. Yet, MHP is not the only actor who uses that fallacy. CHP, who identifies itself 
as a pro-EU party, also uses this fallacy even if not often as MHP: 
(64) With the discussions on the artificial minorities, Turkey is being trapped. 
However, Turkish people are way too experienced to not to fall in this trap 
(Baykal, 26 October 2004) 
The Turkish political parties have been using the fallacies to support their arguments 
and in order to increase the credibility of the arguments, references to Atatürk and presenting 
the case as leading towards a destruction, which is an example of extreme case formation, are 
the two ways that are used most frequently. The reason behing making references to Atatürk 
is that, as the founder of the Republic and being representative of the modernity movement in 
Turkey, he is one of the figures who is very influential for the people in Turkey. While the 
words of Atatürk are influential for increasing the support of Turkish people, the extreme case 
formulation is also effectively used for the masses because the danger of threat towards 
national security and unity is another motive for the people in Turkey to support or oppose an 
argument. Both methods are used to support the claims of the party leaders and increase the 
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credibility of their arguments. In addition to the use of fallacies, use of metaphors is another 
method of supporting arguments whic is also commonly used in the discourses. 
5.3.4. Use of Metaphors 
The referral to metaphors is a frequent tactic used by the political leaders in their 
discourses. They are used with the purpose of political communication, persuasion, 
legitimization, justification or enhancing group solidarity. One of the findings of this 
research is that, on the discourses on the Kurdish conflict, the metaphors are frequently 
used with the purpose of persuasion and justification. The leaders use metaphors to 
increase their credibility and to justify their arguments in order to illustrate a clear picture 
for the audience. In addition, consistency on using similar metaphors is another finding of 
this research. This study shows that the same metaphors are repeated for many times by the 
same leaders over the years.  
In this analysis, the most frequently used metaphors can be grouped as being either 
supportive of the reform process or as opposing it; 
 
Supportive of The Reform Process Opposition to the Reform Process 
The Family Metaphor The Metaphor of Destruction 
The Civilization Metaphor The Metaphor of Surrendering 
The Bridge Metaphor The Metaphor of Trap 
Table 2. Metaphors dominant in the discourses 
 
The first group of the metaphors, namely the supportive metaphors, is used by AKP Leader 
Erdoğan in order to support the EU accession process and the reforms on the Kurdish 
conflict. For this purpose, three metaphors have been used. The first one is the family 
metaphor; 
(65) By being a full member of the EU, we can contribute to the process of 
reshaping both Europe and the global power balances. We can protect our own 
interests by being a part of the European family and becoming a model country 
(Erdoğan, June 2005) 
The family argument is used as a response to the debates in Turkey on Turkey’s 
Europeanness, which focuses on the question of whether Turkey will be a part of the EU or 
not. While the skepticism was increasing in Turkey, the family metaphor has been used to 
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emphasize the already existing relations between Turkey and EU and the benefits of being a 
part of this family.  
The second metaphor is the civilization metaphor and it has been used mostly after the 9/11 
attacks, when the relations between the Eastern and the Western civilizations were tense. In 
accordance with Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, the possibility of establishing 
peaceful relations between the civilizations has been questioned by the people of the EU 
member states. In this environment, as a country that is representing a different civilization 
than EU, Turkey’s membership to EU has been presented as the rapprochement that would 
bring two civilizations closer. 
(66) Turkey will be part of the EU by representing the rapprochement of the 
civilizations. (Erdoğan, July 2004) 
In the discourses of Erdoğan, the bridge metaphor has also been used; however the idea that 
Turkey is a bridge between the East and the West is an old one. Linked with the metaphor of 
civilizations, the bridge metaphor depicts Turkey as a country that could foster peace between 
the civilizations by playing the role of a bridge.  
(67) I have a dream, in which by being a member to the EU, Turkey is representing 
the strongest bridge for the meeting of the civilizations while the clash of 
civilizations was trying to bring twilight to the world. (Erdoğan, 13 October 2003)  
While the metaphors to support the EU accession process have been recurrently used by 
Erdoğan, the opposition parties have used metaphors that have been presenting an opposition 
to the EU accession process. The opposing metaphors use the themes of destruction, 
surrendering and trap. One of the most frequently used metaphors is the destruction metaphor 
which underlines that EU process is taking Turkey towards destruction; 
(68) While Nationalist Movement is underlining that the EU’s vision of identifying 
some of our citizens as national and ethnic minorities is dangerous, AKP mentality 
has named that process as modernity. With the directions AKP received from the 
Brussels, the party brought the country to the edge of destruction. (Bahçeli, 20 
July 2010) 
(69) Re-defining Turkish nation and national identities, protecting the new 
definitions as founding identities under the Constitution, recognizing Kurdish 
language as the language of education and political communication, and setting 
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the ground for the destruction of Turkey’s unitary political structure on the basis 
of “autonomous region-federalism” are the major steps of this betrayal project. 
(Bahçeli, 4 March 2008) 
The second metaphor is the metaphor of surrendering and it presents the reform process as a 
war between the Turkish state and PKK. In this process, Turkish state has been surrendering 
to the demands of PKK with the reforms; 
(70) Broadcasting all day in languages other than Turkish in TRT is the sign of 
surrendering to the armed pressure of the mountain establishment of PKK and the 
political demands of PKK representatives in the cities. (Bahçeli, 4 June 2008) 
The third metaphor is used in the discourses of Baykal in his statements on the reform process 
and his discussions on the definition of the minorities which are designed to entrap Turkey. 
The purpose of using this metaphor has been indicating the dangers of the reform process and 
stressing upon the internal and external threats towards Turkey; 
(71) With the discussions on the artificial minorities, Turkey is being trapped. 
However, Turkish people are way too experienced to not to fall in this trap. 
(Baykal, 26 October 2004) 
As the use of the metaphors show, all parties, except the Kurdish political parties, use 
metaphors frequently. While the Turkish political parties refer to metaphors to support their 
arguments, the Kurdish political parties do not use metaphors frequently. Instead, they resort 
to the use of topoi that have been already explained. Among the Turkish political party 
leaders, there is variance in terms of the metaphors they use. MHP uses metaphors of 
destruction and surrendering, whereas CHP focuses on the potential threats of the reform 
process on Turkey. AKP is the only party that uses metaphors not to undermine the reform 
process, but to support it. This distinguishing feature of AKP actually comes from the fact that 
AKP is the main governing party and it is the main sponsor of the reform process, therefore it 
is expected from AKP to support the process. CHP, representing the soft-Euro-skepticism in 
Turkey, uses metaphors that oppose to the reform process especially on the Kurdish conflict; 
however they never represent a hard-Eurosceptic position as MHP does. This difference 
between the parties is visible both in their degree of Euro-skepticism and the metaphors they 
use. On the one hand, while CHP identifies some part of the reform process with threat, it 
does not generally oppose to the reforms, but only to the part on the definition of the 
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minorities. On the other hand, MHP opposes to the each step taken in the reform process and 
therefore, uses metaphors that are more exaggerated.  
5.4. Conclusion  
Because the parties, and therefore the party leaders, have to justify their policies to their 
national audiences to increase their popularity in the country, in the discourses of the political 
party leaders on the Kurdish conflict, different methods are used to legitimize the arguments 
of the party leaders. Even though some consistency is visible in the discourses, like the 
discourses vary from person to person, they also change over time. In the discourses on the 
Kurdish conflict, the most crucial turning points that cause this change are; the opening of the 
EU accession negotiations in 2005, and the end of PKK’s decision of inaction in 2004 and the 
2007 national elections. In addition, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement that “There is a 
Kurdish issue” (August, 2005) and his speeches on democratic opening in 2009 were also 
influential over the discourses of the opposition parties, CHP and MHP. As the criticisms 
focus on the relation between the EU accession process and the reforms on the Kurdish 
conflict, both of the issues became points to criticize each other.  
One of the findings of this research is that, only the discourses of the MHP leader Bahçeli 
are consistent in time. Presenting a hard-Eurosceptic position, in spite of the developments in 
the domestic and the international arena, such as opening of the accession negotiations and the 
acknowledgement of the Kurdish issue by Erdoğan, contribute to the discourses of Bahçeli as 
points to criticize the reform process; they do not affect the overall position of the party or the 
leader. Throughout the years, the argument of national and territorial unity has been the basis 
of the arguments against the EU reform process, and the reforms have been considered as part 
of a bigger plan which aims to support separatist movement. In fact, especially in the years 
2008 and 2009, when the reform process started to accelerate again, the discourses identified 
the EU, AKP, and PKK as representing the same side and possessing a threat towards 
integrity of Turkey. MHP’s representation in the parliament after 2007 is also another 
influential factor that affected the discourses. 
Identified as a pro-EU party, CHP has been through the most significant change between 
the years 2002 and 2010. In 2002, the discourses of Baykal were supportive of the EU 
process, however after the opening of the negotiations with EU in 2005, CHP rhetoric shifted. 
Three domestic factors also contributed to this shift: The end of the PKK’s decision of 
inaction which resulted in an increase in the number and intensity of the attacks and AKP’s 
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influence over the EU accession process and AKP’s increasing popularity. For the next two 
years, arguing that the EU does not want to take Turkey as a member, the discourses of 
Baykal focused on the credibility of the EU and perceived EU membership as not feasible for 
Turkey. However, CHP’s skeptic position changed towards the national elections in 2007. By 
2006, the discourses of Baykal became supportive of the EU process again and the elections 
are the most important variable to explain this change in the discourses. CHP has been 
representing the pro-EU electorates and did not want to exclude those people with their 
Eurosceptic discourses. Yet, this does not mean that CHP became supportive of the EU 
process under any circumstances. The discourses of Baykal show that especially under the 
concept of “democratic opening”, party still had a Eurosceptic position, but the degree of the 
Euro-skepticism decreased. After Kılıçdaroğlu’s election as the party leader in 2010, the 
discourses became more supportive of the EU and the reform process but this time, the effect 
of the 2011 elections should also be taken into account. Therefore it is clear that for CHP, 
elections have become a factor that increased the pro-EU speeches in the discourses of the 
party leaders.  
The governing party, AKP is also identified as a pro-EU party; supportive of the accession 
process and the reforms. In his discourses, Erdoğan has been focusing on the importance of 
EU membership for Turkey and for the EU itself. In addition, the party leader has been stating 
that the reforms are necessary for the citizens of Turkey to increase the level of democracy. 
While the party has been supportive of the process, the only significant change in the 
discourses occurred when the discourses of the party leaders of the EU member states started 
to discuss the possibility of establishment of privileged partnership for Turkey. Opposing to 
any kind of privileged partnership, the AKP leader insisted that they would continue the 
reform process because they reform process is fundamental for the democratization in Turkey. 
Yet, this opposition did not dominate the discourses of Erdoğan and with the year 2005, the 
opening of the accession negotiations, the discourses became more supportive again. 
The discourses of the Kurdish political parties have always been supportive of the EU 
process with the idea that the EU accession process will bring reforms that are beneficial for 
the Kurdish people and Turkey will have to adopt these changes to be a member of EU. In 
addition, the EU has been seen as a party that could balance the inequality in the power 
relations between the Kurdish political parties and the Turkish state by supporting the hand of 
the Kurdish political parties. However, the criticisms of the EU on the Kurdish political 
parties especially on the recognition of PKK as a terrorist organization have created tension 
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between the EU and the Kurdish parties. Yet, because the EU has been considered as an 
effective actor in the Kurdish conflict, the discourses on EU’s influence over the Kurdish 
conflict did not change. However, while the Turkish political parties have criticized the EU’s 
influence over the conflict, the Kurdish political parties criticized the Turkish state for not 
taking the necessary measures to put a peaceful end to the Kurdish conflict.   
This study reveals that the discourses against the reforms on the Kurdish conflict also 
employed anti-EU and anti-AKP discourses and in fact, the lines between these three issues 
became vague. While the influence of the EU on the reform process on the Kurdish conflict is 
usually criticized by the Turkish political parties, the anti-AKP discourse has also been used 
to criticize the reform process. The rationale behind including AKP in the discourses against 
the reform process is that, the AKP government has always underlined their commitment to 
the EU accession process and has been the main sponsor and supporter of the reforms. 
Therefore, while the reforms and the accession process became identified with the AKP 
government and in fact, as many discourses show, the discourses against the reform process 
and EU accession also became a part of the anti-AKP discourse. Even though the Kurdish 
political parties are supportive of the reform process, in their discourses, AKP has been 
identified as an actor who did not take the necessary steps for the peaceful solution of the 
Kurdish conflict, and that became a criticism directed at AKP under the umbrella of Kurdish 
conflict.  
The similarities in the discourses of the Turkish opposition parties are not limited anti-EU 
anti-AKP discourses, but also include the references to the nodal points. In the discourses, the 
definitions of the Kurdish issue and the Kurds are the problematic issues and even though 
they are constantly referred to by each political actor, one can’t find a solid definition and 
consensus on the nature of the issue. Instead, meanings differ largely between the political 
actors and that can be extracted from their discourses. One of the commonalities of the 
discourses is the use of the concepts ‘national sovereignty’, ‘democracy’, and ‘human rights’ 
by the domestic political actors. In fact, the use of these concepts in the discourses represents 
the deadlocks in the conflict, because just as the discursive nodal points are the concepts that 
are commonly referred but not well specified, these three concepts are also remain as vague 
concepts even though they are frequently referred. For instance, the argument of democracy 
has been used by each political actor; however, the most basic questions remain unanswered. 
The political actors refrain from specifying which reform package would foster democracy or 
which rights should be provided so that the level of democracy would increase. Therefore, 
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while reference to these concepts is common, because of lack of a concensus on their 
definitions, the actors experience hard times to move forward for the peaceful resolution of 
the conflict.  
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CHAPTER 6: COCLUDIG REMARKS 
 
During the accession negotiations, the European Union affects the candidate countries 
by inducing reform packages, requiring structural changes and influencing the domestic 
political structures in favor of an actor for resolution of a conflict. However, the accession 
process is not shaped only by the EU. The domestic political actors become the crucial actors 
who determine the pace and effectiveness of the process. Furthermore, the domestic political 
actors are the ones who are influential over the people of the candidate country in favor or 
against the reform process. As the EU accession process is a representative of a two-level 
game, the influence of the domestic political actors increases. In Turkey’s accession 
negotiations, the reforms on the Kurdish conflict demonstrate a significant example of how 
the domestic actors shape the reform process and how their discourses construct the public 
opinion and frame the issue.  
The Turkish political party leaders avoid manifesting their ideas on the EU accession 
process in detail and usually indicate whether they are supportive of the process or not. In 
order to have a deeper analysis of the discourses, discourse-historical analysis becomes the 
approach to take. Studying the discourses of the political party leaders reveals the arguments 
of the parties on the Kurdish conflict and the rationale behind using these arguments. Apart 
from presenting the views of the domestic political actors, the discourse-historical approach 
also demonstrates how these ideas are used by the actors to influence the public opinion and 
to legitimize their arguments, how certain arguments are re-shaped and constructed in time 
and what kind of a trend and change is visible in the discourses in relation to the political 
developments. The historical context also provides information on how the discourses are 
constructed in response to certain developments and contributes to the discourse analysis by 
including the effects of the context on the discourses. Therefore, the study of discourses 
reveals how the power relations and certain arguments are the manifested and reconstructed 
through the discourses of the political party leaders whose speeches are influential for the 
masses. 
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This study demonstrates that while Europeanization, which has been identified as one 
of the main conflict resolution strategies of European Union, is expected to contribute to the 
resolution of the Kurdish conflict through accession reforms; these positive developments 
may not be reflected to the discourses of the political party leaders. The Kurdish Conflict 
represents an issue of national unity and existence for Turkey and the discourses of the party 
leaders confirm that even though the parties may have soft-Eurosceptic positions, they may 
adopt hard-Eurosceptic positions on the issues of national unity. This differentiation is 
essential in understanding the Eurosceptic positions of the parties because while there is a 
broad literature on the importance of the party’s position, (whether in the government or in 
the opposition) and the ideology (ultranationalistic, social democratic…) on the Eurosceptic 
position of the party, what kinds of issue areas dominate Euroscepticism is not discussed 
enough. In addition, the discourses on these issue areas are used to influence the public 
opinion and shape the political environment, therefore not only their significance of preseting 
the party positions, but also their representativeness of the public opinion become more 
significant. 
Furthermore, this study suggests that in the construction of discourses, the EU has 
been used as a means to criticize the reform process and the governing party, AKP, by other 
political parties. While EU uses its transformative power through reform process, aims to 
improve the rights of the Turkish citizens of all ethnic background, and encourages peaceful 
resolution of the conflict through democratization, the domestic political reactions of the 
Turkish parties to the EU is not supportive of EU’s involvement in the conflict in general. In 
fact, even the soft-Eurosceptic parties carry reservations about the reform process and use the 
EU involvement in the conflict as a means to criticize the policies of the government. Because 
of this approach, the positions on the EU accession process, the attitude towards the 
governing party and the Kurdish conflict become entangled. In fact, it is visible in the 
discourses of the party leaders that they combine their views on the EU and the Kurdish 
conflict and in their references, these issues are depicted as being representative of different 
sides of the same coin.  
This study analyzes the EU accession negotiations as a two-level game, where the 
governing party has to continue negotiations both at the international level and at the domestic 
level for the reform packages to be adopted and to make Turkey a member of the EU. 
However, this task is becoming more challenging especially for the reforms related to the 
Kurdish Conflict. Supported with the skepticisms towards EU’s involvement in the issue, the 
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Turkish opposition parties demonstrate a Eurosceptic position whereas the Kurdish political 
parties have been supportive of the reform process and EU’s involvement in the conflict as a 
third party, even though they do not elaborate on their positions towards EU accession in 
detail but broadly underline that they are supportive of the membership process. This study 
suggests that the domestic political actors revolve around the same issues without making 
proper identifications and descriptions. Especially the discourses of the Turkish opposition 
parties frame the Kurdish conflict in a way that is supportive of the status quo and are usually 
against the developments which may create new channels for communication. However, if a 
more positive and communicative language is to be adopted, instead of preserving the 
contemporary discourses which are leading to the deadlocks in communication, a new chapter 
which leads the way to peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict can be opened.  
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Appendix  
(1) Avrupa Birliği Türkiye’yi içine kabul etmeyi istememekte, bunu hazmedememektedir. 
Bu dışlayıcı tutumun temelinde yatan gerçek neden, din ve kültür farklılıklarıdır. 
Hristiyan dünyasının medeniyet projesi olarak görülen ve ilham kaynağı bu değerler 
olan AB içinde Türkiye’nin yeri yoktur. 
(2) AB’ye tam üye olarak… ülkemizi, AB içindeki en yüksek standartlar doğrultusunda 
bir özgürlükler ülkesi haline getirebiliriz. Sahip olduğumuz tarihi ve kültürel mirasla, 
"medeniyetler çatışması" tezlerini çürütüp, "medeniyetler uyumu"nun en sağlam 
örneğini, Avrupa’yla elele inşa edebiliriz. 
(3) Tam üye olan ülkeler bile şu anda AB müktesebatını yerine getirmiş değildir…Tüm 
bunlara rağmen eğer Türkiye Aralık 2004’ten sonra bekletilecek olursa burada başka 
şey aramaya başlarız. Bu nedir? Bu, mensubu olduğumuz medeniyettir. Avrupalı 
dostlarımıza söylediğimiz şudur: Avrupa medeniyetler çatışmasının adresi haline 
gelmemelidir… Türkiye AB’ye medeniyetler uzlaşmasının bir temsilcisi olarak 
girecektir. 
(4) Gördüğüm rüya, medeniyetler çatışmasının dünyayı bir alacakaranlık kuşağına 
çevirmeye çalışması karşısında, AB'ye girmiş bir Türkiye'nin 'medeniyetler 
buluşması'nın en sağlam köprüsünü olacağını gösteriyor. 
(5) Medeniyetler çatışması temel tezimiz olmamalı. Fransa kamuoyunda şimdiden 
Türkiye Müslüman ülke, Avrupalı değil diye tepkiler oluştu. Onlarla benzer 
yanlarımızı ortaya çıkaran tezleri konuşmalıyız. 
(6) Bazı çevreler, 11 Eylül’ü "medeniyetler ve dinler savaşı"nın habercisi olarak 
göstermeye çalışmaktadırlar. Türkiye AB’yle bütünleşmesini tamamladığında, tüm 
dünya Doğu ile Batının, Hristiyanlık ile Müslümanlığın birarada ahenk içinde 
varolabileceğini görecektir. 
(7) Onlarla benzer yanlarımızı ortaya çıkaran tezleri konuşmalıyız. 1920’lerde Atatürk 
devrimleriyle başlayan çağdaşlaşma mücadelemizi öne çıkarmalıyız. Türkiye AB’ye 
giriyorsa, 80 yıl önce Atatürk devrimleriyle başlayan, çağdaş hukuk sistemini kabul 
etmesi, demokrasi, özgürlük ve kadın hakları konusunda çağdaş değerleri 
benimsemesi sayesindedir. 
(8) AB üyeliği bu yolda bir araçtır, asıl amaç Türkiye'yi muasır medeniyet seviyesinin 
ötelerine taşımaktır.  
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(9) Başbakanın Diyarbakır'da yaptığı sözde demokratik açılımla, bölücü teröre meşruiyet 
kazandıracak sürecin başlaması, adım adım gelinen çözülmenin kilometre taşları 
olmuştur.  
(10) Biz sorunu terör sorunu olarak tanımlamıyoruz. Bilimsel bir tespit yapılması  
gerektiğine inanıyorum. Biz sorunun Kürt halkının sosyal kültürel ve insani haklarının 
reddedilmesi olarak görüyoruz.  
(11) Türkiye’nin bir Kürt sorunu vardır. Bu sorunla yüzleşecek özgüvenimiz ve demokratik 
cesaretimiz de vardır. Ama bu sorunun teröre alet edilmesini asla kabul edemeyiz. 
(12) Dünya PKK’yı terör örgütü ilan ederken bu ülkede sizler canileri koruyacak, şehidimiz 
diye takdim edeceksiniz, ondan sonra da bu ülkenin başbakanından ilgi 
bekleyeceksiniz... Kitabımızda yok böyle bir şey. Önce PKK’nın terör örgütü olduğunu 
ilan et, sonra seninle konuşayım. 
(13) Bu tür dayatmalardan artık vazgeçilmesi gerektiğine inanıyoruz. ‘Partinin neye ne 
diyeceğine kendisi karar versin. 
(14) Bizler, Kürtlerin azınlık olmadığını savunuyoruz. Hiçbir zaman Kürtler kendilerini 
azınlık olarak görmemişler, böyle de ifade etmemişlerdir. Kürtler, Cumhuriyetin asli 
kurucularıdır. 
(15) Türkiye’de ‘Kürt azınlığı’ diye bir kavram yoktur. Kürtler ülkemizi oluşturan 
unsurlardan birisidir. 
(16) Hani benim Kürt kökenli vatandaşlarımı da azınlık olarak tanımlayanlar var ya işte 
bunlar hep bilgisizlikten cehaletten geliyor. Benim Kürt kökenli vatandaşım bu ülkenin 
azınlıkları tanımına girmez. Onlar bu ülkenin asli unsurudur. 
(17) Görevimiz, Türkiye’yi demokratik bir cumhuriyet yapmaya yönelik olacak. 
Kardeşleşmeye yönelik bir çaba olacak. Kürt halkını kendi kimliğini, kültürünü özgürce 
kullanabileceği bir ortamı sağlayama yönelik olacak. 
(18) Bin yıldır birlikte yaşadığımız, ortak kardeşlik hukuku ve akrabalık bağları 
geliştirdiğimiz Kürt kökenli kardeşlerimiz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin eşit haklara sahip 
onurlu bireyleridir. 
(19) Kürtler, Cumhuriyetin asli kurucularıdır. Bu sıfatlarıyla da Anasayasa ve yasalardaki 
haklarını kullanmak istemektedirler. 
(20) Bizim ciddi sorunlarımızdan biriside Güneydoğu arkadaşlar... Akılla, mantıkla, 
cumhuriyetin değerlerine sahip çıkarak, insan haklarına sahip çıkarak, özgürlüklere 
sahip çıkarak, yurttaş haklarını tanıyarak demokrasi ekseninde bu sorunu çözeceğiz. 
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(21) AB'den ülkemiz adına beklediğimiz elbette önemli şeyler var. Ancak, bunun ötesine 
geçmek, yapay azınlık tartışmaları başlatarak konuyu özünden saptırmak kimseye yarar 
sağlamaz... Kürt, Arnavut, Arap, Çerkez, Gürcü tüm bu kesimler, toplumun asli 
unsurudurlar. 
(22) Avrupa Birliğinin…Türkiye’de zorla milli azınlık yaratılmasını amaçlayan 
dayatmaları… bu noktaya gelinmesinin başlıca amilleri olmuştur. 
(23) Avrupa Birliği’nin Türkiye’den esasen istediği, kademeli bir süreç içinde bu milli 
azınlıklara siyasi ve hukuki statü tanınması ve bunun Anayasa’da ifadesini bulmasıdır. 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin eşit haklara sahip vatandaşları arasında böyle bir ayırım ve 
sınıflandırma yapılmasının Türkiye’nin milli birliğini tahrip edeceği ve karşımıza etnik 
çatışma ve ayrışma sürecini çıkaracağı çok açıktır. 
(24) Kürt sorunu, demokrasinin geliştirilmesi çerçevesinde çözümlenebilir ve bunun için de 
zemin oldukça uygundur. 
(25) Demokratik reformların derinleştirilerek Türkiye'nin değişimini ve dönüşümünü 
sağlamaktır. Bu anlamda DTP, Türkiye'nin AB sürecine büyük önem vermekte ve 
desteklemektedir. 
(26) AB zorladığı için değil, Türk insanının haklarını en üst düzeyde kullanması için 
hukuki düzenlemeler yapılıyor. Demokratik hakların hiçbir vatandaştan esirgenemez. 
(27) Bu sebeple 'Kürt sorunu ne olacak?' diyenlere diyorum ki bu ülkenin başbakanı olarak 
o sorun herkesten önce benim sorunumdur. Bu memleketin başka bir meselesini de bana 
soracak olsalar onlara da şunu derim, o mesele de herkesten önce benim meselemdir. 
Biz büyük bir devletiz ve millet olarak bu ülkeyi kuranların bize miras bıraktığı temel 
prensipler ve cumhuriyet ilkesi, Anayasal düzen dahilinde her sorunu daha çok 
demokrasi daha çok vatandaşlık hukuku daha çok refahla çözeceğiz, bu anlayışla 
çözüyoruz ve çözeceğiz de. 
(28) Terör sorunu ile bir toplumsal sorunu birbirinden kesin hatlarla ayırmak gerekiyor, ben 
de bunu yapıyorum. Terör sorunu ayrıdır. Ona karşı mücadele elbette azimle kararlılıkla 
devam edecektir. Bu konuda gereği neyse o da eksiksiz yapılacaktır. Ama diğer taraftan 
bu toplumsal meselenin halli, vatandaşın kazanılması için de sosyo ekonomik, kültürel 
bir takım çözümlerin üretilmesi gerekiyor. 
(29) Yol haritasında netleştirilmesi gereken ikinci husus, Türkiye’nin demokrasi 
konusundaki ilerleyişini bireysel hak ve özgürlükler temelinde demokratikleşme olarak 
kabul etmek ve ettirmektir. Bu konuda gereken her türlü adımı elbette Türkiye atar. 
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Atacaktır. Ama kolektif hak ve özgürlükler biçiminde, Türkiye’ye yönelik bir dayatma 
yapılmasına kesinlikle evet demeyeceğimizi netleştirmemiz lazım. 
(30) CHP, etnik husumet anlayışını kesinlikle gütmez. Herkes ana dilini bilecek, 
öğrenecek; yayınını yapacak, gazetesini çıkartacak. Ve şu bilinmelidir ki biz herkesi 
seviyoruz, Kürtleri de çok seviyoruz. 
(31) Kürt Kültürel Hakları konusunda çalışmalara devam edilmelidir. Ozellikle ülkenin 
güney doğusunda özel yayın hakkı ve fırsat eşitliği getirilmelidir. Siyasi açıdan feodal 
ve seçici bir anlayış beraberinde sadece terörü getirecektir. Bunun yerine eğitim, sağlık, 
kadın hakları konusuna yoğunlaşmalıyız. 
(32) AKP'nin tam bir teslimiyet sergilediği Avrupa Birliği, vatandaşlarımızdan bazılarını 
milli ve etnik azınlık olarak görmüş, kültürel hakların da ötesinde olduğunu iddia ettiği 
etnik farklılıklara siyasi statü kazandırılmasını ve bunun Anayasamızda açıkça 
tanınmasını teklif etmiştir. Nitekim sözde insan hakları, özgürlükler ve demokrasinin 
geliştirilmesi adına… Başbakanın Diyarbakır'da yaptığı sözde demokratik açılımla, 
bölücü teröre meşruiyet kazandıracak sürecin başlaması, adım adım gelinen çözülmenin 
kilometre taşları olmuştur. 
(33) Artık inkâr edilemeyecek kadar aydınlanan PKK ve AKP arasındaki işbirliği ve 
yakınlaşma sürecindeki hedef ve taleplerin beş ana noktada örtüştüğü anlaşılmaktadır. 
Bunlar; a. Türk milli kimliğinin yeniden tanımlanarak değiştirilmesi, Türkiyelilik 
zırvasının üst kimlik olarak benimsenmesi, 
b. Türkçe dışındaki dillerin kademeli olarak eğitim sistemi içine alınması ve 
kamu hizmetlerinde kullanılmasının sağlanması, 
c. Millet kavramının çözülerek bir vatanda çok milletli bir yapı içinde etnik 
kimlikle siyaset ve örgütlenme hakkının tanınması, 
d. Başta Đmralı canisi olmak üzere teröristlere af çıkartılarak yalnızca toplumsal 
hayata değil, aynı zamanda siyasal sisteme katılmalarının da sağlanması, 
e. Üniter yapının yıkılarak “yerinden yönetim” adı altında önce demokratik 
özerklik, ardından artık her ortamda bahsedilen eyaletler sistemine geçişin 
sağlanmasıdır. 
(34) Eğer Sayın Başbakan bu açıklamamızı değerlendirirse her türlü işbirliği ve katkıya 
hazırım. 
(35) Öyle anlaşılıyor ki Avrupa ülkelerinin gözünde Türkiye'nin AB'ye üyeliği, gerçekçi bir 
siyasi hedef olmaktan çıkmıştır. Türkiye, AB'ye tam üye olmayacaksa, bunu bilmemiz 
lazım. 
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(36) Avrupa Birliği'nin Türkiye'yi eşit haklara sahip bir üye olarak içine almaya niyetli 
olmadığı artık bütün çıplaklığıyla anlaşılmıştır. Sanal müzakere sürecinde Türkiye'nin 
tam üyeliği nihai hedef olmaktan çıkarılmış, bu müzakereler AKP hükümetinin de 
rızasıyla böyle bir zeminde başlatılmıştır. Türkiye'nin önüne konulan hedef, ucu açık bir 
sanal müzakere sürecinin sonunda Avrupa Birliği'nin yörüngesinde kalacağı bir taabiyet 
ilişkisidir. 
(37) Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik sürecinde Kıbrıs değil Kürt sorununun belirleyici olacaktır. 
(38) Terör örgütü ve etnik bölücülerin siyasi gündeminin savunucusu olan Avrupa Birliği, 
Başbakan’ın taşeronluğunu yaptığı bu yıkım projesini bu nedenle tarihi fırsat olarak 
görmektedir. 
(39) Avrupa Birliğinin de sayısız dayatmalarından biri olan alt kimliklerin milli azınlık 
olarak tanınması, bu yapay ayrıma Anayasa teminatı altında siyasi ve hukuki statü 
kazandırılması, Türk milletinden ayrı bir millet yaratma arayışları ile bunu sağlamak 
üzere öncelikle ana dilde yayın ve eğitim imkânı sağlanması bu yıkım projesinin temel 
stratejisidir. 
(40) AKP’nin politikalarının her konuda iflas ettiği, yaşanan olaylar ve acı tecrübelerle 
sabittir. Türk Milletine her anlamda çöküntü yaşatan ve Türkiye’yi bir enkaza çeviren 
AKP, büyük bir yalan pazarlaması ve umut ticaretiyle ayakta kalmaya çaba 
harcamaktadır. 
(41) Kürt açılımı adı altında Türkiye’nin milli birliğine ve varlığına kastetmeyi amaçlayan 
yıkım projesinin taşeronu olan Başbakan Anayasa suçu işlemeye teşebbüs halindedir. 
AKP 2002 yılında iktidara geldiği dönemde terörün neredeyse sıfıra indiği bir Türkiye 
devralmıştır. Aradan geçen yedi yılda terör karşısında acz ve teslimiyet içine girmiş, 
terörle mücadeleyi bilinçli olarak zaafa uğratmış ve bölücülerin ümit ve cesaret kaynağı 
olmuştur.  
(42) Bugün vardığımız noktada, AB’ye tam üye olarak, hem Avrupa’nın, hem de küresel 
dengelerin yeniden şekillenmesi sürecine bilfiil katkıda bulunabiliriz. Kendi 
çıkarlarımızı, "büyük Avrupa ailesinin üyesi"  olarak çok daha etkin ve güçlü biçimde 
savunabiliriz. Bir model ülke olarak, Avrupa değerlerinin daha da yayılmasına, 
güçlenmesine destek olabiliriz. Ülkemizi, AB içindeki en yüksek standartlar 
doğrultusunda bir özgürlükler ülkesi haline getirebiliriz. Sahip olduğumuz tarihi ve 
kültürel mirasla, "medeniyetler çatışması" tezlerini çürütüp, "medeniyetler uyumu"nun 
en sağlam örneğini, Avrupa’yla elele inşa edebiliriz. 
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(43) Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkisi, iki tarafın da yararına olacağını umduğumuz bir 
menfaatler ve değerler buluşmasıdır. 
(44) Türkiye ve AB’yi birbirine bağlayan, ortak siyasi, ekonomik ve stratejik çıkarlarıdır. 
Türkiye AB’ye tam üye olduğunda, laik, dışa dönük ve girişimci kimliğiyle, nüfusu ve 
büyüklüğüyle, özel siyasi ve stratejik etkinliğiyle öncü bir rol oynayacaktır. Türkiye bu 
suretle, kendi düşünce ve çıkarlarını AB karar ve politikalarına yansıtma şansını elde 
edecektir. 
(45) Biz, AB’ye üyeliği bir amaç olarak değil, Türk halkını hakettiği çağdaş uygarlık 
seviyesine ulaştırmak için bir araç olarak görüyoruz. 
(46) Türkiye’de terörden beslenen, terörle iç içe girmiş etnik bölücülük sorununun tanımı 
ve çözümü konularında çok tehlikeli bir kayma yaşanmaktadır. Burada ilk planda 
yapılması amaçlanan, bu soruna meşru kimlik ve hak talebi temelinde yeni bir tanım ve 
statü kazandırılmasıdır. Bugün Türkiye’nin karşısına çıkartılan güvenlik ve bölücülük 
sorunu, özü itibariyle bir demokratik hak talebi, bireysel özgürlük, çoğulcu demokrasi 
ve siyasal katılım sorunu değildir. Bu sorun, etnik bölünmeyi amaçlayan silahlı terör 
sorunudur. 
(47) TRT eliyle Kürtçe yayın yapma, üniversitelerde Kürtçe enstitülerini kurma, Kürtçeyi 
seçmeli ders olarak müfredata alma çabaları ve daha ileri adımlar atma konusundaki 
niyetleri bu yönde AKP’nin bölücülere vadeli ümit ve cesaret verme hedefi olarak 
görülmelidir. 
(48) Kamusal alanda, Türkçe dışındaki bir dilin kullanımı konusundaki ısrarlar, millet 
oluşturma yolunda atılan tehlikeli adımlardır. 
(49) Günümüz uluslararası sistemi, kuvvetli bir küreselleşme süreci içindedir. Böyle bir 
sistemde, bölgesel blokların dışında kalmak her ülke için potansiyel bir tehlikedir. 
(50) Erdoğan’ın ‘Kürt sorunu vardır’ ve ‘daha fazla demokrasi ile çözülecektir’ söylemi 
Başbakan’ı Đmralı’yla pazarlığa götürecek bir söylemdir. Ne deniliyor, hele silahları bir 
bırakın, arkası gelir? Neyin arkası gelecek. Yani silah bırakılacak, arkadan af gelecek, 
sonra siyasi hakların iadesi vesaire. Hükümet çok tehlikeli, yanlış istikamete girmiştir. 
(51) ABD destekli, AB patentli, Peşmerge onaylı ve Đmralı imzalı bu yıkımın sözde 
demokratikleşme, özgürlük ve insan hakları ambalajıyla hükümet tarafından 
pazarlanmak istenmektedir. 
(52) Devletin, Kürt sorununda adil ve demokratik bir siyasal çözümü hala 
benimsememesini üzücü buluyoruz. Bu dönemde kurulan hükümetlerin; kalıcı, siyasal, 
sosyal, ekonomik programlar yerine sonuç vermeyen birtakım yasal düzenlemeleri 
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tercih ettiğinin farkındayız... Kürtçe yayının, devlet radyo ve televizyonlarında 
başlaması, kuşkusuz bir dile, bir kültüre karşı, neredeyse yüz yıldır sürdürülen yok 
sayma ya da inkar anlayışının sona erdirilmesi bakımından son derece önemli bir adım 
olmuştur. 
(53) Kürt vatandaşlarından yüzde 85 oy almış bir başbakanım. Ayrım yok, anayasal 
vatandaşlık var. 
(54) Bizim için böyle bir sorun yoktur. Bizim burada temel yaklaşımımız, vatandaşlık 
bilinci içinde tüm vatandaşlarımıza olan yaklaşımdır. Şu anda Türkiye'de ne kadar etnik 
unsur varsa, aynı mesafedeyiz. Bunlar arasında en ufak bir ayrıma giremeyiz. 
(55) Doğu'da da bir sorun olsa benim sorunumdur, Güneydoğu'da da, batıda da, 
Akdeniz'de, Karadeniz'de aklınıza neresi gelirse ülkenin her yerinde, her metrekaresinde 
bir sorun olsa, bu Başbakan olarak benim sorunumdur. Ama diğer siyasi liderler bunu 
sorun olarak duymuyorsa bu beni ilgilendirmez. Ve 'ayrımcılık' gibi ifadeler 
kullanıyorlar, bu siyasi ahlaka ve terbiyeye sığmaz. Ben 72 milyon vatan evladının 
hepsini ayrımcılık yapmadan bağrıma basıyorum. 
(56) Kürt sorunu bu milletin bir parçasının değil, hepsinin sorudur...Bütün sorunlar Türk 
olsun, Kürt olsun, Çerkez olsun, Abaza olsun, Laz olsun bütün Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
vatandaşlarının ortak sorunudur. 
(57) Türkiye'de Kürt kökenli vatandaşın sorunu Türk vatandaşın sorunu ne kadarsa o 
kadardır. Laz kökenli vatandaşın sorunu ne kadarsa Türk kökenli vatandaşın sorunu da 
o kadardır... Parlamentoya girmekse parlamentodalar. Türkiye'de en üst düzey 
yönetimlere gelmekse Türkiye'de en üst düzey yönetimlere gelmiştir. Hiçbir sıkıntıları 
yoktur. 
(58) Bütün barış ve demokrasi arayışlarımıza rağmen, devletin her demokratik süreç 
olanağı ortaya çıktığında Kürtlere daha sert şekilde yöneldiğini görüyoruz. Devletin 
mevcut yapısıyla çözümsüzlükte ısrar ettiğini görüyoruz. 
(59) Peki bu ülkede etnik unsurların sorunları var mı? Var. Türk'ünün de, Kürt'ünün de, 
Laz'ının da, Çerkez'inin de, Gürcü'sünün de, Abhaza'sının da, Roman'ının da, hepsinin 
kendine göre sorunları var. Şimdi bu sorunlara eğilmek yanlış mı?...Bu ülkede 
azınlıkların sorunu yok mu? Var. ...bir kişi dahi olsa sen devletsin o sorunu çözeceksin 
arkadaş, çözeceksin, senin görevin bu. 
(60) Terör ve etnik bölücülükle mücadele, hükümetin Anayasal görevi ve sorumluluğudur. 
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(61) Atatürk’ün gösterdiği yolda çağdaş Batı medeniyetini yakalamış, laik, demokratik ve 
müreffeh bir Türkiye, ortak idealimizdir. AB ise bizi bu ideale taşıyacak en etkili ve 
önemli araçtır. 
(62) Atatürk diyor ki; “Biz Balkanları niçin kaybettik biliyor musunuz? Bunun bir tek 
sebebi vardır; bu da, Đslâv araştırma cemiyetlerinin kurduğu dil kurumlarıdır. Bizim 
içimizdeki insanların, millî şuurlarını uyardığı zaman, biz Balkanlardan Trakya 
hudutlarına çekildik.” 
(63) Nitekim, terör örgütünün 2002 yılında kabul edilen siyasallaşma stratejisinde “Kürt 
kimliğinin tanınması kapsamında yerel dilin geliştirilmesi ve yaygınlaştırılması” birinci 
öncelikli hedef olarak ortaya konulmuştur. Bu şekilde ilk köprübaşı tutulmuş, aradan 
geçen altı yıl içinde bu konuda daha ileri adımlar atılması için her zorlama yapılmış ve 
nihayet 1 Ocak 2009 itibariyle bir kamu tüzel kişisi olan TRT’nin Kürtçe yayına 
başlaması noktasına gelinmiştir. Bize göre bu tarih itibariyle milli bir devlet yapısı 
hükümet eliyle ihanete uğrayarak arkadan hançerlenmiş ve ölümcül bir darbe almıştır. 
(64) Türkiye, yapay azınlık tartışmaları ile bir tuzağın içine çekilmeye çalışılıyor. Türk 
halkı, bu tuzağa düşmeyecek kadar deneyimlidir. 
(65) Bugün vardığımız noktada, AB’ye tam üye olarak, hem Avrupa’nın, hem de küresel 
dengelerin yeniden şekillenmesi sürecine bilfiil katkıda bulunabiliriz. Kendi 
çıkarlarımızı, "büyük Avrupa ailesinin üyesi"  olarak çok daha etkin ve güçlü biçimde 
savunabiliriz. 
(66) Türkiye AB’ye medeniyetler uzlaşmasının bir temsilcisi olarak girecektir. 
(67) Gördüğüm rüya, medeniyetler çatışmasının dünyayı bir alacakaranlık kuşağına 
çevirmeye çalışması karşısında, AB'ye girmiş bir Türkiye'nin 'medeniyetler 
buluşması'nın en sağlam köprüsünü olacağını gösteriyor. 
(68) Milliyetçi Hareket, Avrupa Birliğinin vatandaşlarımızın bir bölümünü milli ve etnik 
azınlık olarak görmesinin tehlikelerine vurgu yaparken; AKP zihniyeti bunu çağdaşlık 
saymış, Brüksel’den aldığı talimatları uygulamanın hevesiyle bugünkü yıkım noktasına 
gelinmiştir. 
(69) Türk milleti ve milli kimlik kavramlarının yeniden tanımlanarak farklı etnik 
kimliklerin kurucu kimlikler olarak Anayasa teminatı altına alınması; Kürtçe’nin eğitim 
ve siyasi iletişim dili olarak resmen kabulü ve Türkiye’nin üniter siyasi yapısının “özerk 
bölge-eyalet sistemi” temelinde yıkımının alt yapısının hazırlanması, bu ihanet 
projesinin temel ayakları olarak belirlenmiştir. 
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(70) Türkçeden başka dillerde, TRT’den yapılacak tam gün yayın anlayışı, PKK terör 
örgütünün dağ kadrosunun silahlı baskısına ve şehirdeki uzantılarının ise siyasal 
taleplerine karşı tam bir teslimiyetin ifadesidir. 
(71) Türkiye, yapay azınlık tartışmaları ile bir tuzağın içine çekilmeye çalışılıyor. Türk 
halkı, bu tuzağa düşmeyecek kadar deneyimlidir. 
